Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth

Section 9 of the Missouri statute prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis, the injection of "a saline or other fluid" into the amniotic sac in place of amniotic fluid. The Court likewise rejected this provision because it proscribed "the most commonly used abortion procedure in the country and one that is safer, with respect to infant mortality, than even the continuation of pregnancy until normal childbirth." According to the appellants, 70 percent of all abortions after the first trimester were performed according to this procedure, and thus it amounted to a de facto prohibition of second-trimester abortions. They also presented evidence that the mortality rate was actually higher in childbirth than in cases where women had received saline amniocentesis; nonetheless, the district court had ruled that the restriction it imposed protected the health of the mother. The Supreme Court did not agree, "particularly in light of the present unavailability" in Missouri of the prostaglandin method, a technique deemed even safer than saline amniocentesis.

Section 10 of the act put in place record keeping requirements whereby clinics would report details of "all abortions performed to assure that they are done only under and in accordance with the provisions of the law." Section 11 required that these records be kept on file for seven years. The appellants challenged these as yet another burden and extra layer of regulation, but the district court had treated them as essential statistical requirements. In spite of "important and sometimes conflicting interests affected by record keeping requirements," the Supreme Court held that these were "reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health . . . " Therefore, it allowed the two laws to stand.

Finally, the Court approached section 6 (1), which stated that

No person who performs or induces an abortion shall fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in the abortion who shall fail to take such measures . . . shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter [and] shall be liable in an action for damages.

The district court had judged this as unconstitutionally overbroad, and the Supreme Court agreed.