Appellants
Kathryn R. Roberts, Acting Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights, et al.
Appellee
U.S. Jaycees
Appellants' Claim
That Minnesota's Human Rights Act was constitutional and required the Jayceesto admit women as regular members.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Richard L. Varco, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Carl D. Hall, Jr.
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun (Warren E. Burger did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 July 1984
Decision
Minnesota's Human Rights Act was constitutional. Requiring the Jaycees to admit women as regular members in accordance with the act's provisions did not violate that organization's right to freedom of association.
Significance
This was the first in a series of Supreme Court decisions that opened many previously all-male organizations to women.
The U.S. Jaycees, originally known as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership corporation founded in 1920. Its national headquarters arein Tulsa, Oklahoma. Its purpose is to "promote and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the United States . . . " It also meant to encourage "genuine Americanism" and "to develop true friendshipand understanding among young men of all nations."
At that time, regular membership was open only to males between the ages of 18 and 35. Men over the age limit and women were permitted to become associatemembers. As such, they still paid dues--although somewhat less than regularmembers--but they could not vote, hold office, or take part in its awards ortraining programs.
Rebellion in the Ranks
Despite the rule against women, two chapters--one in Minneapolis (1974) and the other in St. Paul (1975)--admitted women to full membership. Women becamea significant presence in both local chapters, even serving on their boards of directors. As a consequence, the national organization declared all membersof those chapters ineligible to run for the organization's state or nationaloffices, to receive its awards, or to have their votes counted at the Jaycees' national conventions. The chapters then learned that the national board would meet to consider a motion to revoke their charters.
Minneapolis' and St. Paul's Jaycees immediately filed discrimination complaints with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, claiming that if they excluded women--as the national board was demanding--they would be in violation ofthe state's Human Rights Act. The commissioner agreed and ordered a Human Rights Department hearing examiner to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
The Jaycees' national board fired back with a lawsuit against the commissioner and other state representatives in the U.S. District Court for the Districtof Minnesota. If the act were enforced, they claimed, male members would bedeprived of their constitutional rights of free speech and association. The court dismissed the suit but left the national Jaycees room to sue again if the Human Rights Department examiner ruled against them.
Never Say Die
The department examiner did rule against the national board, classifying theJaycees organization as a "place of public accommodation" within the meaningof Minnesota's Human Rights Act. Therefore, excluding women was an unfair discriminatory practice. The Jaycees renewed its suit before the district court,which then referred the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Having already ruled in 1981 that the state human rights act could be appliedto any "public business facility," the state supreme court also determined that the Jaycees "(a) is a `business' in that it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; (b) is a `public' business based on its unselective criteria; and (c) is a public business `facility' in that it conducts its activities in fixed and mobile sites within the state of Minnesota."
The national Jaycees then amended its district court complaint to add the charge that the act, as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was unconstitutional and overly broad. The district court upheld the act and that rulingwas appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
That court reversed the lower court decision in 1983. The Jaycees' right to determine its membership was protected by the First Amendment freedom of association, since "political and public causes, selected by the membership," is alarge part of the Jaycees' reason for being. The court of appeals also heldthat the Minnesota act was "vague as construed and applied" and therefore inviolation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court Decides
Kathryn R. Roberts, the acting commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On 18 April 1984, Richard L.Varco, Jr., argued that the act was not unconstitutionally broad or vague andthat Minnesota could require the Jaycees to admit women. Carl D. Hall, Jr. argued for the Jaycees that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that laws be clearly written and that rights of free speech and association would be violatedby a requirement to admit women.
Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion. He began by pointing out the differences between two aspects of the First Amendment's right of association:"freedom of intimate association" and "freedom of expressive association."
Associations protected by the right of intimate association, Brennan explained, would include family relationships and other associations "distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Associations formed in the context of "alarge business enterprise" did not involve such concerns. The Jaycees--as anorganization with no other membership criteria than age and sex, and as an organization with a history of permitting the partial but routine association of women and others deemed ineligible for membership--was "clearly . . . outside of the category of relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection."
