Argersinger v. Hamlin

Argersinger extended the holding of the landmark case, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), in which the Supreme Court had ruled that all accused felons must be represented by counsel at trial. Now, the Court held, the state must appoint a lawyer to represent even misdemeanor defendants facing the prospect of incarceration if they are too poor to afford one.

Jon Richard Argersinger was arrested and charged in Florida with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment for up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both. After a trial before a judge, where Argersinger was not represented by counsel because he could not afford one, he was sentenced to 90 days in jail. Argersinger then filed a habeas corpus action before the Florida Supreme Court, challenging his confinement on grounds that his conviction without benefit of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment's right to a fair trial. After the state supreme court denied Argersinger's petition, he applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for review of this decision.

The Florida court had based its decision on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), in which the Court had ruled that the right to a court-appointed attorney only extended to indigent defendants charged with non-petty offenses punishable by more than 6 months imprisonment. The issue in Duncan had been the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, so now the Court turned to another precedent, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), to address the issue of incarceration of criminal defendants without representation. The holding there--that indigent defendants in felony cases have a right to appointed counsel--was now extended to include misdemeanor defendants facing prison sentences. As Justice Douglas wrote for the Court: "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."

Although the vote to overturn the lower court ruling in Argersinger was unanimous, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he voiced doubts about the sweeping rule this case established, which he believed would cause difficulties in the administration of criminal justice:

The flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies the principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no means a universal fact.

Instead, Powell wrote:

I would hold that the right to counsel in petty offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The determination should be made before the accused formally pleads . . .

And indeed, 16 years later, the Supreme Court limited the implication of Argersinger that all criminal defendants who cannot afford to hire an attorney be appointed counsel. In Scott v. Illinois (1979), the Court held that only those indigent criminal defendants who are actually confronting jail time--not those for whom it is only a theoretical possibility--have a Sixth Amendment right to a court-appointed lawyer.