Appellant
Charles F. Champion
Appellee
John C. Ames
Appellant's Claim
That a federal statute prohibiting the carrying of lottery tickets across state lines was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Moritz Rosenthal
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Beck, Assistant Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Henry Billings Brown, John Marshall Harlan I (writing for the Court), OliverWendell Holmes, Joseph McKenna, Edward Douglass White
Justices Dissenting
David Josiah Brewer, Melville Weston Fuller, Rufus Wheeler Peckham, George Shiras, Jr.
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 February 1903
Decision
Lottery tickets were traffic and carrying them from one state to another wasinterstate commerce. Under its power to regulate commerce among the states, Congress could prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from state to state.
Significance
Champion v. Ames was the first recognition of a federal police power.In this case, the Court defined the commerce power of Congress in broad terms, recognizing Congress' power to prohibit the transportation of certain items. Because of this de facto federal police power, national protective legislation grew quickly, leading to the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Mann Act.
Charles F. Champion was accused of violating an Act of Congress of 2 March 1895 entitled An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service. The case before the Supreme Court involved the constitutionality of the first section of the act, which forbade the carrying from one state to another of lottery tickets. Champion was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas for conspiracy involving lottery tickets. The indictment charged that on or about 1February 1899, in Dallas County, Texas, Champion and Charles B. Park conspired to carry lottery tickets from one state to another. Champion and Park had sent a box containing, among other things, two lottery tickets by way of the Wells-Fargo Express Company from Texas to Fresno, California. Champion was arrested in Chicago. Champion filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The writ of habeas corpus complained that Champion was restrained of his liberty by the Marshal of the United States and that the act of 1895 was void under the Constitution of the United States.
An Element Confessedly Injurious to the Public Morals
Champion argued that the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another state by an express company engaged in carrying freight and packages from state to state, although the tickets may be contained in a box, did not constitute commerce among the states within the meaning of the Constitution. Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The government argued that express companies, when in the business of transportation from one state to another, are instrumentalities of commerce among the states. The government also argued that carrying lottery tickets from one state to another is commerce which Congress may regulate and that Congress maymake such an activity an offense.
Justice Harlan I, writing for the majority, defined commerce as "commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches." The word "among" in the Commerce Clause referred to those internal concerns that affect the states generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular state. The Court defined "power" as the power to regulate or to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. In Hanley v. Kansas CitySouthern R. Co. (1903) the Court said that transportation for others, asan independent business, is commerce, whether or not the goods are sold after delivery. Prior cases showed that commerce among the states embraced navigation, intercourse, communication, traffic, the transit of persons, and the transmission of messages by telegraph. The prior cases also showed that the power of Congress to regulate commerce was plenary, complete in itself, and could be exerted by Congress to its utmost extent, subject only to the limits theConstitution places on it. "In determining the character of the regulationsto be adopted, Congress has a large discretion which is not to be controlledby the courts, simply because, in their opinion, such regulations may not bethe best or most effective that could be employed."
It was argued that lottery tickets were not of any real value in themselves and therefore are not subjects of commerce. But the tickets had a monetary value in the market among those who chose to sell or buy lottery tickets. Therefore, because lottery tickets were subject to traffic, they were subjects of commerce. The regulation of the carriage of such tickets from state to state,at least by independent carriers, was a regulation of commerce among the several states.
Champion's counsel argued that the act did not in fact regulate the carryingof lottery tickets from state to state, but in effect prohibited such carrying, and Congress was given the authority to regulate, not to prohibit. The Court responded that the Constitution did not define a legitimate regulation ofinterstate commerce, but left to the discretion of Congress the means employed in executing that power. As long as the end was legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, the means used were constitutional.
The Court noted that in determining whether regulation could sometimes take the form of prohibition, the nature of the interstate traffic could not be overlooked. In Phalen v. Virginia (1850) after observing that the suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality was among the most important duties of government, the Court said,
If a state considering suppressing lotteries could take into view the evils of lotteries, Congress, having the power to regulate commerce among the states, should be able to provide that such commerce is not polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another. The only part of the Constitution that a person wanting to send lottery tickets from one state to anothermight invoke is that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. "But surely it will not be said to be a part of anyone's liberty .. . that he shall be allowed to introduce into commerce among the states anelement that will be confessedly injurious to the public morals."
The Court noted that Congress, in passing the act, was only supplementing theaction of states which, for the protection of the public morals, prohibit lotteries. The act said, in effect, that it would not permit the declared policy of the states, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate commerce. "We should hesitate long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate commerce, cannot be metand crushed by the only power competent to that end."
