Pennsylvania v. Muniz

Justice Brennan, writing for the majority noted that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no one shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This does not mean that a suspect may not be compelled to produce physical evidence. It refers to a suspect providing evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, meaning that it relay a factual assertion or discloses information.

Brennan noted that in the case Miranda v. Arizona (1966) the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects people not only from testifying against themselves in a criminal courtroom, but also from informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. Before any questioning, a person must be given the Miranda warnings. Because Muniz was not read his Miranda rights until after the videotaped proceedings, any verbal statements that were both testimonial and elicited during interrogations should have been suppressed. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued that because Muniz's statement about his sixth birthday was not testimonial and the answers to the prior questions were not elicited by custodial interrogation his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. The Supreme Court agreed that slurred speech is not a testimonial. The answer to the sixth birthday question was incriminating because it could be inferred from it that Muniz's mental state was confused. The Commonwealth argued that this incriminating inference does not invoke the Fifth Amendment because the inference concerns the physiological functioning of Muniz's brain.

The Court noted that the correct question to ask here was whether the incriminating inference was drawn from a testimonial act or from physical evidence. To be testimonial a communication must explicitly or implicitly relate a factual assertion or disclose information. The Fifth Amendment is invoked to spare the accused from having to reveal his knowledge relating him to the offense. The privilege of the Fifth Amendment reflects the Court's unwillingness to subject suspects to the cruel "trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. If a suspect is asked a question forcing him to confront the "trilemma" of truth, falsity, or silence, the suspect's response contains a testimonial component. The sixth birthday question asked of Muniz required a testimonial response because the inherently coercive environment precluded the option of remaining silent. Muniz could therefore only incriminate himself by admitting that he did not know the date or answer untruthfully by guessing. His answer, that he did not know, allowed an incriminating inference that his mental faculties were impaired. Thus the answer to this question, since it was testimonial, should have been suppressed.

The Commonwealth argued that the questions asked regarding name, address, etc. were not custodial interrogation. The Court noted that any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect are subject to the Miranda warning. The perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police, is the focus here. Custodial interrogation includes express questioning and words or actions that, given the officer's knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows are likely to have the force of a question and are likely to elicit an incriminating response. Thus Officer Hosterman's first seven questions were custodial interrogation. However, the answers to these questions are still admissible in court because the questions fall within a routine booking question exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions about biographical data needed to complete the booking process. As a result, the answers to these questions did not need to be suppressed.

The Court noted that Muniz's incriminating statements during the videotaping were voluntary and not elicited in response to custodial interrogation. Brennan summed up by stating that Miranda requires suppression of Muniz's response to the question regarding the date of his sixth birthday, but not the entire audio portion of the videotape. The lower court's judgment reversing the conviction was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. His dissent noted that the sixth birthday question does not subject the suspect to the "trilemma." The officer asked the question to check how well Muniz could do a simple math problem. If the police may require Muniz to use his body in order to demonstrate the level of his physical coordination, there is no reason why they should not be able to require him to speak or write in order to determine his mental coordination . . . .Muniz's responses to the videotaped booking questions were not testimonial and do not warrant application of the privilege."