Petitioner
Lambdin P. Milligan
Respondent
United States
Petitioner's Claim
A military commission was not a competent tribunal for the trial of the petitioner, a military commission may not try nor convict him, and the petitionershould be released.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
J. S. Black, J. E. McDonald, J. A. Garfield, David Dudley Field, A. L. Roache, John R. Coffuth
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
James Speed; Henry Stanbery, U.S. Attorney General; Benjamin F. Butler
Justices for the Court
Salmon Portland Chase, Nathan Clifford, David Davis (writing for the Court),Stephen Johnson Field, Robert Cooper Grier, Samuel Freeman Miller, Samuel Nelson, Noah Haynes Swayne, James Moore Wayne
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 April 1866
Decision
The trial of Milligan on charges of treason and conspiracy, was found to be illegal because it was conducted by a military court.
Significance
A military court may not try an ordinary citizen unconnected with the military or an area of the country directly involved in war. The jurisdiction to trythis citizen falls to the civil and federal courts. The right to a trial byjury is preserved, and regardless of whether the citizen is guilty of the crimes tried by the military court, the court may not pass judgment nor sentencethe individual.
During the Civil War, Lambdin Milligan was charged by a military commission of conspiring against the federal government. Some of the charges included giving aid and comfort to the rebels and inciting an insurrection. He was also charged with disloyal practices and violations of the laws of war.
The military commission charged that he, with others, conspired to seize theU.S. state arsenal, and to release the prisoners of war confined in the military prison. Then, the commission charged, Milligan planned to arm these prisoners, and join the forces of the South who planned to invade the states of Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois. Milligan was convicted and sentenced to hang.He appealed his case to the Supreme Court.
Justice Davis, delivering the opinion of the Court, said the U.S. circuit court had authority to certify questions in a proceeding for a writ of habeascorpus to inquire into a sentence of a military commission, and that theSupreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine them. The act of Congress "relating to habeas corpus" approved 3 March 1863, conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court of Indiana to hear such a case.
Davis said that a military commission had no jurisdiction to try and sentencesomeone who was not a resident of one of the rebellious states, nor a prisoner of war. Davis believed that Congress can grant no such power. The right oftrial by jury is preserved to everyone accused of crime, who is not attachedto the military in actual service.
Martial law, Justice Davis wrote, cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The invasion must be real, such as one that closes the courts and deposes the civil administration. Military rule can never exist where the courts are open,and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. Davis also wrote that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course;and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party applying isdenied the right of proceeding any further with it.
If the military trial of Milligan was contrary to law, then he was entitled,on the facts stated in his petition, to be discharged from custody by the terms of the act of Congress of 3 March 1863. He could not be treated as a prisoner of war, when he had lived in Indiana for over 20 years and was arrested there.
Justice Chase delivered a concurring order but a different opinion. He was joined by Justices Wayne, Swayne, and Miller. He stated that though the crimeswith which Milligan was charged were of the gravest character, it is more important to the country and to every citizen that he should not be punished under an illegal sentence, sanctioned by the Supreme Court, than that he shouldbe punished at all. The laws which protect the liberties of the whole peoplemust not be violated or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty,unauthorized though merited justice.
Related Cases
Lambdin P. Milligan
Respondent
United States
Petitioner's Claim
A military commission was not a competent tribunal for the trial of the petitioner, a military commission may not try nor convict him, and the petitionershould be released.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
J. S. Black, J. E. McDonald, J. A. Garfield, David Dudley Field, A. L. Roache, John R. Coffuth
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
James Speed; Henry Stanbery, U.S. Attorney General; Benjamin F. Butler
Justices for the Court
Salmon Portland Chase, Nathan Clifford, David Davis (writing for the Court),Stephen Johnson Field, Robert Cooper Grier, Samuel Freeman Miller, Samuel Nelson, Noah Haynes Swayne, James Moore Wayne
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 April 1866
Decision
The trial of Milligan on charges of treason and conspiracy, was found to be illegal because it was conducted by a military court.
Significance
A military court may not try an ordinary citizen unconnected with the military or an area of the country directly involved in war. The jurisdiction to trythis citizen falls to the civil and federal courts. The right to a trial byjury is preserved, and regardless of whether the citizen is guilty of the crimes tried by the military court, the court may not pass judgment nor sentencethe individual.
During the Civil War, Lambdin Milligan was charged by a military commission of conspiring against the federal government. Some of the charges included giving aid and comfort to the rebels and inciting an insurrection. He was also charged with disloyal practices and violations of the laws of war.
The military commission charged that he, with others, conspired to seize theU.S. state arsenal, and to release the prisoners of war confined in the military prison. Then, the commission charged, Milligan planned to arm these prisoners, and join the forces of the South who planned to invade the states of Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois. Milligan was convicted and sentenced to hang.He appealed his case to the Supreme Court.
Justice Davis, delivering the opinion of the Court, said the U.S. circuit court had authority to certify questions in a proceeding for a writ of habeascorpus to inquire into a sentence of a military commission, and that theSupreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine them. The act of Congress "relating to habeas corpus" approved 3 March 1863, conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court of Indiana to hear such a case.
Davis said that a military commission had no jurisdiction to try and sentencesomeone who was not a resident of one of the rebellious states, nor a prisoner of war. Davis believed that Congress can grant no such power. The right oftrial by jury is preserved to everyone accused of crime, who is not attachedto the military in actual service.
Martial law, Justice Davis wrote, cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The invasion must be real, such as one that closes the courts and deposes the civil administration. Military rule can never exist where the courts are open,and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. Davis also wrote that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course;and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party applying isdenied the right of proceeding any further with it.
If the military trial of Milligan was contrary to law, then he was entitled,on the facts stated in his petition, to be discharged from custody by the terms of the act of Congress of 3 March 1863. He could not be treated as a prisoner of war, when he had lived in Indiana for over 20 years and was arrested there.
Justice Chase delivered a concurring order but a different opinion. He was joined by Justices Wayne, Swayne, and Miller. He stated that though the crimeswith which Milligan was charged were of the gravest character, it is more important to the country and to every citizen that he should not be punished under an illegal sentence, sanctioned by the Supreme Court, than that he shouldbe punished at all. The laws which protect the liberties of the whole peoplemust not be violated or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty,unauthorized though merited justice.
Related Cases
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
- Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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