Stanford v. Kentucky

Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death sentence on those who were juveniles at the time they the committed crimes for which they were later convicted. Putting to death those who had almost reached the age of majority for horrendous crimes did not offend the drafters of the Bill of Rights and does not offend contemporary American society:

At that time [when the Bill of Rights was adopted], common law set the . . . presumption of incapacity to commit any felony at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed on anyone over the age of 7 . . . Thus petitioners are left to argue that their punishment is contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" [Quoting Trop v. Dulles (1958)] . . . a majority of the States that permit capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or above . . .

For Scalia, and for four other members of the Court, the fact that a majority of the states permit capital punishment to be enforced against those over 16 years of age proved conclusive: Stanford's sentence was affirmed.

Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from this view, declining to vote in favor of the death penalty, as always. In his dissenting opinion, Brennan made much of the fact that state prosecutors seldom pursue the death penalty for juveniles. For Brennan, this was proof that capital punishment for anyone under the age of 18 did not conform with "contemporary standards of decency."

The whole notion of juvenile justice is in fact a modern one. The concept originated late in the nineteenth century and was not subjected to constitutional restraints until Kent v. United States (1966). In In re Gault (1967), the Supreme Court held that juvenile courts must observe the same procedural protections afforded adult offenders. And in In re Winship (1970), the Court ruled that prosecutors who charge juveniles with adult crimes must meet the adult standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt."

While these early decisions might seem to have expanded protections for juvenile offenders, Stanford demonstrates that the process of bringing juvenile justice in line with the criminal procedure applied to adults has its darker side. Stanford made it clear that if an offender is at least 16 when he or she commits a capital crime, the Supreme Court will not intervene to prevent the death sentence from being carried out.