Dunn v. Blumstein

In order to address the issues involved, the Supreme Court first had to decide which standard of review to use in determining whether or not Tennessee's restriction was allowable. Since the restriction deprived some citizens of the right to vote, which was considered to be a fundamental political right, the Court determined that any restriction imposed by the state must withstand what it called "close constitutional scrutiny." Close scrutiny meant that the state must prove that it had a "compelling interest" for which the exclusions were not only helpful, but necessary. Furthermore, wrote Justice Marshall in the Court opinion, the durational residency requirement interfered with a second fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the right to travel. Any infringement on this right must also pass the compelling-state-interest test. The opinion took care to note that Tennessee's interest in having only bona fide residents of the state vote in its elections was undisputed.

The Court then turned to the question of whether Tennessee had demonstrated a compelling state interest in restricting voters to those who had resided in the state for at least a year. Tennessee argued that the requirement was necessary for two reasons. First, it allowed the state to maintain the "purity of the ballot box" by preventing dual voting--voting in more than one place--and "colonization"--the invasion of any district by a group of people whose only intention was to falsely declare residency and then vote, ensuring the election of a particular candidate. Second, the state of Tennessee argued, the durational residency requirement helped ensure a more knowledgeable voter, who had taken the time to become informed about the local candidates and election issues.

The Supreme Court found neither of these interests "compelling." Noting that Tennessee established duration of residency through a citizen's swearing of an oath, the Court declared that citizens intent upon fraud were as likely to swear falsely that they were longtime residents as they were to swear falsely that they were residents. As for dual voting, the Court stated that it was more easily prevented through cross-checking the resident's current registrations with registrations in a resident's former jurisdiction. Voter fraud, the Court concluded, was better dealt with through the state's criminal code, which provided a means of discovering and dealing with such fraud.

The claim that the durational residency requirement provided the state with more knowledgeable voters was also rejected by the Supreme Court. Since the state made no attempt to determine whether or not longtime residents were knowledgeable, the exclusion of new residents on that ground was simply discriminatory. Such devices, wrote Marshall, "represent a requirement of knowledge unfairly imposed on only some citizens." Thus, the Supreme Court found that Tennessee had failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest in its durational residency requirement.

Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the result. However, he stated his conviction that the Court's decision had struck down Tennessee's particular requirement as unreasonable, but had not absolutely established that durational residency requirements were unconstitutional. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion holding that the "compelling state interest" standard was too strict a test for state voting regulations to undergo.