Appellant
Baldwin, for the state of New York
Appellee
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.
Appellant's Claim
That G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., a milk distributor, had no right under the New York Milk Control Act to sell milk in New York state, milk that had been purchased outside the state at a price lower than the minimum established by the act.
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo (writing for the Court), Charles Evans Hughes, James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, HarlanFiske Stone, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1935
Decision
The New York Milk Control Act violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Significance
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. reinforced federal control over interstate commerce, making it difficult for states to use alleged health concernsas a pretext for keeping out products from other states in order to protecttheir own industries.
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. was a milk distributor that bought its milk from a creamery in Fair Haven, Vermont and sold it in its home state of New York. Everyday, the company purchased some 200 cans of milk and 20 cans of cream, a "can" being equal to 40 gallons. Seelig sold 90 percent in the original cans to hotels, restaurants, and other large facilities. The remaining 10 percent wasrepackaged in individual bottles and sold directly to consumers.
Under the New York Milk Control Act, dealers such as G. A. F. Seelig had to pay producers (such as the creamery in Vermont) a certain price for milk. If they paid less, the state commissioner of farms and markets would refuse to license the sale of the milk in the state of New York. The price G. A. F. Seelig paid was below the minimum, and therefore the commissioner denied the company a license to sell its milk within the state. Seelig filed suit against thestate, in the person of Baldwin and other officials, and the case went to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.The court issued a split decree: with regard to the milk sold in the "original packages" or cans, Seelig indeed had a right to resell it in New York. However, the court ruled for Baldwin and the state with regard to the repackaged,consumer-sized bottles.
The Cross-Appeal
New York took its case to the Supreme Court on a cross-appeal, which meant that Baldwin was now the appellant, and G. A. F. Seelig the appellee. As notedby Justice Cardozo, who would give the Court's opinion, New York did not attempt to assert that it had authority to regulate the price paid for milk in Vermont; nor did it claim power to prevent anyone from bringing in milk from Vermont (assuming there was no health issue involved), regardless of the pricepaid. The only area in which New York claimed authority was in prohibiting the sale of such milk once it had entered the state or, as Cardozo put it, "Theimporter . . . may keep his milk or drink it, but sell it, he may not."
The "Metropolitan Milk District," which consisted of New York City and surrounding areas, bought some 70 percent of its milk from within the state. As forthe other 30 percent, according to Cardozo, the price provision of the MilkControl Act helped "keep the system unencumbered by competition from afar." Whereas milk prices would tend to be relatively uniform within the state, in Vermont they might be lower. The act removed the economic incentive for buyingmilk from outside New York. To some, it appeared that the act simply servedto protect the jobs of New York milk producers. But the state, in its case, asserted that the Milk Control Act had been put in place ultimately to protectthe health of its citizens. By ensuring that New York milk producers earneda good profit and thus stayed in business, the act maintained a strong milk industry within the state. This, in turn, meant a milk industry was under state health control, control which would presumably be forfeited to other statesif New York producers were consistently undersold and forced out of business.
Violation of the Commerce Clause
Justice Cardozo gave the Court's opinion, the only opinion on record for thecase. He began by clarifying the issue, stating that New York was only tryingto limit the sale of milk purchased from another state, not the purchase itself. But even so, Cardozo noted, the act violated the Constitution andpresented a barrier to interstate traffic every bit as effective as the tariff by which independent nations often restrict trade. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, the "commerce clause," gives power over interstate commerce to Congress, not the states. Therefore, "it is the established doctrine of this courtthat a state may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate business."
With regard to the argument that New York milk producers should be kept in business in order to maintain state control over the milk industry for the sakeof its citizens' health, Cardozo saw this only as a smokescreen for protection of local industry. Furthermore, if one state is able to make an exceptionto the commerce clause, he suggested, this paves the way for each state to make its own laws regarding trade. In other words to behave as though it were anation rather than a state that is subject to the federal government. To allow this, Cardozo remarked ominously, "would be to invite a speedy end of ournational solidarity." As for any possible argument that underpaid farmers inNew York would seek to relax sanitary controls in order to cut costs, Cardozoagain dismissed the idea. Such actions on the part of a farmer, he said, would have to be dealt with by more direct methods designed specifically to prevent the sale of milk that does not meet health standards. Presumably, such laws were already in place.
Keeping Trade Open between the States
Cardozo did not deny states the right to prevent the sale of products which fail to meet their health standards. However, he opposed the use of such standards as a means of protecting local industry. Thus the Court struck down Baldwin's cross-appeal on the issue of selling the milk to individual consumers.There is no evidence that the opinion of the Court was less than unanimous.
Baldwin was not the first case involving one state's attempt to regulate commerce with another state. The case of Gibbons v. Ogden, for instance, was heard in 1824 and concerned a steamboat franchise with questionablerestrictive clauses. Fourteen years after Baldwin, in Hood v. DuMond , the Court ruled that a state had no authority to refuse a license toa company processing milk for sale outside the state. In the years since Baldwin, the Court has generally upheld the maintenance of free trade between states except in instances involving health questions. Even in such situations, as in the case of Dean Milk Company v. Madison, the Court hasplaced the burden of proof on the state, to show that it is genuinely protecting the health of its citizens and not the health of its industry.
Related Cases
Baldwin, for the state of New York
Appellee
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.
Appellant's Claim
That G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., a milk distributor, had no right under the New York Milk Control Act to sell milk in New York state, milk that had been purchased outside the state at a price lower than the minimum established by the act.
