Petitioners
Van D. Mueller and June Noyes
Respondent
Clyde E. Allen, Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue
Petitioners' Claim
That a Minnesota statute allowing parents to deduct certain school expenses on their state income tax promoted religious schooling, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
William I. Kampf
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Douglas C. Blomgren
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
29 June 1983
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the lower courts that the tax statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Significance
For the first time, the Court let stand a law that in practice benefited parochial schooling, as a majority found the law was primarily secular.
The First Amendment contains in its first clause that "Congress shall make nolaw respecting an establishment of religion." As interpreted by the SupremeCourt, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from promoting religious beliefs in any form. After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the clause was applied to state law as well.
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has considered a number of casesinvolving state support of parochial (also called sectarian) schooling. The Court has generally limited efforts to subsidize religious schooling, viewingthose attempts as the establishment of religion. The Court, however, has found exceptions to those limits, and Mueller v. Allen is one of the mostimportant of these.
Tax Breaks for All--in Theory
In 1955, the state of Minnesota allowed parents to deduct certain expenses ontheir state income tax relating to their children's education. The deductions were for tuition, books, and transportation, up to $500 for each student ingrades K-6 and $700 for students in grades 7-12. Parents of students in either public or private schools could claim the deduction.
The deduction for tuition applied almost exclusively to parents who sent their children to private schools. Tuition was a far greater expense than books or transportation for those parents, most of whom enrolled their children in sectarian schools. A group of Minnesota taxpayers, including Van Mueller, believed the tax law in effect subsidized religious education, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The taxpayers sued the state of Minnesota in federal district court. They introduced statistics to back their claim. In 1978-79, of the 90,000 state students enrolled in private schools, almost all went to parochial institutions. Only 79 students in public schools paid any tuition, to attend schools outsideof their local district. Despite these numbers, the court ruled that law wasneutral: it did not advance or hinder the exercise of religious beliefs. Mueller appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The U.S. Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case.
Applying the "Lemon Test"
The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "Today's case is no exception to our oft-repeated statement that the Establishment Clause presents especially difficult questionsof interpretation and application." But in 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzmanthe Court created a test since adopted in other Establishment Clause cases.The so-called "Lemon test" subjects a law to three requirements: It must reflect a secular purpose; it must, in its primary effect, not advance nor inhibit religion; and it must avoid excessive government "entanglement" in religious practice. The Court used the Lemon test in Mueller and ruled in favor of the Minnesota tax law.
On the first point of the test, Rehnquist wrote that the law was clearly "secular and understandable," as its goal was to help parents pay for education costs. Helping parents with those costs served the greater good by ensuring well educated citizens. Rehnquist further reasoned the existence of private schools helped lower public schooling expenses for taxpayers.
For the second point, Rehnquist wrote, "The deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all parties, including those whose children attendpublic schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private schoolsor sectarian private schools." By helping so many groups, the law did not advance religion.
The ruling in Mueller differed from that of Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), in which the Court struck down New York tax laws that helped only parents who sent their children toprivate, mostly parochial, schools. Mueller and the other petitioners cited Nyquist, arguing that the Minnesota law had a similar effect as the laws that were prohibited in New York. As their statistics showed, the Minnesotalaw in practice helped subsidize religious education. The Court, however, was not swayed by the numbers and largely dismissed them in their decision.
Finally, on the third point, the Court held that the Minnesota tax did not "excessively entangle" the state with religion, even though the state might have to decide which text books were secular and which were sectarian. Previousrulings had found that making such evaluations did not violate the Establishment Clause.
A Strong Dissent
The Mueller decision spelled out the way states could help parents whosent their children to private schools, by allowing tax breaks apply to everyone. However, the dissenters in Mueller thought the decision ignoredthe true effect of Minnesota tax law: the subsidization of religious instruction. In his dissent, Justice Marshall opined that the Establishment Clause applied whether a subsidy for sectarian schooling was direct, as in Nyquist, or indirect, as in this case. Unlike Rehnquist, Marshall was influencedby the petitioners, statistics, and he concluded that they revealed the failure of the Minnesota tax law in the second part of the Lemon test. By almost exclusively helping parents who paid tuition for parochial schools, the tax did advance religion.
Marshall summed up his discomfort with the majority opinion:
Previously, the Court had allowed states to fund parochial schools for non-religious obligations and activities, but nothing that was specifically religious. The Court upheld that standard two years later in Aguilar v. Felton.
Related Cases
Deducting Private School Expenses
Should taxpayers be allowed to deduct from their state income taxes expensesrelated to sending their children to religious schools? Proponents of the measure argue that these tax deductions are not religious in nature because theysupport a secular cause, namely the advancement of education. Further, theyargue that these deductions give poorer students the opportunity to attend private schools.
Opponents argue that these deductions support religious activity and thus breach the Establishment Clause of First Amendment. In addition, they feel thatif more students opt to leave public schools it could have the ill effect oferoding the public educational system. Finally, opponents argue that a greatdeal of state revenue would be lost with these deductions.
Sources
Eastland, Terry. Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993.
