Muscarello v. United States

Muscarello argued the definition adopted by the courts blurred the legal distinction between the terms "carry" and "transport." The latter word was used prevalently elsewhere in "firearms" related legislation and federal regulations. He argued the Court's interpretation of the law would apply as well to passengers on buses, trains, or ships, who stored firearms in checked luggage. Muscarello claimed the law was ambiguous and should not be enforced.

By a narrow majority vote of 5-4, the Court affirmed the lower courts' findings in the First and Fifth Circuits. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, wrote that the phrase "carries a firearm" applied to persons knowingly possessing and conveying firearms in a vehicle, including locked compartments of the car. Breyer found many of Muscarello's arguments unconvincing.

Breyer examined the ordinary English meaning of the phrase "carries a firearm." The parties to the case essentially agreed that Congress intended the ordinary meaning of the phrase. Though the word "carry" may have many different meanings, only two were found relevant in this decision. The primary meaning of "carry firearms" is that a person can carry a firearm in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle. Breyer noted the modern press, novels and newspapers commonly used "carry" in this way. Breyer wrote that though these examples do not relate directly to carrying guns, nothing is unique distinguishing weapons from other materials.

When the word carry was used to mean "bearing" or "packing," Breyer found the meaning was less clear. "Packing" a gun could apply, even if a person "carrying" the gun was stationary. However, Breyer found no reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word to this narrow meaning. Breyer wrote, "It is difficult to believe, however, that Congress intended to limit the statutory word to this definition imposing special punishment upon the comatose gangster while ignoring drug lords who drive to a sale carrying an arsenal of weapons in their van." It made no sense for a statute to penalize a person who walked with a gun in a bag to the site of a drug sale, but ignored an individual who drove to the same site with a gun in a bag in the car. Breyer asked "How persuasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car?" Breyer found it difficult to hold that those who were prepared to sell drugs by placing guns in their cars were less dangerous, or less deserving of punishment, than those who carried handguns on their person.

Breyer concluded Congress intended the former, more common use of the word. Breyer found it not surprising that the federal circuit courts relied consistently on this common meaning of "carry" and not to the more limited interpretation.

Muscarello argued that the Court's broad interpretation of carry confused the term with transport. However, Breyer responded "that our definition does not equate carry and transport. Carry implies personal agency and some degree of possession, whereas transport does not have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances." Therefore, "transport" was a broad category that included "carry" as well as other activities. Breyer found no violation of the person's right to "bear" arms.

In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was joined by William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and David Souter. Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "carries." Ginsburg argued the phrase "carrying a firearm" literally meant to bear a weapon in a manner ready for use. Carry commonly implied various meanings, but the meaning embraced by the Court she did not consider a reliable indicator of what Congress intended by "carries a firearm." She also noted discrepancies between the more general federal sentencing guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentence under the drug crime law. In Muscarello's case, the general guidelines recommended a 16 month maximum sentence, dramatically less than the five year minimum sentence. A significant difference when the Court was so divided over the intent of the more stringent code.