Appellant
Zwickler
Appellee
Koota, District Attorney of Kings County
Appellant's Claim
That section 781-b of the New York Penal Code violated the appellant's FirstAmendment rights.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Emanuel Redfield
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Abe Fortas, Thurgood Marshall, William O. Douglas, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan II
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 December 1967
Decision
Reversal of the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case.
Significance
Zwickler presented an important question regarding the scope of the discretion of the district court to abstain from deciding the merits of a challenge that a state statute on its face violates the Constitution. The ruling established the facts for applying the "Doctrine of Abstention." Because therewas no "special circumstance" warranting application of the abstention doctrine, a district court erred in refusing to hear a claim for a declaratory judgment. The decision established the principle that a federal court has to respect a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of hisfederal constitutional claims. The principle that abstention cannot be usedto give the state courts the first opportunity to vindicate a federal claim in First Amendment issues was established. The delay requiring recourse to thestate courts might moot the constitutional right that a plaintiff seeks to protect.
Section 781-b of the New York Penal Law makes it a crime to distribute quantities of handbills which contain statements about a candidate in any electionof public officers. The law requires that the name and post office address ofthe printer as well as that of the candidate must be on the handbill.
Zwickler was convicted of violating the statute by distributing anonymous handbills critical of the record of a U.S. Congressman seeking re-election at the 1964 elections. Zwickler appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction but offered no opinion. Zwickler then appealed to the New York Supreme Court. The court reversed the decision on thebasis of state law.
Zwickler brought suit in district court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The basis of the suit was that the New York statute was repugnant to the guarantees of free expression secured by the U.S. Constitution. His contention was that the statutesuffers from impermissible "overbreadth" that embraces anonymous handbills,both within, and outside the protection of the First Amendment.
A three-judge court, one judge dissenting, applied the doctrine of abstentionand dismissed the complaint. The court remitted the case to the New York courts to assert a constitutional challenge. Zwickler appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court accepted the case. The basis of the appeal was that the discretion of the district courts to abstain from deciding the merits a state statute violates the Constitution.
An Important Reversal
By a majority vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, and remanded the case to the lower court for judgement. The district court applied the doctrine of abstention when "special circumstances" did not exist. The Supreme Court first considered whether abstention from the declaratory judgment sought by appellant was appropriate in the absence of his request for injunctive relief. They then considered whether abstention was justified because appellant also sought an injunction against future criminal prosecutions for violation of section 781-b of the New York Penal law.
Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws during most of the nation's first century. The only exception was the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This act provided for Supreme Court review when a state court denied a federal claim. After the Civil War, the policy was completely altered when nationalism dominated political thought. Congress gave the federal judiciary increased powers. The act of 3 March 1875 was the principal means of the broadening federal domain in the area of individual rights. This statute allowed Congress to give the federal courts a vast range of power, which had lain dormantin the Constitution since 1789. The federal courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states. They became the primary and powerful forum for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.
Prior to the 1875 act, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This actallowed suit to be brought against "every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws." It gave the district courts "original jurisdiction" of actions under state law of any right secured by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that in expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary. It was a duty to givedue respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. A federal court cannot escape fromthat duty because state courts also have the solemn responsibility to guard,enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.
The judge-developed doctrine of abstention was created in 1941 in RailroadCommission of Texas v. Pullman Company. This doctrine sanctions the useof the doctrine only in narrowly limited "special circumstances." One of the"special circumstances" is the susceptibility of a state statute to interpretation by the state courts that would avoid or modify a constitutional question. The Court argued that the district court applied this maxim.
The Supreme Court said that they were not reviewing the issue of constructionof section 781-b of the New York Penal Law that would "avoid or modify the constitutional question." Zwickler's appeal was not based on the fact that thestatute is void for "vagueness." Zwickler based his constitutional attack onthe fact that the statute, although lacking neither clarity nor precision, was void for "overbreadth." This means that it violated the constitutional principle that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Koota did not contest Zwickler's suggestion that 781-b is both clear and precise.
The Court used the principle established in Livingston v. United States (1960) as a guide to its decision. The principle is expressed as:
In Turner v. City of Memphis (1962), the Court vacated an abstention order. Its basis was that a declaratory judgment action ought to have been brought in the state court, before the federal court, in a Fourteenth Amendmentissue. In McNeese v. Board of Education (1959), it was shown that abstention cannot be ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity tovindicate the federal claim. In the McNeese case, the Court concludedthat "we would defeat those purposes if we held that assertion of a federalclaim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim ina state court." The Court ruled that the district court erred in refusing the Zwickler claim for declaratory judgement since there was no "special circumstance" to satisfy the doctrine of abstention.
