Appellant
Lucious Abrams
Appellee
Davida Johnson
Appellant's Claim
That the plan adopted by the district court redrawing Georgia's legislative districts violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the principle of one-person, one-vote.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Seth P. Waxman and Laughlin McDonald
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Michael J. Bowers and A. Lee Parks
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
19 June 1997
Decision
That the redistricting plan adopted by the district court did not violate theVoting Rights Act or the Constitution.
Significance
In upholding the district court's plan, the Court emphasized its previous decisions which stated that race may not be taken into account by a state legislature or court in creating election districts, even where race is used to promote minority representation.
Article I, section 3 of the Constitution requires that the number of U.S. Representatives for each state be apportioned--that is, distributed--based on each state's population, which is determined by a census taken every 10 years.Under this provision, if a state gains sufficient population over the ten year period between one census and the next, it may gain an additional congressperson in the House of Representatives. Conversely, because the total number of Representatives is fixed at 435, if a state loses population it will also lose one or more congresspersons. Under this system, each congressperson is elected from a district within the state he or she represents. Thus, if a statehas ten congressional seats, it will have ten congressional districts. However, if a state gains or loses a congressional seat, the state must redraw itscongressional districts to reflect the change, a process known as "redistricting" or "reapportionment."
The 1990 Census and Georgia's Restricting Plan
The census performed in 1990 revealed that Georgia's population had increasedsignificantly, and that Georgia was entitled to 11, instead of 10, congressional seats. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was the responsibility ofthe Georgia state legislature to reapportion its congressional seats. However, the legislature was required to have its plan approved by either the U.S.Department of Justice, or by a federal district court. In order to secure theapproval of the Department of Justice, the Georgia legislature eventually adopted a plan which contained three districts known as "majority-minority" districts. "Majority-minority" districts are districts in which a majority of the registered voters are members of racial minorities. These districts are designed to make it easier for minority candidates to get elected, and thus increase minority representation in Congress.
In this case, the legislature's plan created three (out of 11) districts in which a majority of the registered voters were African American. However, onesuch district was oddly shaped, being very long and narrow, connecting distant cities to achieve a majority of African Americans. In the 1995 case Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court found that this redistricting plan was unconstitutional because race was a predominate factor in the designing of theGeorgia legislature's plan. The Court found that race was a predominate factor based on the bizarre shape of the districts and other evidence of the Georgia legislature's intention to create three majority-minority districts. TheCourt concluded that race may not be used as a basis for redrawing congressional districts, even if it is used for the beneficial purpose of increasing minority representation. Following the Court's decision in the Miller case, the Georgia legislature was unable to agree on another plan. Accordingly,under the Voting Rights Act, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Courtfor the Southern District of Georgia devised its own plan. This plan includedonly one majority-minority district.
Court Upholds Plan
The U.S. Department of Justice and various African American voters appealed the district court's plan to the Supreme Court. They argued that the districtcourt should have adopted one of several plans submitted to the district court which would have had two majority-minority districts. Among other claims, they argued that the plan adopted by the district court violated section 2 Voting Rights Act and the principle of "one man, one vote." In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, and upheld the district court's plan.
The Supreme Court first rejected the argument that the plan diluted the votesof African Americans in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 requires that a political process, in this case the apportionment of Georgia's congressional districts, allows racial minorities an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." In the case Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court heldthat a violation of section 2 occurs only where the minority group is largeenough to constitute a majority in a specific geographic area, the members ofthe group vote similarly, and the majority group votes with enough similarity to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. In Abrams, the Court found that this test was not met because statistical data showed that there was large cross-over voting--that is, a significant percentage of whitesvoted for African American candidates and a significant percentage of AfricanAmericans voted for white candidates.
The Court also concluded that the district court's plan did not violate the principle of "one man, one vote" embodied in Article I, section 2 of the Constitution. This principle requires that, as near as possible, legislative districts have the same number of people. Relying on statistical data, the Court concluded that the population differences between the districts were extremelysmall, and thus were acceptable. In fact, the Court noted, the differences in the plan adopted by the district court were smaller than any of the differences between districts involved in any of the alternative plans proposed to the district court.
Four justices dissented from the Court's decision, concluding that the district court should have adopted one of the plans which provided for two majority-minority districts. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg argued that it would not have been impracticable to create a second majority-minoritydistrict in a constitutional way. More importantly, however, the dissenters disagreed with the test employed by the majority. Justice Breyer, writing forthe dissenters, concluded that the majority, "by focusing upon what it considered to be an unreasonably pervasive positive use of race as a redistrictingfactor, . . . created a legal doctrine that will unreasonably restrict legislators' use of race, even for the most benign, or antidiscriminatory purposes." However, despite the dissenters' position, the Court's decision makes clearthat any use of race as a factor in redistricting, even a positive use, willnot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Related Cases
Lucious Abrams
Appellee
Davida Johnson
Appellant's Claim
That the plan adopted by the district court redrawing Georgia's legislative districts violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the principle of one-person, one-vote.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Seth P. Waxman and Laughlin McDonald
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Michael J. Bowers and A. Lee Parks
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
19 June 1997
Decision
That the redistricting plan adopted by the district court did not violate theVoting Rights Act or the Constitution.
