Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit

Appellant
Huron Portland Cement Co.
Appellee
City of Detroit
Appellant's Claim
That the city of Detroit had no right to enforce a local anti-pollution ordinance against ships owned by the Huron Portland Cement Company, given that those ships had been "inspected, approved and licensed" by the Federal Government for interstate commerce; moreover, even if Detroit's law was not in conflict with federal law, enforcement of the statute was an unreasonable restraintof interstate commerce.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
John F. Hathaway
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Alfred E. Lindbloom
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Earl Warren, Charles Evans Whittaker
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 April 1960
Decision
That the Detroit anti-smoke ordinance was constitutional, even when applied to ships licensed by the federal government, and that the criminal provisionsof the Detroit law did not impose "an undue burden" on interstate commerce.
Significance
This case was an important step forward in establishing cities' right to institute environmental legislation, even if such laws caused difficulties for business. It was also another step in the ongoing effort to determine the balance of power between federal and local government.
In the 1960s, concerns about the environment were far less common than they are today. The word "pollution" was still a new term, while the idea that an industrial plant might release toxic fumes or dangerous by-products was a relatively rare notion. In this context, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City ofDetroit, et al. stands as an early example of the Supreme Court upholdingenvironmental legislation.
Hand-Fired Boilers and Coal Smoke
The Huron Portland Cement Co. was a Michigan company engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement. Its fleet of five vessels traveled across the Great Lakes, carrying cement to various customers from its mill in Alpena, Michigan.Huron Portland Cement Co. had made certain to have all its ships inspected, approved, and licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard. However, two of its vessels, the S.S. S.T. Crapo and the S.S. John W. Boardman were equippedwith hand-fired Scotch marine boilers. When these boilers were operating, they burned fuel coal in such a way as to emit huge quantities of dense, black smoke.
The City of Detroit, mindful of the enormous amount of industry it then contained, had passed the Smoke Abatement Code, which limited the amount of smokeany combustion equipment could emit. If an owner's device emitted more than the legal amount of smoke, he or she might be liable for a fine of $100 and a30-day jail sentence, so the Huron Portland Cement Company found itself in violation of the Detroit law.
Criminal chargess were brought against the company. The company responded bytaking the city to court. The company argued that its ships had been licensedby the federal government and approved for interstate trade. In order to getlicensed, the ships had even been inspected by the Coast Guard.
Regulating Interstate Commerce
The company argued that the Detroit laws were clearly unreasonable. They imposed an unfair burden on interstate commerce, and on those grounds alone, theyshould be found unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not agree.
When it finally heard the case on appeal, the Court found that the Detroit laws were completely justified. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart explained:

The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare of the city's inhabitants. Legislation designed tofree from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is . . . known as thepolice power.

The Court went further. In addition to affirming Detroit's right to regulateits air quality, Stewart asserted the government's general right to make lawsprotecting its citizens, even if such laws might adversely affect interstatecommerce. This was true even though only the federal government could actually regulate the commerce between states:

. . . it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when "conferring upon Congress the regulation ofcommerce . . . never intended to cut the States off from legislating on allsubjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in itwithout constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution."

"At War With the Federal License"
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter strongly disagreed with the majority opinion. They argued that, "[t]he requirements of the Detroit smoke ordinance are squarely in conflict with the federal statute." The dissenters agreed that there were many areas in which local regulations might be added to federal ones.Speed limits, traffic regulations, or rules for using a dock might all existalongside of federal laws for inspecting and licensing boats. But, wrote Douglas, in those cases:

. . . we would have local laws not at war with the federal license, but complementary to it . . . This case [on the otherhand] . . . involves the collision between a local law and a federal law . ..

Local vs. Federal Control
In a sense, both the majority and the minority of the Court were trying to balance two competing interests in Huron Cement Co. On the one hand, local units of government had the right to use "police power" to protect their citizens. On the other hand, companies engaged in interstate commerce had theright to expect a uniform standard that would apply in all fifty states, so that once they were licensed by the federal government, they could feel sure that they would be allowed to operate anywhere in the country.
Related Cases

• South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177(1938).
  
• Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
  
• Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
  
• Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad. Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
  
• Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).

Early Pollution Regulations
Major pollution regulation is administered by the federal government in cooperation with the states. Efforts to regulate pollution began before World WarII. Early pollution regulation focused on preserving clean air and drinking water. The rapid increase of industrial output in the United States brought ongreater challenges for the environment in such areas as hazardous waste disposal, ozone depletion, climate change, chemical plant accidents, and medicalwaste.
In the 1970s the federal government began to take a lead role in environmental law. Earth Day of 1970 was the symbolic starting point of federal involvement pollution regulation, though regulation began in the 1940s. There have been roughly nine major laws enacted to regulate pollution, beginning with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1947). Other major legislation enacted to regulate pollution includes: the Water Pollution Control Act(1948); Air Pollution Control Act (1955); National Environmental Policy Act(1970); the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974); Toxic Substances Control Act (1976); and the Pollution Prevention Act (1990). There have also been hundreds ofminor regulatory laws adopted to control pollution.
Sources
Davies, J. Clarence, and Jan Mazurek. Pollution Control in the United States: Evaluating the System. Resources for the Future, 1998.