Petitioners
Police Department of the City of Chicago, et al.
Respondent
Earl Mosley
Petitioners' Claim
That a Chicago city ordinance banning labor-related picketing next to a school was constitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Richard L. Curry
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Harvey J. Barnett
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., WilliamH. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1972
Decision
Denied the petitioners' claim and reversed the decision of the U.S. DistrictCourt for the Northern District of Illinois, affirming the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the Chicago ordinance banning non-labor demonstrations next to schools violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Significance
The ruling extended protection of an individual's right to freedom of speechand assembly which the Court had previously affirmed by striking down state ordinances banning demonstrations in the vicinity of state capitols: Gregory v. City of Chicago (1969) and parks: Niemotko v. Maryland (1951).
Public Forum Doctrine
Public demonstrations for social, political, or labor causes have been a partof American life since before the establishment of the United States. In fact, demonstrations played a major role in spurring the American Revolution, and the founding fathers were undoubtedly looking to protect public political expression in the writing of the First Amendment. Likewise, the Supreme Courthas consistently ruled in favor of free public expression of political beliefs within certain parameters. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (1939) the Court established the public forum doctrine. This doctrine maintains that government may not prohibit free political speech or relatedactivities, including demonstrations, distribution of printed materials, andpublic speaking in favor of or opposing various policies or organizations. During the 1960s the public forum doctrine was repeatedly challenged, as public demonstrations became commonplace.
In August of 1967 Earl Mosley, an employee of the U.S. Postal Department, began a solitary protest against the hiring and admissions policies of the JonesCommercial High School in Chicago, Illinois. By the standards of the 1960s,a decade replete with violent demonstrations, Mosley's protest was quite unobtrusive. His usual method of operations consisted of walking back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the school carry a placard bearing a slogan, suchas "Jones High School Practices Black Discrimination. Jones High School Has ABlack Quota." Mosley always conducted himself in an orderly manner, and hisprotest was entirely nonviolent. On 26 March 1968, with Mosley's protest still in progress, the city of Chicago passed Municipal Code Chapter 193-1 (i), which prohibited
Legal Proceedings
Mosley argued that Chapter 193-1 (i) punished activities protected by the First Amendment and that the ordinance also denied him equal protection in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court was unmoved by these arguments, however, and Mosley was forced to take his case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, holding that since Chapter 193-1 (i) prohibited even peaceful protesting of many kinds it was too broad and "patently unconstitutional on itsface." The Chicago Police Department then appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 19 January 1972.
Time, Place, and Manner and Equal Protection
In addition to the public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court has developed thetime, place, and manner rule for the adjudication of freedom of speech questions. This rule allows for regulation of certain types of speech by reason ofits time, place, and manner, for instance, a zoning ordinance regulating theplacement of adult theaters and bookstores, while not enabling governments to restrain speech in general. In considering cases under this rule, the Courthas invariably held in favor of government regulation of speech only where there is a clear necessity for such regulation to maintain a public interest and such regulation is applied without distinction. As such, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this case, ruling by a vote of 9-0that Chicago Municipal Code Chapter 193-1 (i) was unconstitutional in that itexempted peaceful labor picketing from its ban of demonstrations within 150feet of school grounds. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted that the Court struck down the Chicago ordinance only because, by exempting peaceful labor demonstrations, it did not seek to regulate speech based on that speech's time, place, and manner of conveyance, but rather its content.
Impact
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley occupies an important place asan example of the application of the public forum doctrine and the time, place, and manner rule. The decision in this case was in keeping with those of Edwards v. South Carolina (1966) and Niemotko v. Maryland (1951)in that it denied states the right to ban protests occurring near specific buildings or locations. In subsequent rulings the primacy of the time, place, and manner rule and, in particular, the public forum doctrine have diminishedto some extent, and the Court has often upheld ordinances and statutes regulating speech as long as such regulations apply equally with regard to the content of said speech.
Related Cases
Police Department of the City of Chicago, et al.