The Court stated that regulation may sometimes appropriately assume the formof prohibition. This had been illustrated by regulations regarding the transportation from one state to another of diseased cattle and liquor, and by theSherman Anti-Trust Act, which prohibited unlawful restraints and monopolies.In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States (1899), the Court said,
The Court did not agree that the constitutional guarantee of liberty to the individual to enter into private contracts limited the power of Congress and prevented it from legislating on the subject of such contracts. In fact, the Court felt the opposite was true, that the provision regarding the liberty ofthe citizen was to some extent limited by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce allowed Congress to prohibit citizens from entering into private contracts which regulate commerce among the states.
Suppression of Lotteries is a Power of the States
Chief Justice Fuller, writing the dissent, noted that the power to impose restraints on persons and property to conserve and promote public health, good order, and prosperity was a power that has always belonged to the states. Thesuppression of lotteries as a harmful business fell within this police power.
Impact
Congress had no constitutional mandate to protect public health, welfare or morals, which traditionally were the responsibilities of the states through their police powers. But in the late nineteenth century Congress began to develop a federal police power to deal with social problems of national scope. Tojustify this, Congress used its authority over interstate commerce. In Champion v. Ames, known as the Lottery Case, the Court sanctioned the new federal police power, noting that the act did not interfere with the sale of lottery tickets within states and thus did not infringe on states' rights. TheCourt justified the ban on carrying lottery tickets over state lines as Congress' power to suppress "an evil of such appalling character," thus propounding the noxious products doctrine.
In 1904, the Court enlarged on the Champion v. Ames ruling, upholdinga police use of the federal tax power to hinder the marketing of colored oleomargarine. The Court cited the Lottery Case as a precedent when upholding thePure Food and Drug Act and the Mann Act, which prohibited transporting womenacross state lines for immoral purposes.
Issues of the extent of Congress' power over interstate commerce and the existence of a federal police power were central to the Progressive Party's attempts at rescuing the poor through strengthening the state. The importance of the harmfulness of a product in justifying a federal police power, stressed inthe Lottery Case, gave flexibility that allowed the Court to step back fromthis position as progressivism declined.
Related Cases
Charles F. Champion
Appellee
John C. Ames
Appellant's Claim
That a federal statute prohibiting the carrying of lottery tickets across state lines was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Moritz Rosenthal
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Beck, Assistant Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Henry Billings Brown, John Marshall Harlan I (writing for the Court), OliverWendell Holmes, Joseph McKenna, Edward Douglass White
Justices Dissenting
David Josiah Brewer, Melville Weston Fuller, Rufus Wheeler Peckham, George Shiras, Jr.
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 February 1903
Decision
Lottery tickets were traffic and carrying them from one state to another wasinterstate commerce. Under its power to regulate commerce among the states, Congress could prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from state to state.
Significance
Champion v. Ames was the first recognition of a federal police power.In this case, the Court defined the commerce power of Congress in broad terms, recognizing Congress' power to prohibit the transportation of certain items. Because of this de facto federal police power, national protective legislation grew quickly, leading to the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Mann Act.
Charles F. Champion was accused of violating an Act of Congress of 2 March 1895 entitled An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service. The case before the Supreme Court involved the constitutionality of the first section of the act, which forbade the carrying from one state to another of lottery tickets. Champion was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas for conspiracy involving lottery tickets. The indictment charged that on or about 1February 1899, in Dallas County, Texas, Champion and Charles B. Park conspired to carry lottery tickets from one state to another. Champion and Park had sent a box containing, among other things, two lottery tickets by way of the Wells-Fargo Express Company from Texas to Fresno, California. Champion was arrested in Chicago. Champion filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The writ of habeas corpus complained that Champion was restrained of his liberty by the Marshal of the United States and that the act of 1895 was void under the Constitution of the United States.
An Element Confessedly Injurious to the Public Morals
Champion argued that the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another state by an express company engaged in carrying freight and packages from state to state, although the tickets may be contained in a box, did not constitute commerce among the states within the meaning of the Constitution. Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The government argued that express companies, when in the business of transportation from one state to another, are instrumentalities of commerce among the states. The government also argued that carrying lottery tickets from one state to another is commerce which Congress may regulate and that Congress maymake such an activity an offense.
Justice Harlan I, writing for the majority, defined commerce as "commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations in all its branches." The word "among" in the Commerce Clause referred to those internal concerns that affect the states generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular state. The Court defined "power" as the power to regulate or to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. In Hanley v. Kansas CitySouthern R. Co. (1903) the Court said that transportation for others, asan independent business, is commerce, whether or not the goods are sold after delivery. Prior cases showed that commerce among the states embraced navigation, intercourse, communication, traffic, the transit of persons, and the transmission of messages by telegraph. The prior cases also showed that the power of Congress to regulate commerce was plenary, complete in itself, and could be exerted by Congress to its utmost extent, subject only to the limits theConstitution places on it. "In determining the character of the regulationsto be adopted, Congress has a large discretion which is not to be controlledby the courts, simply because, in their opinion, such regulations may not bethe best or most effective that could be employed."
