J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel T. B.

In order to determine paternity and get support for her minor child, respondent T. B. (mother), represented by the state of Alabama, filed a paternity suit against J. E. B. (alleged father). The trial court called 36 potential jurors (24 female, 12 male) for the panel. Three jurors were excluded by the court, so only 10 male jurors remained when the state exercised its nine of ten peremptory strikes to eliminate male jurors from the panel. Objecting to the peremptory challenges of the respondent, the petitioner invoked Batson v. Kentucky (1986) wherein peremptory strikes directed just to exclude jurors on the basis of race were held unacceptable and inconsistent with Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that a similar nondiscriminatory standard was applicable to the respondent's intention to impanel a jury which could diminish his possibility of an impartial trial. Despite the petitioner's objections, an all-female jury was seated and found the petitioner to be the father of the child in question; the court ordered him to pay child support. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld the findings of the lower court.

Respondent (Alabama ex rel T. B.) contended that pretrial selection of a jury on the basis of gender should not be constrained as in Batson v. Kentucky. Instead, the respondent's attorney argued that discrimination on the basis of sex was never so delicate and critical as racial discrimination. Moreover, peremptory strikes of potential male jurors were justified because, historically, data suggested men could have a tendency to be more favorably inclined to arguments of males; conversely, women could be predisposed to arguments on behalf of the respondent. Finally, counsel for the respondent suggested that the Supreme Court might be more interested in determining paternity than disposition of peremptory actions.

Six U.S. Supreme Court justices held that exclusion of jurors solely because of their sex was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. At the outset, they emphasized that regardless of whether the trial was civil or criminal, all participants in the trial must enjoy adequate, equal protection with respect to jury selection. Historical prejudices and stereotypes that could jeopardize an equitable and fair trial had to be avoided, thus the practice of peremptory challenges had to be guided by equal protection principles. Justices recognized that peremptory challenges based on gender were resurgent and recalled discriminatory exclusion of women as a significant fact in history; it was an irregular practice of the judicial system for many years. Nonetheless, since women were endowed with the same right as men to participate in trials and became trusted members of jury panels, no questions about appropriateness of sex should exist. Justices posited that the only concern should be fairness in court rooms and that discrimination did not promote that fundamental feature of the judicial system. Thus, no relevance existed in supposing that men or women in the court room would act or have a tendency to act as a group. Further, discrimination among members of a jury pool was contrary to quality jurisprudence. No grounds existed to support conventionalized ideas that men and women had dissimilar perspectives which could incline toward one litigant.