Van D. Mueller and June Noyes
Respondent
Clyde E. Allen, Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue
Petitioners' Claim
That a Minnesota statute allowing parents to deduct certain school expenses on their state income tax promoted religious schooling, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
William I. Kampf
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Douglas C. Blomgren
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
29 June 1983
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the lower courts that the tax statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Significance
For the first time, the Court let stand a law that in practice benefited parochial schooling, as a majority found the law was primarily secular.
The First Amendment contains in its first clause that "Congress shall make nolaw respecting an establishment of religion." As interpreted by the SupremeCourt, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from promoting religious beliefs in any form. After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the clause was applied to state law as well.
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has considered a number of casesinvolving state support of parochial (also called sectarian) schooling. The Court has generally limited efforts to subsidize religious schooling, viewingthose attempts as the establishment of religion. The Court, however, has found exceptions to those limits, and Mueller v. Allen is one of the mostimportant of these.
Tax Breaks for All--in Theory
In 1955, the state of Minnesota allowed parents to deduct certain expenses ontheir state income tax relating to their children's education. The deductions were for tuition, books, and transportation, up to $500 for each student ingrades K-6 and $700 for students in grades 7-12. Parents of students in either public or private schools could claim the deduction.
The deduction for tuition applied almost exclusively to parents who sent their children to private schools. Tuition was a far greater expense than books or transportation for those parents, most of whom enrolled their children in sectarian schools. A group of Minnesota taxpayers, including Van Mueller, believed the tax law in effect subsidized religious education, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The taxpayers sued the state of Minnesota in federal district court. They introduced statistics to back their claim. In 1978-79, of the 90,000 state students enrolled in private schools, almost all went to parochial institutions. Only 79 students in public schools paid any tuition, to attend schools outsideof their local district. Despite these numbers, the court ruled that law wasneutral: it did not advance or hinder the exercise of religious beliefs. Mueller appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The U.S. Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case.
Applying the "Lemon Test"
The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "Today's case is no exception to our oft-repeated statement that the Establishment Clause presents especially difficult questionsof interpretation and application." But in 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzmanthe Court created a test since adopted in other Establishment Clause cases.The so-called "Lemon test" subjects a law to three requirements: It must reflect a secular purpose; it must, in its primary effect, not advance nor inhibit religion; and it must avoid excessive government "entanglement" in religious practice. The Court used the Lemon test in Mueller and ruled in favor of the Minnesota tax law.
On the first point of the test, Rehnquist wrote that the law was clearly "secular and understandable," as its goal was to help parents pay for education costs. Helping parents with those costs served the greater good by ensuring well educated citizens. Rehnquist further reasoned the existence of private schools helped lower public schooling expenses for taxpayers.
For the second point, Rehnquist wrote, "The deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all parties, including those whose children attendpublic schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private schoolsor sectarian private schools." By helping so many groups, the law did not advance religion.
The ruling in Mueller differed from that of Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), in which the Court struck down New York tax laws that helped only parents who sent their children toprivate, mostly parochial, schools. Mueller and the other petitioners cited Nyquist, arguing that the Minnesota law had a similar effect as the laws that were prohibited in New York. As their statistics showed, the Minnesotalaw in practice helped subsidize religious education. The Court, however, was not swayed by the numbers and largely dismissed them in their decision.
Finally, on the third point, the Court held that the Minnesota tax did not "excessively entangle" the state with religion, even though the state might have to decide which text books were secular and which were sectarian. Previousrulings had found that making such evaluations did not violate the Establishment Clause.
A Strong Dissent
The Mueller decision spelled out the way states could help parents whosent their children to private schools, by allowing tax breaks apply to everyone. However, the dissenters in Mueller thought the decision ignoredthe true effect of Minnesota tax law: the subsidization of religious instruction. In his dissent, Justice Marshall opined that the Establishment Clause applied whether a subsidy for sectarian schooling was direct, as in Nyquist, or indirect, as in this case. Unlike Rehnquist, Marshall was influencedby the petitioners, statistics, and he concluded that they revealed the failure of the Minnesota tax law in the second part of the Lemon test. By almost exclusively helping parents who paid tuition for parochial schools, the tax did advance religion.
Marshall summed up his discomfort with the majority opinion:
For the first time, the Court has upheld financial support for religious schools without any reason at all to assume that the support will be directed to the secular function of those schools and will not be used to support religious instruction. This result is flatly at odds with the fundamental principle thata State may provide no financial support whatsoever to promote religion.
Previously, the Court had allowed states to fund parochial schools for non-religious obligations and activities, but nothing that was specifically religious. The Court upheld that standard two years later in Aguilar v. Felton.
Related Cases
- Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
- Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
- Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
Deducting Private School Expenses
Should taxpayers be allowed to deduct from their state income taxes expensesrelated to sending their children to religious schools? Proponents of the measure argue that these tax deductions are not religious in nature because theysupport a secular cause, namely the advancement of education. Further, theyargue that these deductions give poorer students the opportunity to attend private schools.
Opponents argue that these deductions support religious activity and thus breach the Establishment Clause of First Amendment. In addition, they feel thatif more students opt to leave public schools it could have the ill effect oferoding the public educational system. Finally, opponents argue that a greatdeal of state revenue would be lost with these deductions.
Sources
Eastland, Terry. Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993.
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