Appellant
Ruth O. Shaw, et al.
Appellee
Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, et al.
Appellant's Claim
That the state of North Carolina created an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered district, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Robinson O. Everett
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
H. Jefferson Powell
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 June 1993
Decision
The district court's decision was reversed and remanded.
Significance
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the many complex and difficult issues involved when the state of North Carolina proposed the creation of a second majority-minority district no wider than a two-lane highway, raising the possibility that this action violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Case Background
In the fall of 1991, a reapportionment plan was submitted for the state of North Carolina that only included one black minority district. This plan was subsequently rejected by the U.S. attorney general due to the lack of minorityvoting representation. In order to remedy this, a revised plan was submittedthat included a second majority-minority district of an unusual shape. The new district was at times no wider than a two-lane highway and ran along Interstate 85 for about 160 miles. Five residents of North Carolina filed a claim that this new district was created for the sole purpose of adding another black representative.
This rearrangement of district lines to produce a change in the voting majority of a certain area is called a "gerrymander." Because this new district consisted of such an unusual shape so that it deliberately encompassed areas with higher black populations, these residents believed that the state may haveviolated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
The case was heard by a three-judge district court, who ruled that the residents did not prove an unconstitutional equal protection claim. An appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was made.
When Has a State Gone Too Far?
The residents were represented by Robinson O. Everett, who argued that the state had gone too far in trying to secure a second black majority district. Heargued that this new district, an awkward and unusual one that had no otherpurpose than to create a black majority, violated certain principles of reapportionment such as compactness, contiguousness, and community of interest. Everett concluded that the state had erred by drawing district boundaries in such a way as to target two seats for persons of a particular race.
The state's position, presented by H. Jefferson Powell, was that it had madean effort in good faith to carefully comply with both the Voting Rights Act legislation and the "one person, one vote" requirement (Reynolds v. Sims [1964]), by intentionally creating a second majority-minority district. Heargued that states should be encouraged to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the residents did raise a valid questionunder the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which prevents anystate from discriminating against persons according to their race. The district court decision was reversed and remanded, although it was noted that the district court did properly dismiss their claims, and must now determine if there was some "compelling governmental interest" to justify this plan.
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. O'Connor noted in the opinion that the appellants' claim "must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting." A racial gerrymander should be closely scrutinized so as to avoid stereotypical ideas about the preferences of voters of the same race, and state legislation that focuses on classifying citizens according to race "must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest," since this type of racial classification can threaten "special harms." Furthermore, a covered jurisdiction cannot use section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to justify racial gerrymandering. For thesereasons, the district court's decision was reversed and remanded.
Dissension
Justice White gave a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. White believed that the appellants were not able to show how they had received a "cognizable injury." In other words, the appellants were not able toshow that they were deprived of a right to vote, nor were they able to showthat their own political strength was in any way diminished by the new district, and he cited the cases of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) and Guinn v.United States (1915). Justice White wrote that the issue in this case "iswhether the classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying equal access to the political process," and found that in this case, ithad not.
Impact
This case was remanded back to the district court, which held that the reapportionment plan was constitutional because it did meet the requirement of theU.S. Supreme Court that the state must have a "compelling interest" in complying with the Voting Rights Act, sections 2 and 5. Since this decision, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit courts have heard several cases in which the results of Shaw v. Reno have been cited. These have included cases involving racial gerrymandering, drawing school and voting districts, housing discrimination, and voting rights. This case was once again appealed backto the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was heard as Shaw v. Hunt in which the decision of the district court was reversed once more, as the Supreme Court found that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issues involving the right to vote and have protection against all forms of discrimination continue to be explored and debated.
Related Cases
Ruth O. Shaw, et al.
Appellee
Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, et al.
Appellant's Claim
That the state of North Carolina created an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered district, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Robinson O. Everett
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
H. Jefferson Powell
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 June 1993
Decision
The district court's decision was reversed and remanded.
Significance
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the many complex and difficult issues involved when the state of North Carolina proposed the creation of a second majority-minority district no wider than a two-lane highway, raising the possibility that this action violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Case Background
In the fall of 1991, a reapportionment plan was submitted for the state of North Carolina that only included one black minority district. This plan was subsequently rejected by the U.S. attorney general due to the lack of minorityvoting representation. In order to remedy this, a revised plan was submittedthat included a second majority-minority district of an unusual shape. The new district was at times no wider than a two-lane highway and ran along Interstate 85 for about 160 miles. Five residents of North Carolina filed a claim that this new district was created for the sole purpose of adding another black representative.
This rearrangement of district lines to produce a change in the voting majority of a certain area is called a "gerrymander." Because this new district consisted of such an unusual shape so that it deliberately encompassed areas with higher black populations, these residents believed that the state may haveviolated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
The case was heard by a three-judge district court, who ruled that the residents did not prove an unconstitutional equal protection claim. An appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was made.
When Has a State Gone Too Far?
The residents were represented by Robinson O. Everett, who argued that the state had gone too far in trying to secure a second black majority district. Heargued that this new district, an awkward and unusual one that had no otherpurpose than to create a black majority, violated certain principles of reapportionment such as compactness, contiguousness, and community of interest. Everett concluded that the state had erred by drawing district boundaries in such a way as to target two seats for persons of a particular race.
The state's position, presented by H. Jefferson Powell, was that it had madean effort in good faith to carefully comply with both the Voting Rights Act legislation and the "one person, one vote" requirement (Reynolds v. Sims [1964]), by intentionally creating a second majority-minority district. Heargued that states should be encouraged to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the residents did raise a valid questionunder the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which prevents anystate from discriminating against persons according to their race. The district court decision was reversed and remanded, although it was noted that the district court did properly dismiss their claims, and must now determine if there was some "compelling governmental interest" to justify this plan.
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. O'Connor noted in the opinion that the appellants' claim "must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting." A racial gerrymander should be closely scrutinized so as to avoid stereotypical ideas about the preferences of voters of the same race, and state legislation that focuses on classifying citizens according to race "must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest," since this type of racial classification can threaten "special harms." Furthermore, a covered jurisdiction cannot use section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to justify racial gerrymandering. For thesereasons, the district court's decision was reversed and remanded.
Dissension
Justice White gave a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. White believed that the appellants were not able to show how they had received a "cognizable injury." In other words, the appellants were not able toshow that they were deprived of a right to vote, nor were they able to showthat their own political strength was in any way diminished by the new district, and he cited the cases of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) and Guinn v.United States (1915). Justice White wrote that the issue in this case "iswhether the classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying equal access to the political process," and found that in this case, ithad not.
Impact
This case was remanded back to the district court, which held that the reapportionment plan was constitutional because it did meet the requirement of theU.S. Supreme Court that the state must have a "compelling interest" in complying with the Voting Rights Act, sections 2 and 5. Since this decision, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit courts have heard several cases in which the results of Shaw v. Reno have been cited. These have included cases involving racial gerrymandering, drawing school and voting districts, housing discrimination, and voting rights. This case was once again appealed backto the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was heard as Shaw v. Hunt in which the decision of the district court was reversed once more, as the Supreme Court found that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issues involving the right to vote and have protection against all forms of discrimination continue to be explored and debated.
Related Cases
- Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
- United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
- Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
- Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
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