Bell v. Wolfish

Due to a lack of adequate facilities, a New York custodial facility placed two pretrial detainees in rooms planned for single occupancy. Because convicted inmates were sharing common areas, pretrial detainees were expected to abide by the same restrictions as those of the prisoners. The justices ruled that pretrial detainees, regardless of where they were housed, were not entitled to receive less restrictive treatment if the institution of confinement had justifiable reasons that mandated sharing common areas with convicted inmates.

The respondent, Louis Wolfish, a detainee in the City of New York Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), on behalf of other detainees, demanded abrogation of rules they felt were inappropriately restrictive. The respondents brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of all incarcerated persons (pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates). Incarcerated to ensure their appearance at trial, pretrial detainees were imprisoned with other convicts and, therefore, subject to the same restrictions established by prison management. Unfortunately, because of overcrowding at the facility, administrators had to resort to double-bunking confinees in rooms intended for single occupancy. The detainees, believing that their privacy and personal autonomy were jeopardized, filed a suit in the district court challenging prison conditions and complaining about MCC procedures. Objectionable conditions and procedures cited were "double bunking" (the replacement of single bunks in individual dormitories with double bunks), a "publisher only" rule (inmates could only receive books directly from publishers), the practice of body-cavity searches after visits, a prohibition on packages received (except at Christmas), and the eviction of inmates during room searches. The detainees alleged such practices were unjustified and an infringement on their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted the Wolfish case as a class action suit. The court decided that established MCC procedures and restrictions were inordinately restrictive and reasoned that pretrial detainees should not be treated in same manner as sentenced inmates. The district court opined "pretrial detainees (are) presumed to be innocent and held only to ensure their presence at trial"; thus, deprivation of their rights must be justified with "compelling necessity." The court ruled that the MCC should discontinue their restrictive practices, with the proviso that detainees must stay outside their rooms during routine searches.

The court of appeals endorsed the district court and further ordered that conditions of confinement in MCC be evaluated to determine "adequateness" or "inadequateness" of pretrial conditions. The appellate court could not find "compelling necessity" to justify placement of two persons in single occupancy rooms nor (through treatment that presumed guilt) deprivation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The procedures followed by the New York custodial facility were judged restrictive and unjustified. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the rulings of the two lower courts.

The court of appeals had found MCC's treatment of pretrial confinees inappropriate according to the "rudiments of due process" and noted that their practices did not meet the burdens of "compelling necessity." But the U.S. Supreme Court found no violation of the Constitution with respect to restrictions and conditions at the detention center. The Court acknowledged that under the Due Process Clause pretrial detainees must not be punished before being proven guilty and that detention was only meant to ensure their presence at trial so detainees should not be treated like convicted inmates. The Supreme Court also reasoned that no matter where inmates were incarcerated or what kind of inmates were accommodated, the purpose of detention excludes a right to live comfortably with no restraints during confinement. Indeed, regulatory restraints could be imposed if "legitimate governmental purpose" existed.

The detainees believed they were burdened by the punishing purpose of MCC regulations. Conversely, petitioners pointed out that holding the detainees was necessary to ensure the appearance of a suspect at trial. Moreover, if incarceration was needed until a defendant was found guilty or innocent, it followed that restrictions during confinement with convicted inmates had to be the same. The majority of justices agreed. The regulations contributed to safety, maintained order, prevented illegal activities and served a legitimate governmental interest. Contrary to the detainees' claim, the Court did not believe MCC restrictions were intended to unreasonably "torture" inmates.

Although Justice Powell agreed with the findings of the majority opinion of the Court, he nonetheless agreed with dissenting justices that body cavity searches were highly objectionable if administered to pretrial detainees. He opined that anal and genital searches were intrusive and inarguable. Similarly, three other (dissenting) justices found flaws in the majority opinion. They disagreed that the treatment of detainees at MCC was acceptable and instead felt procedures were "arbitrary or purposeless" and represented an unjustifiable burden on the constitutional rights of detainees. The justices pointed out that many detainees were only imprisoned because they could not afford bail; thus, it was not necessary for the petitioner to imply that the state's interest in pretrial detention went beyond a need to ensure a detainee's appearance at trial. The minority justices considered the findings of the Court improper because there did not appear to be any particular, important reason to inflict extraordinary restrictions on pretrial detainees. In writing his own dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall further opined that if there indeed existed a significant, increased need to confine pretrial detainees (especially with convicted inmates), the rationale supporting a governmental interest had to be more extensively justified.

The dissenting justices also disagreed with the Court's rationale in support of the restrictive measures imposed on pretrial detainees at MCC. Justices felt "double bunking" was not a proper way to solve the problems of overcrowding in prisons because it was irregular and, especially in the case being considered, intruded on the rights of confinees. They pointed out that MCC administrators might choose less oppressive alternatives to address security concerns. The minority justices could not appreciate a rationale which justified a prohibition on receiving personal packages from outside and a bar to receiving hardback books if they were not sent by the publisher. While prison officials had a reasonable interest in preserving safety, such measures seemed inappropriate given the presumption of innocence which should be granted pretrial detainees. Similarly, the justices felt that evicting detainees from their personal areas during routine searches seemed inappropriate; if inmates were not present during searches, MCC might face an additional, unexpected problem of ensuring the security of personal items or preventing planted contraband by detention officers. However, the minority opinion reserved its most determined objections to comment on the MCC practice of imposing body cavity searches after visits of pretrial detainees. They considered it one of the "most grievous offenses against personal dignity and common decency." Visits were conducted in glass-enclosed rooms and guarded by correction officers, thus it was unlikely that illicit drugs could be passed and smuggled into the facility during visits. (Justice Marshall wryly observed that since inserting objects into the rectum is likely to be a very painful and unpleasant performance, it was difficult to believe that guards would not notice.) Moreover, the justices pointed out that other, more effective options could have been used (e.g., metal detectors, fluoroscope searches of visitor's parcels and handbags) before imposing such a heavy intrusion into a detainee's personal autonomy. Justice Marshall summarized that "only by blinding itself to the facts presented on this record can the Court accept the Government's security rationale."

Justices Brennan and Stevens, in joining with the other two dissenting justices, observed that because a "detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law," the Due Process Clause was depreciated and ignored by the Court's ruling. Both men cautioned that the Court should have remained mindful that pretrial detainees were not convicted for any crimes and therefore "their detention may serve only a more limited, regulatory purpose." They cited objective criteria presented in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) that stipulated applicable restrictions for detainees and which, they felt, entitled pretrial detainees at MCC not to be exposed to compulsory constraints nor subjected to treatment beyond the limits of personal rights to which they were constitutionally entitled. Finally, Brennan and Stevens maintained there were no necessary reasons that the New York City Metropolitan Correctional Center's security interests had to be protected with such inordinately severe regulations or procedures.