United States v. Vuitch

Gesell had found the D.C. abortion law vague for two reasons. First, once an abortion took place, the physician "is presumed guilty and remains so unless a jury can be persuaded that his acts were necessary for the preservation of the woman's life and health." Second, the judge felt disturbed by the "ambivalent and uncertain word `health."'

The trial court had examined Williams v. United States (1943) to determine that the D.C. law placed the burden of proof on the defendant once prosecutors had proved an abortion had taken place. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Court had held that the prosecution did not have to prove abortion was unnecessary to preserve life or health to win.

However, Justice Black--on behalf of the Supreme Court majority--stated that "whether or not this is a correct reading of Williams . . . it is an erroneous interpretation of the statute." The D.C. law had "expressly authorized" physicians to perform abortions to preserve a woman's life or health. It did not presume the guilt of a doctor for performing the operation.

The Court also agreed that the word "health" carried an "uncertain" and "ambivalent" meaning, which failed to inform a "defendant of the charge against him and therefore . . . offends the Due Process Clause of the Constitution." Gesell had felt the term vague because it did not account for "varying degrees of mental as well as physical health."

The Supreme Court looked to Doe v. General Hospital of the District of Columbia (1970) for guidance. Judge Joseph Waddy had permitted abortions there "for mental health reasons whether or not the patient had a previous history of mental defects." Therefore, the Court found "no reason why this interpretation of the statute should not be followed." Black continued: "Webster's Dictionary . . . defines health as the `state of being . . . sound in body [or] mind.' Viewed in this light, the term `health' presents no problem of vagueness."

The majority decided "the District of Columbia abortion law is not unconstitutionally vague," and "the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on that ground."

Although Black reversed Gesell's decision, he said that the District law should give "physicians considerable latitude [within the law's restrictions] to perform legal abortions." He added that in future abortion trials, the government must prove that the mother's health was not endangered.