Significance
In upholding the district court's plan, the Court emphasized its previous decisions which stated that race may not be taken into account by a state legislature or court in creating election districts, even where race is used to promote minority representation.
Article I, section 3 of the Constitution requires that the number of U.S. Representatives for each state be apportioned--that is, distributed--based on each state's population, which is determined by a census taken every 10 years.Under this provision, if a state gains sufficient population over the ten year period between one census and the next, it may gain an additional congressperson in the House of Representatives. Conversely, because the total number of Representatives is fixed at 435, if a state loses population it will also lose one or more congresspersons. Under this system, each congressperson is elected from a district within the state he or she represents. Thus, if a statehas ten congressional seats, it will have ten congressional districts. However, if a state gains or loses a congressional seat, the state must redraw itscongressional districts to reflect the change, a process known as "redistricting" or "reapportionment."
The 1990 Census and Georgia's Restricting Plan
The census performed in 1990 revealed that Georgia's population had increasedsignificantly, and that Georgia was entitled to 11, instead of 10, congressional seats. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was the responsibility ofthe Georgia state legislature to reapportion its congressional seats. However, the legislature was required to have its plan approved by either the U.S.Department of Justice, or by a federal district court. In order to secure theapproval of the Department of Justice, the Georgia legislature eventually adopted a plan which contained three districts known as "majority-minority" districts. "Majority-minority" districts are districts in which a majority of the registered voters are members of racial minorities. These districts are designed to make it easier for minority candidates to get elected, and thus increase minority representation in Congress.
In this case, the legislature's plan created three (out of 11) districts in which a majority of the registered voters were African American. However, onesuch district was oddly shaped, being very long and narrow, connecting distant cities to achieve a majority of African Americans. In the 1995 case Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court found that this redistricting plan was unconstitutional because race was a predominate factor in the designing of theGeorgia legislature's plan. The Court found that race was a predominate factor based on the bizarre shape of the districts and other evidence of the Georgia legislature's intention to create three majority-minority districts. TheCourt concluded that race may not be used as a basis for redrawing congressional districts, even if it is used for the beneficial purpose of increasing minority representation. Following the Court's decision in the Miller case, the Georgia legislature was unable to agree on another plan. Accordingly,under the Voting Rights Act, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Courtfor the Southern District of Georgia devised its own plan. This plan includedonly one majority-minority district.
Court Upholds Plan
The U.S. Department of Justice and various African American voters appealed the district court's plan to the Supreme Court. They argued that the districtcourt should have adopted one of several plans submitted to the district court which would have had two majority-minority districts. Among other claims, they argued that the plan adopted by the district court violated section 2 Voting Rights Act and the principle of "one man, one vote." In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, and upheld the district court's plan.
The Supreme Court first rejected the argument that the plan diluted the votesof African Americans in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 requires that a political process, in this case the apportionment of Georgia's congressional districts, allows racial minorities an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." In the case Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court heldthat a violation of section 2 occurs only where the minority group is largeenough to constitute a majority in a specific geographic area, the members ofthe group vote similarly, and the majority group votes with enough similarity to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. In Abrams, the Court found that this test was not met because statistical data showed that there was large cross-over voting--that is, a significant percentage of whitesvoted for African American candidates and a significant percentage of AfricanAmericans voted for white candidates.
The Court also concluded that the district court's plan did not violate the principle of "one man, one vote" embodied in Article I, section 2 of the Constitution. This principle requires that, as near as possible, legislative districts have the same number of people. Relying on statistical data, the Court concluded that the population differences between the districts were extremelysmall, and thus were acceptable. In fact, the Court noted, the differences in the plan adopted by the district court were smaller than any of the differences between districts involved in any of the alternative plans proposed to the district court.
Four justices dissented from the Court's decision, concluding that the district court should have adopted one of the plans which provided for two majority-minority districts. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg argued that it would not have been impracticable to create a second majority-minoritydistrict in a constitutional way. More importantly, however, the dissenters disagreed with the test employed by the majority. Justice Breyer, writing forthe dissenters, concluded that the majority, "by focusing upon what it considered to be an unreasonably pervasive positive use of race as a redistrictingfactor, . . . created a legal doctrine that will unreasonably restrict legislators' use of race, even for the most benign, or antidiscriminatory purposes." However, despite the dissenters' position, the Court's decision makes clearthat any use of race as a factor in redistricting, even a positive use, willnot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Related Cases
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
- Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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