Martin v. Wilks

This was one of the first of many cases involving the issue of reverse discrimination and allowed whites to claim prejudices against minorities.

Beginning in the late 1950s, a growing national awareness triggered one of the greatest periods of federal antidiscrimination legislation. Out of this period came the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In trying to provide a balance for previous discriminatory injustices, it created its own set of problems.

The long circuitous story of Martin v. Wilks actually began in 1974. The Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and seven African Americans filed separate class-action complaints against Birmingham, Alabama, and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They claimed that the city and the board had both hired and promoted firefighters in a racially discriminatory fashion and that these practices violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and various other federal laws.

Before the case culminated in a judgment, both sides reached a "consent decree." That is, the defendants in the case agreed to cease the discriminatory activities and so the charges were dropped. The city and board devised a sweeping plan that included long-term solutions as well as immediate yearly goals to hire African American firefighters. The decree also included goals for promoting African Americans within the fire department. The district court provisionally approved the decrees and ordered that a notice be published about the upcoming fairness hearings. These notices were published in two local newspapers.

The Birmingham Firefighters Association (BFA) appeared at the hearing and filed objections. Before the decrees were actually approved, the BFA and two members tried to intervene, saying that these decrees would infringe on their civil rights. However, the district court ruled that the BFA motion was "untimely," and approved the consent decrees.

At this point, seven caucasian firefighters--all BFA members--filed their own complaint against the city and the board to prevent the decrees from being enforced. The firefighters claimed that the decree would be illegal discrimination against them. The district court ruled against them. The seven firefighters took their case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the district court's previous decision and denied a rehearing.

Later, another group of caucasian firefighters--the Wilks plaintiffs--brought their own suit against Birmingham and the County Personnel Board. They claimed that African Americans were being promoted, not because they were more qualified, but because they were African Americans, in violation the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Both the city and the board agreed that employment and promotion decisions had been made in favor of African Americans, but the decisions stood because they were made in light of the earlier consent decree. The court allowed several African Americans to defend the decrees--including Martin.

Eventually, the district court dismissed the caucasian firefighters' cases, saying that if the city had hired and promoted African Americans, it was because of the consent decree and therefore there was no case of illegal racial discrimination. In fact, the defendants had demonstrated that the promotion of African Americans was required by one of the consent decrees.

When appealed, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, saying essentially that because Wilks and the others had not been part of the consent decrees, they could claim unlawful reverse discrimination. The court of appeals applauded the worth of sound, voluntary affirmative action plans, but also said that such policies "must yield to the policy against requiring third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were either ignored or sacrificed." At this point, the case then went to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the appeals court, saying that it was a general principle that people cannot be deprived of their legal rights when they were not part of a preceding agreement. Specifically, since these firefighters were not participants in the original consent decree, they were free to claim--in a separate district court case--that the promotion decisions made according to the consent decree were racially biased, violating the Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In dissent, Justice Stevens said, in part, that just as caucasian employees benefited innocently from illegal racial discrimination, it was inevitable that the same caucasian employees would suffer innocently in sharing some of the load in repairing past damages.