Zwickler asked for an injunction against further prosecutions in violation ofsection 781-b of the New York penal code. He wanted to continue to distribute anonymous handbills in quantity in connection with election of party officials. The majority of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that abstention from deciding the declaratory judgment issue was justified because Zwickler hadnot shown "special circumstances" entitling him to an injunction against criminal prosecution. It would be the task of the district court on the remand todecide whether an injunction will be "necessary or appropriate" should Zwickler request for declaratory relief prevail.
Justice Harlan concurred but wrote a separate opinion. His opinion stressed adifference of view. He wrote "If, however, the opinion of the Court is intended to suggest that the central, or even a principal, issue in deciding the propriety of abstention is whether the complaint has alleged `overbreadth,' oronly `vagueness,' with respect to the New York statute in question, I cannotagree." His main argument was based on the fact that neither principle has ever been definitively delimited by the Supreme Court, and a doctrine built upon their supposed differences would flounder because of lack of a foundation.
An Additional Reversal
The case reappeared in the Supreme Court as Golden v. Zwickler and wasdecided in March of 1969. The Court held that on the remand Zwickler would have to "establish the elements governing the issuance of a declaratory judgment," noting as relevant to that question that the congressman who had been the target of Zwickler's handbills had been elected to the Supreme Court of NewYork. On remand, the district court, without hearing evidence held that theessential elements for declaratory relief existed when this action was initiated. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court should have considered the facts at the time the case was heard on remand. The Court ruled that Zwickler did not establish the facts for declaratory judgement on remand. The district court decision was reversed and the case was remanded with direction toenter a new judgement to dismiss the complaint.
Impact
The ruling in this case established that the doctrine of abstention could only be applied in certain cases where special circumstances existed. It becamea landmark case in establishing jurisdictional issues between the state and federal systems.
Related Cases
Zwickler
Appellee
Koota, District Attorney of Kings County
Appellant's Claim
That section 781-b of the New York Penal Code violated the appellant's FirstAmendment rights.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Emanuel Redfield
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Abe Fortas, Thurgood Marshall, William O. Douglas, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan II
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 December 1967
Decision
Reversal of the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case.
Significance
Zwickler presented an important question regarding the scope of the discretion of the district court to abstain from deciding the merits of a challenge that a state statute on its face violates the Constitution. The ruling established the facts for applying the "Doctrine of Abstention." Because therewas no "special circumstance" warranting application of the abstention doctrine, a district court erred in refusing to hear a claim for a declaratory judgment. The decision established the principle that a federal court has to respect a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of hisfederal constitutional claims. The principle that abstention cannot be usedto give the state courts the first opportunity to vindicate a federal claim in First Amendment issues was established. The delay requiring recourse to thestate courts might moot the constitutional right that a plaintiff seeks to protect.
Section 781-b of the New York Penal Law makes it a crime to distribute quantities of handbills which contain statements about a candidate in any electionof public officers. The law requires that the name and post office address ofthe printer as well as that of the candidate must be on the handbill.
Zwickler was convicted of violating the statute by distributing anonymous handbills critical of the record of a U.S. Congressman seeking re-election at the 1964 elections. Zwickler appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction but offered no opinion. Zwickler then appealed to the New York Supreme Court. The court reversed the decision on thebasis of state law.
Zwickler brought suit in district court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The basis of the suit was that the New York statute was repugnant to the guarantees of free expression secured by the U.S. Constitution. His contention was that the statutesuffers from impermissible "overbreadth" that embraces anonymous handbills,both within, and outside the protection of the First Amendment.
A three-judge court, one judge dissenting, applied the doctrine of abstentionand dismissed the complaint. The court remitted the case to the New York courts to assert a constitutional challenge. Zwickler appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court accepted the case. The basis of the appeal was that the discretion of the district courts to abstain from deciding the merits a state statute violates the Constitution.
An Important Reversal
By a majority vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, and remanded the case to the lower court for judgement. The district court applied the doctrine of abstention when "special circumstances" did not exist. The Supreme Court first considered whether abstention from the declaratory judgment sought by appellant was appropriate in the absence of his request for injunctive relief. They then considered whether abstention was justified because appellant also sought an injunction against future criminal prosecutions for violation of section 781-b of the New York Penal law.
Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws during most of the nation's first century. The only exception was the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This act provided for Supreme Court review when a state court denied a federal claim. After the Civil War, the policy was completely altered when nationalism dominated political thought. Congress gave the federal judiciary increased powers. The act of 3 March 1875 was the principal means of the broadening federal domain in the area of individual rights. This statute allowed Congress to give the federal courts a vast range of power, which had lain dormantin the Constitution since 1789. The federal courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states. They became the primary and powerful forum for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.
