Columbia Broadcasting System v. The Democratic National Committee

This case set the precedent that broadcasters were not required by the Constitution to accept editorials in the form of ads.

One of the things that sets the United States apart from other countries is the wide range of freedoms its citizens enjoy. Among those freedoms, one of the most precious is the freedom of speech as expressed in the Constitution's First Amendment. This amendment takes away from the U.S. government the authority to tell its residents what to say, how to say it, to whom they can say it, and much more.

Broadcasting, because of its pervasiveness, presented a large problem for the government. Ideas, previously concentrated in smaller, easily controlled areas, were now available to most of the country. There was much debate about how much information should be allowed to be transmitted across the airwaves and through television sets, and how much should be stopped from being communicated at all. The Supreme Court, in the center of this controversy, ruled that one of the purposes of the First Amendment was to allow for uninhibited ideas, allowing truth to ultimately shine through. They took a rather liberal approach to this problem.

Later, the Federal Communications Commission developed the "fairness doctrine," which Congress later legislated into law (and even later repealed). The "fairness doctrine" was to help maintain freedom of speech through the airwaves by requiring broadcasters "to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."

However, with so many different citizens representing so many different views, individual freedoms sometimes clashed. When this happens, it is not always evident--even to the U.S. Supreme Court--in which direction constitutional compliance lies. It is within this problem that the Columbia Broadcasting System v. The Democratic National Committee case arose.

In January of 1970, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission that a Washington, D.C. radio station--WTOP--had refused to sell it broadcast time for a series of one-minute spot announcements that expressed BEM's views on the Vietnam War.

Many broadcasters had a policy of refusing to sell announcement time to individuals and groups for expressing their different views on controversial topics. WTOP--like many other stations--maintained that it already covered important topical issues, including Vietnam, broadly and fairly. Therefore, said the station, it did not have to accept BEMs "paid for" editorials. WTOP demonstrated that it had already broadcast the views of Vietnam policy critics on numerous occasions, and did not need or want the BEM's broadcasts.

BEM challenged WTOP's fairness in regard to Vietnam, but it couldn't muster any evidence demonstrating its claim. In May of the same year, the DNC asked the FCC to rule that, in general, a broadcaster could not refuse to sell advertising to responsible parties for soliciting funds or commenting on public issues. According to the DNC, this was covered by the Constitution's First Amendment, and the Communications Act. After due consideration, the FCC rejected the demands of the BEM and the DNC, stating broadly that WTOP had violated neither First Amendment rights nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reversed the FCC's decision, saying that, indeed the station's policy of refusing paid editorial advertisements violated the First Amendment as long as the station accepted other forms of paid advertising.

When the U.S. Supreme Court heard this case, Justice Burger ruled that broadcasters were not required by the Constitution to purchase and broadcast editorial advertising, and six other members joined in different points on his opinion. His point was that such an arrangement would not necessarily further the public interest nor the free exchange of ideas because the platform would be weighted towards those who could spend the most for the most amount of editorial advertising time.

Furthermore, he was concerned that such a decision would add to government's control over the content of public debates, and that it could allow the airwaves to be monopolized by people and organizations of one political persuasion, creating, in effect, a true "captive audience." The Court put emphasis on the limited space and time of broadcasting, saying that, "[what] is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."

Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, saying that since the broadcast media are so pervasive, deciding flatly to deny public access to broadcasting limits and hampers a free and open public debate severely.