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo (writing for the Court), Charles Evans Hughes, James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, HarlanFiske Stone, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1935
Decision
The New York Milk Control Act violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Significance
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. reinforced federal control over interstate commerce, making it difficult for states to use alleged health concernsas a pretext for keeping out products from other states in order to protecttheir own industries.
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. was a milk distributor that bought its milk from a creamery in Fair Haven, Vermont and sold it in its home state of New York. Everyday, the company purchased some 200 cans of milk and 20 cans of cream, a "can" being equal to 40 gallons. Seelig sold 90 percent in the original cans to hotels, restaurants, and other large facilities. The remaining 10 percent wasrepackaged in individual bottles and sold directly to consumers.
Under the New York Milk Control Act, dealers such as G. A. F. Seelig had to pay producers (such as the creamery in Vermont) a certain price for milk. If they paid less, the state commissioner of farms and markets would refuse to license the sale of the milk in the state of New York. The price G. A. F. Seelig paid was below the minimum, and therefore the commissioner denied the company a license to sell its milk within the state. Seelig filed suit against thestate, in the person of Baldwin and other officials, and the case went to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.The court issued a split decree: with regard to the milk sold in the "original packages" or cans, Seelig indeed had a right to resell it in New York. However, the court ruled for Baldwin and the state with regard to the repackaged,consumer-sized bottles.
The Cross-Appeal
New York took its case to the Supreme Court on a cross-appeal, which meant that Baldwin was now the appellant, and G. A. F. Seelig the appellee. As notedby Justice Cardozo, who would give the Court's opinion, New York did not attempt to assert that it had authority to regulate the price paid for milk in Vermont; nor did it claim power to prevent anyone from bringing in milk from Vermont (assuming there was no health issue involved), regardless of the pricepaid. The only area in which New York claimed authority was in prohibiting the sale of such milk once it had entered the state or, as Cardozo put it, "Theimporter . . . may keep his milk or drink it, but sell it, he may not."
The "Metropolitan Milk District," which consisted of New York City and surrounding areas, bought some 70 percent of its milk from within the state. As forthe other 30 percent, according to Cardozo, the price provision of the MilkControl Act helped "keep the system unencumbered by competition from afar." Whereas milk prices would tend to be relatively uniform within the state, in Vermont they might be lower. The act removed the economic incentive for buyingmilk from outside New York. To some, it appeared that the act simply servedto protect the jobs of New York milk producers. But the state, in its case, asserted that the Milk Control Act had been put in place ultimately to protectthe health of its citizens. By ensuring that New York milk producers earneda good profit and thus stayed in business, the act maintained a strong milk industry within the state. This, in turn, meant a milk industry was under state health control, control which would presumably be forfeited to other statesif New York producers were consistently undersold and forced out of business.
Violation of the Commerce Clause
Justice Cardozo gave the Court's opinion, the only opinion on record for thecase. He began by clarifying the issue, stating that New York was only tryingto limit the sale of milk purchased from another state, not the purchase itself. But even so, Cardozo noted, the act violated the Constitution andpresented a barrier to interstate traffic every bit as effective as the tariff by which independent nations often restrict trade. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, the "commerce clause," gives power over interstate commerce to Congress, not the states. Therefore, "it is the established doctrine of this courtthat a state may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate business."
With regard to the argument that New York milk producers should be kept in business in order to maintain state control over the milk industry for the sakeof its citizens' health, Cardozo saw this only as a smokescreen for protection of local industry. Furthermore, if one state is able to make an exceptionto the commerce clause, he suggested, this paves the way for each state to make its own laws regarding trade. In other words to behave as though it were anation rather than a state that is subject to the federal government. To allow this, Cardozo remarked ominously, "would be to invite a speedy end of ournational solidarity." As for any possible argument that underpaid farmers inNew York would seek to relax sanitary controls in order to cut costs, Cardozoagain dismissed the idea. Such actions on the part of a farmer, he said, would have to be dealt with by more direct methods designed specifically to prevent the sale of milk that does not meet health standards. Presumably, such laws were already in place.
Keeping Trade Open between the States
Cardozo did not deny states the right to prevent the sale of products which fail to meet their health standards. However, he opposed the use of such standards as a means of protecting local industry. Thus the Court struck down Baldwin's cross-appeal on the issue of selling the milk to individual consumers.There is no evidence that the opinion of the Court was less than unanimous.
Baldwin was not the first case involving one state's attempt to regulate commerce with another state. The case of Gibbons v. Ogden, for instance, was heard in 1824 and concerned a steamboat franchise with questionablerestrictive clauses. Fourteen years after Baldwin, in Hood v. DuMond , the Court ruled that a state had no authority to refuse a license toa company processing milk for sale outside the state. In the years since Baldwin, the Court has generally upheld the maintenance of free trade between states except in instances involving health questions. Even in such situations, as in the case of Dean Milk Company v. Madison, the Court hasplaced the burden of proof on the state, to show that it is genuinely protecting the health of its citizens and not the health of its industry.
Related Cases
- Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 Wheat. 1 (1824).
- Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
- Dean Milk Company v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Further Readings
- Bartholomew, Paul C., and Joseph F. Menez. Summaries of Leading Cases on the U.S. Constitution, 13th ed. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990.
- Chandler, Ralph C., et al. The Constitutional Law Dictionary, Vol.2. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1987.
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of theUnited States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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3 months ago
thank you very much!