Cantwell v. Connecticut

Appellant
Newton Cantwell
Appellee
State of Connecticut
Appellant's Claim
That a state law requiring prior official approval before soliciting door-to-door violates the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Hayden C. Covington
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Edwin S. Pickett and Francis A. Pallotti
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Charles Evans Hughes, James Clark McReynolds, Frank Murphy, Stanley Forman Reed, Owen Josephus Roberts (writing for the Court), Harlan Fiske Stone
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 May 1940
Decision
While asserting that a state has the right to issue appropriate time, place,or manner restrictions on solicitation, the Court unanimously struck down theConnecticut statute as violative of the First Amendment.
Significance
Cantwell v. Connecticut was the first case to state that the First Amendment's Free Exercise of Religion Clause applies at the state level, and also the first to state what later became a standard canon of constitutional law: the "time, place, and manner " rule.
Newton Cantwell, together with his sons, Jesse and Russell, was arrested while individually going house to house in a heavily Catholic neighborhood of NewHaven, Connecticut. As they went from one door to the next, the Cantwells, all of them members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, asked residents if they wouldlike to accept a pamphlet or hear a record. Both of these items attacked Roman Catholicism. If the residents refused requests to buy a book, the Cantwellsthen solicited a donation that would go toward publication of more pamphlets.
Police arrested the Cantwells, charging them under a Connecticut statute requiring individuals to obtain permission from the secretary of public welfare prior to engaging in solicitation. After the Cantwells were convicted in trialcourt, they appealed to the state supreme court, which affirmed their convictions. They then turned to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Roberts, first dispensed with the argument that the First Amendment did not apply to the state of Connecticut. Clearly, said the Court, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment--which says that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"--makes the First Amendment applicable at the state level. Here, for the first time, the Court specifically stated that the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment applies to statesas well as to the federal government. "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibitingthe free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."
Court Develops the "Time, Place, and Manner" Rule
The Court went on to point out that there are two aspects to freedom of religion, and that although freedom of conscience cannot be restricted by law, some restraints can be placed on some acts of religious adherence.

[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be . . .No one would contest the proposition that a state may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such aprevious and absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee. Itis equally clear that a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon the streets, and or holding meetings thereon . . .

Federal courts would go on to hear many more cases concerning time, place, and manner restrictions--not all centering on freedom of religion. In each, thepreliminary inquiry was whether or not the regulation at issue was truly neutral, or "non-discriminatory," in the words of Justice Roberts' Cantwell opinion. If so, the courts must then balance the interests of those who wish to practice their religion publicly against the interests of the larger society. Recently, as the "time, place, and manner" rule has become more and more refined, the Supreme Court has been granting government more latitude in regulating the incidental effects of free expression and narrowing its definition of what constitutes a public forum, which must remain available to thosewishing to exercise all of their First Amendment rights.
Related Cases

• Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
  
• Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
  
• Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
  
• Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
  
• Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

"Time, Place, and Manner" Rule
The "time, place and manner" rule arose from a decision by the Supreme Courtthat the federal government, as well as states were bound by the First Amendment's guarantees for religious freedom. The Court held that one of these guarantees, namely the rights of citizens to follow whatever religious beliefs they wish, is protected and absolute. However, the Court also stated that the amendment's Free-Exercise Clause, the right of citizens for free exercise of their religion, is not absolute. A citizen's free-exercise right must be weighed against the public interest and a state can regulate to ensure that it ispracticed in a reasonable time, place, and manner.
Thus, a state cannot deny, totally, a child's right to pray in school, for instance, providing the prayer is done in a reasonable time, place, and mannerand does not disturb other students. In the Court's view, the "time, place, and manner" rule is a general and nondiscriminatory restraint of religious practice and therefore does not violate the guarantees of the First Amendment.
Sources
Eastland, Terry. Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993.