It was argued that lottery tickets were not of any real value in themselves and therefore are not subjects of commerce. But the tickets had a monetary value in the market among those who chose to sell or buy lottery tickets. Therefore, because lottery tickets were subject to traffic, they were subjects of commerce. The regulation of the carriage of such tickets from state to state,at least by independent carriers, was a regulation of commerce among the several states.
Champion's counsel argued that the act did not in fact regulate the carryingof lottery tickets from state to state, but in effect prohibited such carrying, and Congress was given the authority to regulate, not to prohibit. The Court responded that the Constitution did not define a legitimate regulation ofinterstate commerce, but left to the discretion of Congress the means employed in executing that power. As long as the end was legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, the means used were constitutional.
The Court noted that in determining whether regulation could sometimes take the form of prohibition, the nature of the interstate traffic could not be overlooked. In Phalen v. Virginia (1850) after observing that the suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality was among the most important duties of government, the Court said,
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placedin contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries . . . The latter infests the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; itpreys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple.
If a state considering suppressing lotteries could take into view the evils of lotteries, Congress, having the power to regulate commerce among the states, should be able to provide that such commerce is not polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another. The only part of the Constitution that a person wanting to send lottery tickets from one state to anothermight invoke is that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. "But surely it will not be said to be a part of anyone's liberty .. . that he shall be allowed to introduce into commerce among the states anelement that will be confessedly injurious to the public morals."
The Court noted that Congress, in passing the act, was only supplementing theaction of states which, for the protection of the public morals, prohibit lotteries. The act said, in effect, that it would not permit the declared policy of the states, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate commerce. "We should hesitate long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate commerce, cannot be metand crushed by the only power competent to that end."
The Court stated that regulation may sometimes appropriately assume the formof prohibition. This had been illustrated by regulations regarding the transportation from one state to another of diseased cattle and liquor, and by theSherman Anti-Trust Act, which prohibited unlawful restraints and monopolies.In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States (1899), the Court said,
Under this grant of power to Congress that body . . . may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of anycontract between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct effect of such a contract will be . . . to directly . . . regulate to any substantial extent interstate commerce.
The Court did not agree that the constitutional guarantee of liberty to the individual to enter into private contracts limited the power of Congress and prevented it from legislating on the subject of such contracts. In fact, the Court felt the opposite was true, that the provision regarding the liberty ofthe citizen was to some extent limited by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce allowed Congress to prohibit citizens from entering into private contracts which regulate commerce among the states.
Suppression of Lotteries is a Power of the States
Chief Justice Fuller, writing the dissent, noted that the power to impose restraints on persons and property to conserve and promote public health, good order, and prosperity was a power that has always belonged to the states. Thesuppression of lotteries as a harmful business fell within this police power.
To hold that Congress has general police power would be to holdthat it may accomplish objects not entrusted to the general government, and to defeat the operation of the 10th Amendment, declaring that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
Impact
Congress had no constitutional mandate to protect public health, welfare or morals, which traditionally were the responsibilities of the states through their police powers. But in the late nineteenth century Congress began to develop a federal police power to deal with social problems of national scope. Tojustify this, Congress used its authority over interstate commerce. In Champion v. Ames, known as the Lottery Case, the Court sanctioned the new federal police power, noting that the act did not interfere with the sale of lottery tickets within states and thus did not infringe on states' rights. TheCourt justified the ban on carrying lottery tickets over state lines as Congress' power to suppress "an evil of such appalling character," thus propounding the noxious products doctrine.
In 1904, the Court enlarged on the Champion v. Ames ruling, upholdinga police use of the federal tax power to hinder the marketing of colored oleomargarine. The Court cited the Lottery Case as a precedent when upholding thePure Food and Drug Act and the Mann Act, which prohibited transporting womenacross state lines for immoral purposes.
Issues of the extent of Congress' power over interstate commerce and the existence of a federal police power were central to the Progressive Party's attempts at rescuing the poor through strengthening the state. The importance of the harmfulness of a product in justifying a federal police power, stressed inthe Lottery Case, gave flexibility that allowed the Court to step back fromthis position as progressivism declined.
Related Cases
- Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
- Hanley v. Kansas City S. R. Co., 187 U.S. 617 (1903).
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