Prior to the 1875 act, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This actallowed suit to be brought against "every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws." It gave the district courts "original jurisdiction" of actions under state law of any right secured by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that in expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary. It was a duty to givedue respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. A federal court cannot escape fromthat duty because state courts also have the solemn responsibility to guard,enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.
The judge-developed doctrine of abstention was created in 1941 in RailroadCommission of Texas v. Pullman Company. This doctrine sanctions the useof the doctrine only in narrowly limited "special circumstances." One of the"special circumstances" is the susceptibility of a state statute to interpretation by the state courts that would avoid or modify a constitutional question. The Court argued that the district court applied this maxim.
The Supreme Court said that they were not reviewing the issue of constructionof section 781-b of the New York Penal Law that would "avoid or modify the constitutional question." Zwickler's appeal was not based on the fact that thestatute is void for "vagueness." Zwickler based his constitutional attack onthe fact that the statute, although lacking neither clarity nor precision, was void for "overbreadth." This means that it violated the constitutional principle that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Koota did not contest Zwickler's suggestion that 781-b is both clear and precise.
The Court used the principle established in Livingston v. United States (1960) as a guide to its decision. The principle is expressed as:
Regard for the interest and sovereignty of the state and reluctance needlessly to adjudicate constitutional issues may require a federal District Courtto abstain from adjudication if the parties may avail themselves of an appropriate procedure to obtain state interpretation of state laws requiring construction Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The decision in Harrison, however, is not a broad encyclicalcommanding automatic remission to the state courts of all federal constitutional questions arising in the application of state statutes National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Bennett Though never interpreted by a state court, if a state statute is not fairly subject to an interpretation, which will avoid or modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of a federal court to decide the federal question when presented to it. Any other course would impose expense and long delay upon the litigants without hope of its bearing fruit.
In Turner v. City of Memphis (1962), the Court vacated an abstention order. Its basis was that a declaratory judgment action ought to have been brought in the state court, before the federal court, in a Fourteenth Amendmentissue. In McNeese v. Board of Education (1959), it was shown that abstention cannot be ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity tovindicate the federal claim. In the McNeese case, the Court concludedthat "we would defeat those purposes if we held that assertion of a federalclaim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim ina state court." The Court ruled that the district court erred in refusing the Zwickler claim for declaratory judgement since there was no "special circumstance" to satisfy the doctrine of abstention.
Zwickler asked for an injunction against further prosecutions in violation ofsection 781-b of the New York penal code. He wanted to continue to distribute anonymous handbills in quantity in connection with election of party officials. The majority of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that abstention from deciding the declaratory judgment issue was justified because Zwickler hadnot shown "special circumstances" entitling him to an injunction against criminal prosecution. It would be the task of the district court on the remand todecide whether an injunction will be "necessary or appropriate" should Zwickler request for declaratory relief prevail.
Justice Harlan concurred but wrote a separate opinion. His opinion stressed adifference of view. He wrote "If, however, the opinion of the Court is intended to suggest that the central, or even a principal, issue in deciding the propriety of abstention is whether the complaint has alleged `overbreadth,' oronly `vagueness,' with respect to the New York statute in question, I cannotagree." His main argument was based on the fact that neither principle has ever been definitively delimited by the Supreme Court, and a doctrine built upon their supposed differences would flounder because of lack of a foundation.
An Additional Reversal
The case reappeared in the Supreme Court as Golden v. Zwickler and wasdecided in March of 1969. The Court held that on the remand Zwickler would have to "establish the elements governing the issuance of a declaratory judgment," noting as relevant to that question that the congressman who had been the target of Zwickler's handbills had been elected to the Supreme Court of NewYork. On remand, the district court, without hearing evidence held that theessential elements for declaratory relief existed when this action was initiated. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court should have considered the facts at the time the case was heard on remand. The Court ruled that Zwickler did not establish the facts for declaratory judgement on remand. The district court decision was reversed and the case was remanded with direction toenter a new judgement to dismiss the complaint.
Impact
The ruling in this case established that the doctrine of abstention could only be applied in certain cases where special circumstances existed. It becamea landmark case in establishing jurisdictional issues between the state and federal systems.
Related Cases
- Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
- Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
- McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1959).
- Livingston v. United States, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
- Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
- Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt. Congressional Quarterly's Guide tothe U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly,Inc., 1996.
- Freedom Forum Online. http://www.freedomforum.org/first/welcome.asp
User Comments Add a comment…