Calder v. Bull

Petitioners
Mr. and Mrs. Calder
Respondents
Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull
Petitioners' Claim
That Connecticut legislation granting a rehearing of a probate dispute violated the Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws.
Justices for the Court
Samuel Chase (writing for the Court), William Cushing, James Iredell, WilliamPaterson
Justices Dissenting
None (Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
8 August 1798
Decision
Connecticut's legislation was not a constitutional violation because the ex post factoprovision applies only to criminal cases.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in Calder v. Bull changed the course of American jurisprudence by eliminating consideration of ex post facto violations in civil cases.
The Facts of the Case
Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws, laws drafted "after the fact." The specific meaning and application of this provision was not clarified by the Supreme Court untilit ruled in the case of Calder v. Bull.
This case arose out of a dispute between two married couples, the Calders andBulls, over the estate left behind by Normand Morrison, a physician who diedin 1793. Although the Bulls were the express beneficiaries of Morrison's estate, the Calders secured the property rights to some of the deceased's possessions. The Bulls then took the Calders to Connecticut probate court, which ruled in the Calders' favor. By law, the Bulls then had 18 months to appeal this ruling. When that time period expired, they entreated the state legislatureto pass a law changing the time limit on appeals. Upon rehearing the case, the probate court then ruled in favor of the Bulls. Unwilling to accept this reversal, Calder took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. He claimed that theConnecticut legislation was a violation of Article 1, section 10.
High Court Rules
On 8 August 1798, the Supreme Court ruled on the case. Two of the six justices did not weigh in on the dispute, while each of the other four issued his own opinion. All of them agreed on the outcome, however. Connecticut's legislation granting the Bulls a new hearing in probate court was found not to be anex post facto law. The Court went even further in limiting the ex post facto provision to the realm of criminal law. The Calders' claim to Morrison's property was negated and the rights of possession were conferred upon the Bulls.
Justice Chase wrote the lead opinion in the case. In rendering his judgement,he relied upon the insight that, while all ex post facto laws are bydefinition retroactive, not all retroactive laws are ex post facto laws--and only the latter are unconstitutional. Chase limited his definition ofan ex post facto law to four important types, all in the criminal rather than civil realm:

1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; andpunishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment,and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.

Prohibitions against ex post facto laws, Chase concluded, were designed to protect citizens against unscrupulous prosecution, not to safeguard their private property rights. As Chase wrote: "The restraint against making anyex post facto laws was not considered, by the framers of the Constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested rightto property."
To further buttress his argument, Chase pointed out constitutional language that expressly barred the passage of laws which impaired the obligations of private contracts. This, in his view, was an attempt by the framers to provideprotections of property rights which were left unprotected by the ex postfacto clause. If the framers had intended for the ex post facto clause to cover property disputes, these passages would have been redundant.
Chase's fellow justices largely agreed. Justice Paterson echoed his view thatthe ban on impairment of contracts suggested that the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition of ex post facto laws to include "crimes, pains, and penalties, and no further." And Justice Iredell expressed the view that the purpose of the ex post facto clause did not extend to "civil cases, to cases that merely affect the private property of citizens."
Impact
The Supreme Court's decision in Calder v. Bull had a substantial impact on legal history. As a consequence of this decision, individuals deprived of vested property rights could no longer cite the ex post facto prohibition in their argument for relief. Instead they relied on constitutional protections on the sanctity of contracts to protect themselves against legislative action that threatened their property rights.
Related Cases

• Pigeon v. Buck, 237 U.S. 386 (1915).
  
• Fred T. Ley Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 386 (1927).
  
• Adamos v. New York Life Insurance Company, 293 U.S. 386 (1935).
  
• Bowen v. Kizer, 485 U.S. 386 (1988).