Turning to constitutional protection of the "freedom of expressive association," Brennan noted that "an individual's freedom to speak, worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances" included the "freedom toengage in group effort toward those ends . . . " So, while the right to engage in such "protected activities" was "plainly implicated" in the case under consideration, Brennan pointed out that the "right to associate for expressivepurposes is not . . . absolute. Infringements on that right may be justifiedby regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests . . . " Minnesotahad a compelling state interest in ending sex discrimination, Brennan concluded, and that interest justified the impact of its Human Rights Amendment onthe Jaycees.
To further illustrate the compelling nature of the state's interest, Brennandiscussed the nineteenth-century passage of public accommodation laws intended to end racial discrimination, and their expansion over time, "both with respect to the number and type of covered facilities and the groups against whomdiscrimination is forbidden." He referred to the Court's 1964 decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibitions on racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. In that case, Brennan quoted, the Court recognized that the law's "fundamental object . . . was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignitythat surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments." The Court now recognized that such a "stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by personssuffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees was followed bytwo other Supreme Court decisions granting women access to previously all-male organizations or establishments: Rotary International v. Rotary Club ofDuarte (1987) and New York State Club Association, Inc. v. New York City (1988).
Related Cases
Exclusive Clubs and Discrimination
Inasmuch as a club truly is private,the Constitution offers little to impedeits members from restricting membership. Not only is there an idea of freedomof association derived from the First Amendment, but the Constitution itselfis designed to place restraints on government, not on individuals. Yet wherediscrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or other such factors canbe clearly demonstrated, and where a club is clearly public, then the SupremeCourt has tended to support a "compelling state interest" that overrides thedesires of the club's members to keep out others.
If an individual can compel a club to open its doors, as occurred in Roberts, could such an exercise of civil rights jeopardize civil liberties insome other sector? The Constitution is a document with almost nothing to sayabout the private lives of citizens. To accommodate the government's intrusion into personal associations in the Constitution might be equally as dangerous as permitting acts of blatant discrimination.
Sources
Leonard W. Levy, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Kathryn R. Roberts, Acting Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights, et al.
Appellee
U.S. Jaycees
Appellants' Claim
That Minnesota's Human Rights Act was constitutional and required the Jayceesto admit women as regular members.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Richard L. Varco, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Carl D. Hall, Jr.
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun (Warren E. Burger did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 July 1984
Decision
Minnesota's Human Rights Act was constitutional. Requiring the Jaycees to admit women as regular members in accordance with the act's provisions did not violate that organization's right to freedom of association.
Significance
This was the first in a series of Supreme Court decisions that opened many previously all-male organizations to women.
The U.S. Jaycees, originally known as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a nonprofit membership corporation founded in 1920. Its national headquarters arein Tulsa, Oklahoma. Its purpose is to "promote and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the United States . . . " It also meant to encourage "genuine Americanism" and "to develop true friendshipand understanding among young men of all nations."
At that time, regular membership was open only to males between the ages of 18 and 35. Men over the age limit and women were permitted to become associatemembers. As such, they still paid dues--although somewhat less than regularmembers--but they could not vote, hold office, or take part in its awards ortraining programs.
Rebellion in the Ranks
Despite the rule against women, two chapters--one in Minneapolis (1974) and the other in St. Paul (1975)--admitted women to full membership. Women becamea significant presence in both local chapters, even serving on their boards of directors. As a consequence, the national organization declared all membersof those chapters ineligible to run for the organization's state or nationaloffices, to receive its awards, or to have their votes counted at the Jaycees' national conventions. The chapters then learned that the national board would meet to consider a motion to revoke their charters.
Minneapolis' and St. Paul's Jaycees immediately filed discrimination complaints with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, claiming that if they excluded women--as the national board was demanding--they would be in violation ofthe state's Human Rights Act. The commissioner agreed and ordered a Human Rights Department hearing examiner to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
The Jaycees' national board fired back with a lawsuit against the commissioner and other state representatives in the U.S. District Court for the Districtof Minnesota. If the act were enforced, they claimed, male members would bedeprived of their constitutional rights of free speech and association. The court dismissed the suit but left the national Jaycees room to sue again if the Human Rights Department examiner ruled against them.
