Petitioners
Richard Quirin, et al.
Respondent
Albert Cox, Brigadier General, Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington
Petitioners' Claim
That the president lacks the power to set up special military tribunals to try war crimes, and that civil courts have the right to review decisions made by these special military courts.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Kenneth C. Royall
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, James Francis Byrnes, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Stanley Forman Reed, Owen Josephus Roberts, Harlan Fiske Stone (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
None (Frank Murphy did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
31 July 1942
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the president has the power to set up military courts in time of war, but that the decisions of these tribunals can be reviewed by civil courts.
Significance
Ex Parte Quirin established the principle that, in times of war, enemyagents can be tried by military courts. Such defendants do not have the right to a civil jury trial, although the decisions of the courts martial are subject to review by civilian courts.
Richard Quirin was one of eight German saboteurs captured just after the United States entered World War II. The eight were accused of violating the unformalized international law of war and the Articles of War enacted by the U.S.Congress. The petitioners had been detained for trial on charges of attempting to undermine the American war effort. Their trials were to be held before amilitary commission set up for that purpose by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The eight saboteurs applied to the District Court of the District of Columbiafor permission to file petitions for habeas corpus, challenging theirconfinement, in the U.S. Supreme Court. When the district court turned themdown, they applied directly to the Supreme Court. In their petitions, they challenged the authority of the president to set up the military tribunal and asserted their right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to trial by jury, aprocedure with more safeguards than are observed in military courts.
Supreme Court Holds Special Session as Saboteurs Face Death Penalty
The military trial went forward, even while the Supreme Court considered their petitions. By 27 July 1942, all the evidence had been submitted at the military trial. The case was closed except for the arguments of prosecutors and defense lawyers. On 28 July 1942, the Supreme Court met in special session toconsider the saboteurs' petitions. (This was an ex parte proceeding because the petitioners were not present, having been confined in military prisons.) The Court rejected all eight. Six of the prisoners were executed a little morethan a week later.
The Court did not consider the guilt or innocence of the alleged saboteurs. The only issue in the case was the authority of the military tribunal. In an opinion finally released 29 October 1942, Chief Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the president's powers as commander-in-chief to upholdthe creation of a military tribunal in times of war. The legitimacy of the tribunal was also supported by congressional legislation authorizing military trials for those accused of violating the law of war. Although they did not have a right to ordinary civilian procedures such as a grand jury hearing or trial by jury, defendants such as the eight German saboteurs do have the rightto have the judicial denial of petitions for writs of habeas corpus reviewed by federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court.
In 1866, in Ex parte Milligan, a case resulting from restrictions on civil liberties during the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled that military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians in time of war in areas where civilcourts remain open. Lambdin P. Milligan was a northerner with Confederate sympathies who attempted to seize arms from federal arsenals and to liberate Confederate soldiers from northern prisons. Now, in Quirin, the Court distinguished its earlier ruling by declaring that the German saboteurs, unlikeMilligan, were "enemy belligerents":
Related Cases
Richard Quirin, et al.
Respondent
Albert Cox, Brigadier General, Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington
Petitioners' Claim
That the president lacks the power to set up special military tribunals to try war crimes, and that civil courts have the right to review decisions made by these special military courts.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Kenneth C. Royall
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, James Francis Byrnes, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Stanley Forman Reed, Owen Josephus Roberts, Harlan Fiske Stone (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
None (Frank Murphy did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
31 July 1942
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the president has the power to set up military courts in time of war, but that the decisions of these tribunals can be reviewed by civil courts.
Significance
Ex Parte Quirin established the principle that, in times of war, enemyagents can be tried by military courts. Such defendants do not have the right to a civil jury trial, although the decisions of the courts martial are subject to review by civilian courts.
Richard Quirin was one of eight German saboteurs captured just after the United States entered World War II. The eight were accused of violating the unformalized international law of war and the Articles of War enacted by the U.S.Congress. The petitioners had been detained for trial on charges of attempting to undermine the American war effort. Their trials were to be held before amilitary commission set up for that purpose by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The eight saboteurs applied to the District Court of the District of Columbiafor permission to file petitions for habeas corpus, challenging theirconfinement, in the U.S. Supreme Court. When the district court turned themdown, they applied directly to the Supreme Court. In their petitions, they challenged the authority of the president to set up the military tribunal and asserted their right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to trial by jury, aprocedure with more safeguards than are observed in military courts.
Supreme Court Holds Special Session as Saboteurs Face Death Penalty
The military trial went forward, even while the Supreme Court considered their petitions. By 27 July 1942, all the evidence had been submitted at the military trial. The case was closed except for the arguments of prosecutors and defense lawyers. On 28 July 1942, the Supreme Court met in special session toconsider the saboteurs' petitions. (This was an ex parte proceeding because the petitioners were not present, having been confined in military prisons.) The Court rejected all eight. Six of the prisoners were executed a little morethan a week later.
The Court did not consider the guilt or innocence of the alleged saboteurs. The only issue in the case was the authority of the military tribunal. In an opinion finally released 29 October 1942, Chief Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the president's powers as commander-in-chief to upholdthe creation of a military tribunal in times of war. The legitimacy of the tribunal was also supported by congressional legislation authorizing military trials for those accused of violating the law of war. Although they did not have a right to ordinary civilian procedures such as a grand jury hearing or trial by jury, defendants such as the eight German saboteurs do have the rightto have the judicial denial of petitions for writs of habeas corpus reviewed by federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court.
In 1866, in Ex parte Milligan, a case resulting from restrictions on civil liberties during the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled that military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians in time of war in areas where civilcourts remain open. Lambdin P. Milligan was a northerner with Confederate sympathies who attempted to seize arms from federal arsenals and to liberate Confederate soldiers from northern prisons. Now, in Quirin, the Court distinguished its earlier ruling by declaring that the German saboteurs, unlikeMilligan, were "enemy belligerents":
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemycombatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are examples of belligerents who are . . . offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
Related Cases
- Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
- In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
- United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Further Readings
- Belknap, Michael R. "The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case." Military Law Review, Vol. 89,1980, pp. 59-95.
- Fellman, David. The Defendant's Rights Today. Madison: Universityof Wisconsin Press, 1976.
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