Hudson v. McMillian

In a case such as Hudson's, where the prisoner alleges that he or she has been beaten by prison officials during a "prison disturbance," O'Connor wrote, the Court must balance the need of prison officials to maintain order against the harm that inmates might suffer from the force used by the officials. Under Whitley, the Court must ask whether "the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" when it examines a claim that a prison official inflicted unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering. In determining whether the use of force by a prison official was applied in good faith or whether it was malicious, the Court must look at several factors. These factors, said the majority, included the need for the force, the connection between the need for force and the amount of force used, the threat that was reasonably perceived by the prison officials, and efforts made to minimize the severity of the force.

The majority acknowledged that the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate is another factor in deciding an Eighth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force. McMillian, Mezo, and Woods claimed that under the Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter (1994) the Court had inserted an objective requirement into the analysis by preventing an Eighth Amendment claim unless the inmate has suffered a significant physical injury. In Wilson, a prison inmate made a claim of cruel and unusual punishment based on the horrific conditions of his confinement. In that case, the Court ruled that in making an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of confinement, the prisoner had to prove that he or she had suffered a serious physical injury as a result of the confinement conditions. The respondents argued that Hudson's claim of cruel and unusual punishment could not succeed because Hudson had not suffered a serious physical injury.

The respondents' understanding of the Wilson case was flawed, the majority wrote, because under Whitley the analysis for Eighth Amendment claims varies according to the nature of the claim. The analysis varies, the majority instructed, for two reasons: first, because of the differences in the kind of conduct that comprises Eighth Amendment claims, and second, because the Eighth Amendment prohibitions draw their meaning "from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," an approach that forecloses most "absolute limitations." In the context of health care, for example, the Court had observed in Estelle v. Gamble (1976) that society does not expect that prison inmates will have completely unfettered access to health care. However, society does expect that prison officials will not be deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prison inmates. In Rhodes v. Chapman (1981), a case dealing with conditions of confinement, the Court had stated that society expects prisoners to experience "routine discomfort" as part of the incarceration experience. At the same time, though, society does not condone depriving prisoners of a "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." These cases, the majority maintained, demonstrated how standards of decency were derived from societal mores.