Inc. v. NLRB Lechmere

The U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion held that barring non-employee union organizers from access and occupation of corporate property did not represent an "unfair labor practice." The majority decision relied, in part, on NLRB v. Babcock (1956), in which a litigant successfully challenged a company ban on a non-employee union from recruiting in a company parking lot. Although that decision recognized the legitimate attempts of unions to organize employees, the Court recognized that the "right to distribute (union literature) is not absolute, but must be accommodated to the circumstances." They explained that circumstances might warrant permission to trespass on private property whenever distribution of "organizational literature" was especially difficult. In Babcock, such circumstances were present. Thus the company was ordered to permit organizers access to private company property in order to distribute materials. But, the Court rejected the endorsement of the National Labor Relations Board which directed Lechmere to permit unimpeded access of union organizers to employees on corporate property because "an employer cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by non-employee organizers on his property." The justices felt that the only exception which could mandate requiring an employer to permit access to employees on company property was if employees were "beyond the reach" of information about their right to organize. The Court further cited precedence set in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB (1972) and in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board (1976) wherein similar sets of circumstances existed (as in the Lechmere case). The need to provide "accommodation" of employees rights according to section 7 of the NLRA only superseded an employer's property rights when access to employees was not feasible. Compromise did not have to be discussed when access to employees was otherwise feasible.

Citing the Babcock case, the majority justices concluded that the NLRA did not extend protection to non-employee union organizers but rather, applied to exceptional circumstances where "the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to communicate with them through the usual channels." As long as non-employee union organizers had alternative access to employees, the right for employees to self-organize without interference by an employer (according to sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA) was not violated. Moreover, according to Babcock, the Court opined that "an employer may validly post his property against non-employee distribution of union literature." Accordingly, the Supreme Court cited two additional reasons why the National Labor Relations Board improperly endorsed lower court rulings. The union had other avenues available for "nontrespassory access" to employees and (according to Babcock) there existed no clear evidence that the petitioner's denial of union access to its private property automatically created a circumstance wherein it became unrealistic for the union to reach employees and communicate with them in any other way. Prohibiting trespass on the petitioner's private parking lot did not place employees "beyond the reach," of union organizers since other means of communication were available (mailings, phone calls, home visits, and advertising). Furthermore, since union non-employee organizers had been able to picket at the entrance of the shopping center for a period of time, the Court found the respondent's argument was flawed.