Civil Rights Cases

The five cases which were combined in the Civil Rights Cases were actions against private individuals who had denied rights to African Americans. The first four cases were filed by the solicitor general on 7 November 1882; the fifth case was brought by Richard A. Robinson on 29 March 1883. In setting aside the lower court convictions of the accused, the Court ruled that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 went beyond the power of Congress under both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Two of the cases, against Stanley and Nichols, were indictments for denying accommodations. Two other cases involved theater admission. The case against Ryan was for refusing a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's Theater in San Francisco. The case against Singleton was for denying admission to the Grand Opera House in New York. The fifth case involved Mr. and Mrs. Richard A. Robinson who had brought action against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company in Tennessee. A conductor on the line had refused to allow Mrs. Robinson access to the ladies' car because she was of African descent, and traveling with a party the conductor assumed was white. As a consequence, he assumed she was of loose morals and denied her access to the ladies' car.

Justice Bradley delivered the majority opinion, ruling that the U.S. Constitution contained no language dealing with discrimination. When Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1 March 1875, it had based the law upon the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Bradley argued that the Thirteenth Amendment related only to slavery, and that discrimination or denial of equal accommodation did not constitute a badge of slavery on the victim of the discrimination. Since the amendment dealt only with slavery, it could not be the basis of the law. The Fourteenth Amendment dealt only with the states. Therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could prohibit discrimination by the states, but not by private citizens. The amendment gave Congress the power to prohibit state laws and state acts, but it did not authorize Congress to create a code for the regulation of private rights. The Court found the assumption that Congress could legislate generally on the subject of rights based on flawed logic. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, the ruling pointed out, had reserved to the states, powers not specifically delegated by the Constitution to the federal government. Thus, the individuals who had been discriminated against could only bring civil actions in state courts against those who had injured them, under the laws of the states.

Former slaves, the argument ran, once they became citizens, were not entitled to any special protection of the law, but only the protection by the ordinary modes by which other citizens' rights were protected. Since no other grounds but the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were put forward to justify the law, the Court ruled that the law was null.

Justice Harlan, a former slave owner, as the sole dissenter, argued that both the substance and the spirit of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were being overthrown by the majority opinion. He believed the intent of the amendments had been to guarantee equal rights to African Americans and he believed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had been enacted with that intent in mind. Looking closely at the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan argued that while its intent had been to prohibit the states from all discrimination against citizens on the grounds of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, that language was not intended to prohibit the Congress from enforcing laws against discrimination. Harlan warned that if the Court allowed racial discrimination to persist, in the future, other forms of class discrimination and class tyranny would emerge. In Harlan's opinion, Congress had the power to stop such class tyranny and for that reason he withheld his assent to the Court opinion.