Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb

The Supreme Court was unanimous in deciding that the district courts ruled incorrectly, striking down Indiana's law. Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion, said:

This principle that `the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action' has been applied not only to statutes that directly forbid or proscribe advocacy, . . . but also to regulatory schemes that determine eligibility for public employment, . . . tax exemptions, . . . and moral fitness justifying disbarment. Appellees argue that the principle should nevertheless not obtain in cases of state regulation of access to the ballot. We perceive no reason to make an exception, and appellees suggest none. Indeed, all of the reasons for application of the principle in the other contexts are equally applicable here.

The Court also emphasized the importance of the case to the integrity of the political process, quoting previous decisions:

Thus, burdening access to the ballot, rights of association in the political party of one's choice, interests in casting an effective vote and in running for office, not because the party urges others "to do something, now or in the future . . . but . . . merely to believe in something" Yates is to infringe interests certainly as substantial as those in public employment, tax exemption, or the practice of law. For "the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights . . . " (Reynolds v. Sims) "Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." (Wesberry v. Sanders)

Justice Powell was joined in a concurring opinion by three other justices, in which he agreed with the result but felt the decision should have been reached for a much more basic issue, that the Democratic and Republican Parties had also not filed affidavits promising they would not advocate the violent overthrow of the government. He wrote:

In my view it was quite unnecessary to reach the issue addressed by the Court. It was established at trial that the appellees had certified the Democratic and Republican Parties despite the failure of party officials to submit the prescribed affidavits . . . In Williams v. Rhodes, . . . this Court held that a discriminatory preference for established parties under a state's electoral system can be justified only by a "compelling state interest." In the present case, no colorable justification has been offered for placing on appellants burdens not imposed on the two established parties. It follows that the appellees' discriminatory application of the Indiana statute denied appellants equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The lasting import of the case, however, came in the confirmation of a principle the Court had earlier stated in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button case:

Precision of a regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.