Appellant
United States
Appellee
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
Appellant's Claim
That the president has the power to prohibit arms sales to warring nations.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Homer S. Cummings, U.S. Attorney General; Martin Conboy
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
William Wallace
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes,Owen Josephus Roberts, George Sutherland (writing for the Court), Willis VanDevanter
Justices Dissenting
James Clark McReynolds (Harlan Fiske Stone did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 December 1936
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the presidential resolution prohibiting the arms sales.
Significance
Using broad language to describe executive power in the area of foreign affairs, the Court provided a justification not only for the exercise of presidential authority under immediate consideration, but for many future presidentialdecisions concerning U.S. activity abroad.
In the mid-1930s, Bolivia and Paraguay went at war over the Chaco region of South America after oil was found there. The House of Representatives and theSenate together passed legislation authorizing the president to place an embargo on shipments of arms to warring countries. President Franklin Roosevelt then proclaimed the embargo, prohibiting arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was later indicted for violating the embargo. Claiming that the embargo was an illegitimate exercise because Congress had delegated legislative power to the executive branch, Curtiss-Wright prevailed in federal district court. The government then asked the Supreme Court toreview this decision.
Court Upholds Broad Presidential Powers in Foreign Affairs
Most conflicts between the legislative and executive branches involve political questions which the Supreme Court lacks the power to resolve. In Curtiss-Wright, however, the dispute did not concern domestic governance but foreign affairs. Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland stressed that this was not an area governed by express grants of power by the Constitution:
Sutherland went on to say that if sovereignty--the power of an independent nation--rested in the federal government, then the executive branch must control relations with foreign sovereigns. Therefore, he reasoned, no express grantin the Constitution of a "foreign affairs" power was necessary to enable thepresident to act in these matters. In the case of the South American arms embargo, wrote Sutherland, "[W]e are . . . dealing not alone with an authorityvested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such anauthority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of internationalrelations."
The breadth of the Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright has been used countless times to justify presidential initiatives in foreign affairs that arepresented to Congress only for rubber stamp approval. President Lyndon Johnson, for example, sent half a million American soldiers to fight in Vietnam without Congress having exercised its constitutional power to declare war. Thisaction in part accounted for the passage in 1973 of the War Powers Act over President Richard Nixon's veto. The War Powers Act--which also cited Curtiss-Wright as authority--was intended to curb presidential war making by requiring that the legislative and executive branches reach a collective agreement before committing American troops abroad.
The growth of the power of the presidency in modern times owes much to this landmark decision. Ironically, perhaps, the Court's refusal to cross the boundary into matters of foreign policy itself grows out of the doctrine of separation of powers. Political questions which can be resolved by the political branches of government--Congress and the presidency--have traditionally been considered off limits to judicial intervention.
Related Cases
United States
Appellee
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
Appellant's Claim
That the president has the power to prohibit arms sales to warring nations.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Homer S. Cummings, U.S. Attorney General; Martin Conboy
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
William Wallace
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes,Owen Josephus Roberts, George Sutherland (writing for the Court), Willis VanDevanter
Justices Dissenting
James Clark McReynolds (Harlan Fiske Stone did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 December 1936
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the presidential resolution prohibiting the arms sales.
Significance
Using broad language to describe executive power in the area of foreign affairs, the Court provided a justification not only for the exercise of presidential authority under immediate consideration, but for many future presidentialdecisions concerning U.S. activity abroad.
In the mid-1930s, Bolivia and Paraguay went at war over the Chaco region of South America after oil was found there. The House of Representatives and theSenate together passed legislation authorizing the president to place an embargo on shipments of arms to warring countries. President Franklin Roosevelt then proclaimed the embargo, prohibiting arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was later indicted for violating the embargo. Claiming that the embargo was an illegitimate exercise because Congress had delegated legislative power to the executive branch, Curtiss-Wright prevailed in federal district court. The government then asked the Supreme Court toreview this decision.
Court Upholds Broad Presidential Powers in Foreign Affairs
Most conflicts between the legislative and executive branches involve political questions which the Supreme Court lacks the power to resolve. In Curtiss-Wright, however, the dispute did not concern domestic governance but foreign affairs. Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland stressed that this was not an area governed by express grants of power by the Constitution:
[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of externalsovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never beenmentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government asnecessary concomitants of nationality . . .
Sutherland went on to say that if sovereignty--the power of an independent nation--rested in the federal government, then the executive branch must control relations with foreign sovereigns. Therefore, he reasoned, no express grantin the Constitution of a "foreign affairs" power was necessary to enable thepresident to act in these matters. In the case of the South American arms embargo, wrote Sutherland, "[W]e are . . . dealing not alone with an authorityvested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such anauthority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of internationalrelations."
The breadth of the Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright has been used countless times to justify presidential initiatives in foreign affairs that arepresented to Congress only for rubber stamp approval. President Lyndon Johnson, for example, sent half a million American soldiers to fight in Vietnam without Congress having exercised its constitutional power to declare war. Thisaction in part accounted for the passage in 1973 of the War Powers Act over President Richard Nixon's veto. The War Powers Act--which also cited Curtiss-Wright as authority--was intended to curb presidential war making by requiring that the legislative and executive branches reach a collective agreement before committing American troops abroad.
The growth of the power of the presidency in modern times owes much to this landmark decision. Ironically, perhaps, the Court's refusal to cross the boundary into matters of foreign policy itself grows out of the doctrine of separation of powers. Political questions which can be resolved by the political branches of government--Congress and the presidency--have traditionally been considered off limits to judicial intervention.
Related Cases
- Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
- Massieu v. Reno, 915 F.Supp. 681 (1996).
- Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389 (1998).
User Comments Add a comment…