Respondent
Earl Mosley
Petitioners' Claim
That a Chicago city ordinance banning labor-related picketing next to a school was constitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Richard L. Curry
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Harvey J. Barnett
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., WilliamH. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1972
Decision
Denied the petitioners' claim and reversed the decision of the U.S. DistrictCourt for the Northern District of Illinois, affirming the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the Chicago ordinance banning non-labor demonstrations next to schools violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Significance
The ruling extended protection of an individual's right to freedom of speechand assembly which the Court had previously affirmed by striking down state ordinances banning demonstrations in the vicinity of state capitols: Gregory v. City of Chicago (1969) and parks: Niemotko v. Maryland (1951).
Public Forum Doctrine
Public demonstrations for social, political, or labor causes have been a partof American life since before the establishment of the United States. In fact, demonstrations played a major role in spurring the American Revolution, and the founding fathers were undoubtedly looking to protect public political expression in the writing of the First Amendment. Likewise, the Supreme Courthas consistently ruled in favor of free public expression of political beliefs within certain parameters. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (1939) the Court established the public forum doctrine. This doctrine maintains that government may not prohibit free political speech or relatedactivities, including demonstrations, distribution of printed materials, andpublic speaking in favor of or opposing various policies or organizations. During the 1960s the public forum doctrine was repeatedly challenged, as public demonstrations became commonplace.
In August of 1967 Earl Mosley, an employee of the U.S. Postal Department, began a solitary protest against the hiring and admissions policies of the JonesCommercial High School in Chicago, Illinois. By the standards of the 1960s,a decade replete with violent demonstrations, Mosley's protest was quite unobtrusive. His usual method of operations consisted of walking back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the school carry a placard bearing a slogan, suchas "Jones High School Practices Black Discrimination. Jones High School Has ABlack Quota." Mosley always conducted himself in an orderly manner, and hisprotest was entirely nonviolent. On 26 March 1968, with Mosley's protest still in progress, the city of Chicago passed Municipal Code Chapter 193-1 (i), which prohibited
pickets or demonstrations on a public way within150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided that this subsection doesnot prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute . . .Upon hearing of the new ordinance, Mosley contacted theChicago Police Department, which informed him that under the ordinance he would be arrested if he continued his protest. As such, Mosley resumed his protest at a distance of greater than 150 feet from the school, but found that the architecture and layout of the neighborhood rendered his picketing entirelyineffective at that distance. Finding his protest stymied, Mosley sought aninjunction against Chapter 193-1 (i) in the district court.
Legal Proceedings
Mosley argued that Chapter 193-1 (i) punished activities protected by the First Amendment and that the ordinance also denied him equal protection in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court was unmoved by these arguments, however, and Mosley was forced to take his case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, holding that since Chapter 193-1 (i) prohibited even peaceful protesting of many kinds it was too broad and "patently unconstitutional on itsface." The Chicago Police Department then appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 19 January 1972.
Time, Place, and Manner and Equal Protection
In addition to the public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court has developed thetime, place, and manner rule for the adjudication of freedom of speech questions. This rule allows for regulation of certain types of speech by reason ofits time, place, and manner, for instance, a zoning ordinance regulating theplacement of adult theaters and bookstores, while not enabling governments to restrain speech in general. In considering cases under this rule, the Courthas invariably held in favor of government regulation of speech only where there is a clear necessity for such regulation to maintain a public interest and such regulation is applied without distinction. As such, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this case, ruling by a vote of 9-0that Chicago Municipal Code Chapter 193-1 (i) was unconstitutional in that itexempted peaceful labor picketing from its ban of demonstrations within 150feet of school grounds. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted that the Court struck down the Chicago ordinance only because, by exempting peaceful labor demonstrations, it did not seek to regulate speech based on that speech's time, place, and manner of conveyance, but rather its content.
Impact
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley occupies an important place asan example of the application of the public forum doctrine and the time, place, and manner rule. The decision in this case was in keeping with those of Edwards v. South Carolina (1966) and Niemotko v. Maryland (1951)in that it denied states the right to ban protests occurring near specific buildings or locations. In subsequent rulings the primacy of the time, place, and manner rule and, in particular, the public forum doctrine have diminishedto some extent, and the Court has often upheld ordinances and statutes regulating speech as long as such regulations apply equally with regard to the content of said speech.
Related Cases
- Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1966).
- Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
- City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 289(1984).
- Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
Further Readings
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of theUnited States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Whitehead, John. "Academic Freedom and the Rights of Religious Faculty."Rutherford Institute. http://campus.leaderu.com/real/ri-intro/freedom.
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