Gannett Co. v. DePasquale

The essential issue debated in this case was whether public interest in open criminal proceedings should take precedence over individual rights to request temporary suppression of proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision to close the pretrial hearing, and found that unrestricted access to trials was not, as claimed by the petitioner, a provision of the First, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. They ruled the Sixth Amendment provides a measure of common law that permits open court proceedings in the interest of defendants' rights, but does not extend to provide an unrestricted right to access by journalistic media or public scrutiny.

After fishing in Seneca Lake near Rochester, New York, 42 year-old Wayne Clapp never returned home. A publisher of the two Rochester newspapers, Gannett Co., Inc., assigned a reporter to follow the police investigation and subsequent capture of two suspects: Greathouse and Jones. Reports and articles described the circumstances of Clapp's disappearance--three men were seen on the lake; a few witnesses testified to "having heard five or six shots;" and, after an examination of Clapp's boat, the police theorized his death was violent. Police arrested the suspects in Jackson County, Michigan, after they noticed a truck matching the description of Clapp's stolen vehicle parked at a local motel. At the time of his arrest, Greathouse revealed to the police where he had hidden Clapp's revolver; police also found matching ammunition at the motel.

News stories reported that the case would be prosecuted even though a body was not found. Although police found incriminating evidence in the possession of the suspects that included Clapp's 357 Magnum revolver, credit card, and truck, police could not find the body. During the three months before their pretrial hearing, the suspects tried to suppress statements given to the police. They alleged that statements were given involuntarily, primarily with respect to admissions regarding the gun and the subsequent entry of the gun as physical evidence. In the time that ensued, newspapers continued covering details of the arraignments, reported the indictment of the suspects by the Seneca County grand jury, and reported the "not guilty" plea entered by both men.

Motions to suppress reporting of the pretrial hearing were presented to Judge DePasquale. Defense attorneys felt exclusion of the public and press from the hearing was warranted because media coverage had been quite extensive; they considered that "adverse publicity" could diminish their clients' right to have a fair trial. The district attorney concurred with their request and the presiding judge granted an exclusionary order which permitted a closed, pretrial hearing.

Although in attendance at the proceedings, a reporter for Gannett Co. failed to voice objections to the ruling. The day after the hearing, she submitted a letter that demanded permission for the press to cover the pretrial hearing. Gannett Co., the reporter's publisher, subsequently petitioned for abrogation of the exclusionary order; however, Judge DePasquale denied the motion simply noting that "the suppression [of the] hearing had concluded and that any decision on immediate release of the transcript had been reserved." He further stated that there existed no constitutional right of the press to attend a court trial and report about the evidence presented. Further, he found that granting the defendants a closed hearing provided a significant safeguard against negative public reaction that could influence the impending trial.

Gannet Co. challenged DePasquale's ruling before the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. Their petition considered the exclusion of the public as violation of the provision for a public trial as guaranteed by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Appellate Division found DePasquale's order unlawful believing that the lower court's decision denied the "public's vital interest in open judicial proceedings." On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, however, Judge DePasquale's decision was upheld. The Court of Appeals pointed out that because the defendants pleaded "guilty to lesser included offenses," that a "transcript of the suppression hearing was made available to petitioner." The higher court seemed to suggest the issue was therefore rendered moot.

In contrast to the decision of the appellate division, the U.S. Supreme Court majority decision held that under the Constitution there was no "affirmative right of access to the pretrial proceeding" and confirmed Judge DePasquale's original ruling. First, they reasoned that a trial judge had the right to bar public scrutiny that might negatively influence court proceedings or jeopardize the right of due process for the accused. The Court reasoned that unrestrained media reporting may, at times, adversely shape public opinion and therefore threaten to render a jury unreliable or prejudiced by misinformed opinion. As such, Judge DePasquale's ruling, supported by both defense and prosecuting attorneys, seemed to appropriately exclude the public vis-a-vis journalistic coverage in the interest of fairness and to avoid "effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity." The U.S. Supreme Court went on to explain that the right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment "is for the protection of all persons accused of crime" and that openness of criminal trials did not entitle the public and press to unrestricted access to courtrooms. Justices pointed out that the public desire to be informed about the proceedings of trials must be balanced with "other constitutional guarantees extended to the accused as well." The Court did not underestimate the social interest served by media coverage of court proceedings, but they held that none of the petitioner's rights were infringed upon under the Sixth Amendment. The majority opinion further pointed out that although history showed that the Sixth Amendment presumes the "common-law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings," that did not necessarily mean that trials could not be closed from the public to ensure fairness of process. If, as in the case presided over by Judge DePasquale, all participants agreed to have a closed hearing for "efficient administration of justice," press members have no right to demand access for the purpose of public scrutiny. Neither did the Court find evidence of constitutional violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioner's reporter attended the hearing but made no objection to the judge's decision at that time. Moreover, denial of information about the pretrial hearing was only temporary since transcripts were later made available after the risks of prejudicial danger had expired. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision denied the validity of the petitioner's claim because the Court was not asked to evaluate the importance of social desirability for open trials. Instead, the issue at stake was whether barring the petitioner from a pretrial hearing was unconstitutional if all participants in the litigation had agreed to a closed proceeding. In that respect, the Court found that respecting the due process rights of the defendants outweighed the right of public access to judicial proceedings.

In principle, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Court's majority opinion but all chose to deliver separate, concurring opinions. Notwithstanding a public interest to attend court proceedings, Burger noted that "interest alone does not create a constitutional right." Justice Powell further pointed out that the "right of access to [the] courtroom is not absolute" because there existed a possibility that press reports could stir up wrongful and deceptive public opinion and thus inappropriately prejudice a jury. Powell also pointed out that because the two defendants were so young, press coverage of the case was greatly extended and, in fact, represented a credible threat to their right to have fair trial. Justice Rehnquist further held that courts could exercise a perfectly acceptable practice by freely determining "whether to open or close the proceeding."

Conversely, dissenting justices agreed that there were no significant reasons to justify the exclusion of publicity for pretrial hearings. The minority view was that press reports of the defendant's trial presented a factual, objective review of events; neither did the minority opinion believe that public opinion necessarily manifested danger to fair judicial proceedings. They explained that Sixth Amendment constraints to have open trials should be considered as a "restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." Thus, they emphasized the need to allow public presence in courtrooms because, historically, the public interest serves as a safeguard in the administration of justice. They further opined that Sixth Amendment rights did not enable defendants to have "private" court proceedings if they waived their Sixth Amendment rights to have open public trials. Instead, they felt that public trials increase "effectiveness of the trial process" by scrutinizing the system of justice applied in a courtroom. Moreover, before excluding public scrutiny of a trial, substantial proof must be provided to show that public conduct could "irreparably damage fair trial right" and that other alternatives could not protect defendant's due process rights. The minority opinion felt that to exclude public access to a pretrial hearing, the court and trial participants must provide precise reasons that "demonstrate inescapable necessity for closure of proceedings."