Never Say Die
The department examiner did rule against the national board, classifying theJaycees organization as a "place of public accommodation" within the meaningof Minnesota's Human Rights Act. Therefore, excluding women was an unfair discriminatory practice. The Jaycees renewed its suit before the district court,which then referred the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Having already ruled in 1981 that the state human rights act could be appliedto any "public business facility," the state supreme court also determined that the Jaycees "(a) is a `business' in that it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; (b) is a `public' business based on its unselective criteria; and (c) is a public business `facility' in that it conducts its activities in fixed and mobile sites within the state of Minnesota."
The national Jaycees then amended its district court complaint to add the charge that the act, as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was unconstitutional and overly broad. The district court upheld the act and that rulingwas appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
That court reversed the lower court decision in 1983. The Jaycees' right to determine its membership was protected by the First Amendment freedom of association, since "political and public causes, selected by the membership," is alarge part of the Jaycees' reason for being. The court of appeals also heldthat the Minnesota act was "vague as construed and applied" and therefore inviolation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court Decides
Kathryn R. Roberts, the acting commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On 18 April 1984, Richard L.Varco, Jr., argued that the act was not unconstitutionally broad or vague andthat Minnesota could require the Jaycees to admit women. Carl D. Hall, Jr. argued for the Jaycees that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that laws be clearly written and that rights of free speech and association would be violatedby a requirement to admit women.
Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion. He began by pointing out the differences between two aspects of the First Amendment's right of association:"freedom of intimate association" and "freedom of expressive association."
Associations protected by the right of intimate association, Brennan explained, would include family relationships and other associations "distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Associations formed in the context of "alarge business enterprise" did not involve such concerns. The Jaycees--as anorganization with no other membership criteria than age and sex, and as an organization with a history of permitting the partial but routine association of women and others deemed ineligible for membership--was "clearly . . . outside of the category of relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection."
Turning to constitutional protection of the "freedom of expressive association," Brennan noted that "an individual's freedom to speak, worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances" included the "freedom toengage in group effort toward those ends . . . " So, while the right to engage in such "protected activities" was "plainly implicated" in the case under consideration, Brennan pointed out that the "right to associate for expressivepurposes is not . . . absolute. Infringements on that right may be justifiedby regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests . . . " Minnesotahad a compelling state interest in ending sex discrimination, Brennan concluded, and that interest justified the impact of its Human Rights Amendment onthe Jaycees.
To further illustrate the compelling nature of the state's interest, Brennandiscussed the nineteenth-century passage of public accommodation laws intended to end racial discrimination, and their expansion over time, "both with respect to the number and type of covered facilities and the groups against whomdiscrimination is forbidden." He referred to the Court's 1964 decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibitions on racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. In that case, Brennan quoted, the Court recognized that the law's "fundamental object . . . was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignitythat surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments." The Court now recognized that such a "stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by personssuffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees was followed bytwo other Supreme Court decisions granting women access to previously all-male organizations or establishments: Rotary International v. Rotary Club ofDuarte (1987) and New York State Club Association, Inc. v. New York City (1988).
Related Cases
- Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
- Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, Benev. and Protective Orderof Elks, 854 P.2d 513 (1993).
- South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F.Supp 891 (1995).
- Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137 (1998).
Exclusive Clubs and Discrimination
Inasmuch as a club truly is private,the Constitution offers little to impedeits members from restricting membership. Not only is there an idea of freedomof association derived from the First Amendment, but the Constitution itselfis designed to place restraints on government, not on individuals. Yet wherediscrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or other such factors canbe clearly demonstrated, and where a club is clearly public, then the SupremeCourt has tended to support a "compelling state interest" that overrides thedesires of the club's members to keep out others.
If an individual can compel a club to open its doors, as occurred in Roberts, could such an exercise of civil rights jeopardize civil liberties insome other sector? The Constitution is a document with almost nothing to sayabout the private lives of citizens. To accommodate the government's intrusion into personal associations in the Constitution might be equally as dangerous as permitting acts of blatant discrimination.
Sources
Leonard W. Levy, ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
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