New York v. United States

The Court voted unanimously to uphold the first two forms of incentive, and by a vote of 6-3 it ruled that the "take- title" incentive was unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, noted that it had used as its standards the affirmative grants to Congress contained in the Commerce and Spending Clauses of Article I, as well as the principle of state sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment.

The constitutionality of congressional authority over interstate disposal of low-level radioactive waste had been established in Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978). But a review of other Court decisions such as Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. (1981)--not to mention an examination of the concerns raised by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention--offered a counterbalancing claim. Specifically, as Justice O'Connor wrote, Congress lacked the power to "commandeer the States' legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"; rather, it was incumbent on Congress to "exercise legislative authority directly upon individuals." In spite of that, methods existed whereby Congress could "urge" a state, without coercion, to comply with a federal program. It could use its spending power to influence a state's actions by attaching conditions on the dispensing of federal funds, a principle upheld in South Dakota v. Dole (1987). Also, in a situation where Congress had regulatory authority over private activity under the Commerce Clause, it could offer to the states the choice of either regulating their activities according to federal standards, or of having their laws pre-empted by the federal government.

The petitioners had put forth an argument regarding the portion of the act which required states to deal with their own radioactive waste problems, an idea which Justice O'Connor rejected. That provision, the petitioners claimed, was a direct order from Congress to the states, and could be viewed as such by separating it from the rest of the act. Justice O'Connor held, however, that the clause in question was not a "separable mandate." Viewed on its own, the clause would clearly constitute a violation of the balance between federal and state powers, and would thus raise another issue; but Justice O'Connor held that it could not be viewed on its own. Rather, the act should be construed "as a whole to comprise three sets of incentives to the States."

The Court next dealt with the first of these incentives. In establishing the monetary incentive, the Court ruled, Congress acted "well within" its authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, and thus the Tenth Amendment had not been violated in that particular instance. By authorizing sited states to place surcharges on radioactive waste, Congress was simply enabling interstate commerce, and the collection of a percentage of that charge by the Secretary of Energy was "no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power." Furthermore, the monetary incentive met the four requirements established in Dole. As for the claim by the petitioners that the escrow account arrangement was "nonfederal" because it collected funds separately from various states, rather than doing so in a blanket fashion, the Court responded that nothing in the Spending Clause prevented this. In any case, by choosing to comply or not, states were free to control whether or not they paid into the account or received a refund for compliance.

The access incentives were constitutional as well, as they were "a conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power along the lines of that approved in Hodel," and thus did not violate the Tenth Amendment either. Once again, states had a choice: they could either comply with regulations, or they could be denied access to disposal sites. In no way did Congress force them to regulate their waste disposal, make any expenditures, or participate in any federal program.

The third incentive, the one labeled "take-title," was more problematic. The "choice" it offered--of either taking title to the waste and the resulting liabilities, or of complying with the federal program, was coercive and hence forbidden under the Tenth Amendment. By forcing waste-generators (e.g. industry) to transfer their waste to the state, and by requiring states to become liable for the waste, Congress was attempting to "commandeer" the states into compliance with a federal program. Likewise the requirement that states had to regulate waste in accordance with federal direction was unconstitutional as well. The "choice" offered in the take-title provision, Justice O'Connor wrote, "is no choice at all." Hence, the Court ruled this provision invalid.

Justice O'Connor dealt with several arguments raised by the respondents. The federal government had claimed that there were limited situations in which it was permissible for Congress to coerce states, but the Court rejected this and similar propositions. Likewise the Court rejected the sited states' contention that the act could not be ruled an unconstitutional infringement on New York's sovereignty because officials of that state had been given the opportunity to challenge the act's passage and had not; in fact, they had supported it. Consent of state officials, Justice O'Connor suggested, was irrelevant, "since the Constitution protects state sovereignty for the benefit of individuals, not States or their governments, and since the officials' interests may not coincide with the Constitution's allocation."

The Court held that the act did not violate the Guarantee Clause because nothing in it "c[ould] be reasonably said to deny New York a republican form of government." Up to this point, the ruling had concerned itself with sovereignty, but the Court concluded by establishing the severability of the act, whereby the "take-title" clause could be removed in order to preserve the constitutionality of the rest of the statute. The guideline for severability was that if a part of a law could be removed from the rest without defeating the purpose of the larger statute, then it was severable. (To make an analogy, a printer or audio speakers would be considered "severable" portions of a computer system; the processing unit and monitor would not, because to remove them would impair the system's entire function.) Because the act still contained two incentives powerful enough to encourage compliance, and since removal of the take-title clause would not place a burden on other states' citizens as no regional compacts were required to accept New York's waste after the final transition period, the act would remain effective with or without the take-title provision.