Petitioner
Joseph Oncale
Respondent
Sundowner Offshore Services Incorporated, John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson
Petitioner's Claim
That on the job sexual harassment by coworkers of the same sex constitutes sexual discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Nicholas Canaday III
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Harry M. Reasoner
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia (writing for the Court), David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1998
Decision
Ruled in favor of Oncale and reversed two lower court decisions by finding that Oncale was deserving of damages for sexual harassment.
Significance
The ruling recognized that individuals have the right to file sexual harassment complaints against employers based on same-sex sexual harassment claims. The Court found that Title VII applies equally to all sexual harassment situations. The decision ensured for the first time that men taunted or abused by other men, and women harassed by women can sue for damages. The harassment must be based on gender in some manner, but not necessarily by sexual desire. Following a set of Supreme Court decisions in 1998, employers scrambled to reassess their policies and institute more vigorous training for their employees.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discriminationbased on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. In 1986 the Courtruled that sexual harassment was a form of job discrimination and fell undercivil rights law when leading to a job loss, or hostile working environment.Courts had recognized two types of sexual harassment, quid pro quo andhostile working environment. Quid pro quo is more straightforward bycommonly involving blatant demands for sexual favors related to employment, hiring, promotion, and retention decisions. Hostile working environment harassment, recognized by the Court in 1986, is often much less clear. A hostile working environment is created when the workplace becomes filled with such persistent intimidation, ridicule, and insults that the workplace conditions aresubstantially changed.
In the wake of the Anita Hill accusations at Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, many firms, particularly large corporations, established policies expressly forbidding unwelcomed advances or sexual harassment between employees. Such guidelines were written broadly enough that any behavior of a sexual nature was clearly prohibited, regardless of gender. Others, especiallysmaller businesses, were often less thorough in setting or enforcing policies.
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
In regard to the appropriateness of sexual harassment claims when the allegedvictim was the same sex as the alleged harasser, the lower courts were extraordinarily inconsistent in their rulings. The District of Columbia Circuit inBarnes v. Costle (1977) acknowledged the possibility of sexual harassment under Title VII where a homosexual employer harassed an employee of either gender. In the Second Circuit case of Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital (1993), the court observed that harassment is harassment regardlessof whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex. In Gliddens v. Shell Oil Co. (1993), a court elaborated that male-on-male harassment with sexual overtones was not sex discrimination unless the employee could demonstrate that the employer treated him differently because of his sex. However, the Garcia v. Elf Atochem (1994) ruling barred all same-sex sexual harassment claims. In a heterosexual harassment case, the Seventh Circuit in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co. (1995) noted that, although sexual harassment of women by men was the most common kind, same sex claims should not be excluded from Title VII consideration. The possibility existed thatsexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women could be subject to claims in appropriate cases. However, the Fourth Circuit in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors (1996) held that harassment among heterosexuals of the same sex cannot give rise to a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII. Clearly the lower courts lacked consensus on the whether Title VII applied to same-sex sexual harassment cases.
Sexual Assault or Horseplay
Joseph Oncale, at age 21, was hired in August of 1991 as a roustabout by Sundowner Offshore Services in Houma, Louisiana. After a few weeks of working with an eight-man crew on a Chevron USA oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico, he began to be subjected to a series of humiliating and sexually threatening actions by the other men. On one occasion, two supervisors and another coworker physically assailed him in a sexual manner on a small boat between two oil platforms. The assaults continued through the following day accompanied with threats of rape over the next several weeks. At one point, he was sexually accosted in a shower. Oncale complained to company officials, but received no helpful response as Sundowner's workers denied all allegations and no company investigation was initiated. Sundowner, in fact, claimed it was only horseplay.In November, only a few months after being hired, Oncale quit for fear of eventually being raped.
Oncale filed a sex discrimination suit against Sundowner and three of his former coworkers with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans seekingdamages for the humiliating harassment that led to his being run off the job.Citing Garcia, the court dismissed the case asserting that no federallaw recognized sexual discrimination by one man against another. He appealedto the federal appeals court which affirmed the district court's decision. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), urged the Supreme Court to take up the case. The Court issued awrit of certiorari, a written order commanding the lower court to forward the proceedings of the case for review.
Oncale, with assistance from the EEOC, argued before the Court that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination and the Court's previous sexual harassment decisions were all stated in gender-neutral terms. Thus, all discrimination based on sex is prohibited, regardless of the genders involved. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted that in "hostile work environment claims state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances." When Congress enacted Title VII, male-on-male sexual harassment in theworkplace was not considered an issue. In regard to that observation, Sundowner argued that recognizing liability for same-sex sexual harassment would make Title VII more of a general civility code for the workplace rather than discrimination code for which it was intended. Scalia rejected the argument noting that the risk was no greater for same-sex sexual harassment than for opposite-sex sexual harassment.
Scalia wrote that sexual harassment in the work place clearly violated TitleVII if it constituted quid pro quo harassment regardless of gender. Ifa supervisor conditions job benefits, either explicitly or implicitly, or anemployee participates in sexual activity, it is "quid pro quo." Scalia reversed the two lower court decisions that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to same-sex sexual harassment.
Impact
At the time of decision, Oncale was 27 years of age, married, with two children. For the first time the Court clarified an employers, liability for instances of sexual harassment between two people of the same gender. Critics of the Oncale decision quickly claimed the Court distorted the Civil RightsAct which they asserted was specifically intended to protect female employees from discrimination by male supervisors. The distinction between rowdy behavior, perhaps involving assault, was blurred with sexual harassment.
The Court decided two other sexual harassment cases later in 1998 in additionto Oncale. The three cases posed substantial changes to many businesses. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the Court ruled that anemployer held responsibility for harassment situations, regardless of whetherit was aware of an harassment situation. In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth (1998), the Court ruled that a harassed employee did not need to demonstrate a tangible job loss to successfully prove sexually harassment. The victim, in fact, never reported the incidents of sexual harassment and actuallyreceived a promotion before resigning and 15 months later filing the lawsuit.
Oncale as well as the other cases raised the issue of what the word "sex" means in sexual discrimination law. Debates continued as to whether sex referred to the gender of the victim, gender of the harasser, the type of behavior involved, or all three. Same-sex issues highlighted that for behavior tobe unlawful, it must be motivated by hostility as well as sexual desire. Infact, sexual desire need not be a factor. Hostility based on the gender of the victim could be sufficient to prove a case. However, hostility without thefactor of gender does not constitute sexual harassment and does not generallyviolate federal law. Employers were put on alert that their legal liabilityfor sexual harassment could arise from diverse situations, not just the commonly imagined male harassment of female form. Many employers reassessed theirsexual harassment policies and enhanced their employee training programs.
Related Cases
Joseph Oncale
Respondent
Sundowner Offshore Services Incorporated, John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson
Petitioner's Claim
That on the job sexual harassment by coworkers of the same sex constitutes sexual discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Nicholas Canaday III
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Harry M. Reasoner
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia (writing for the Court), David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1998
Decision
Ruled in favor of Oncale and reversed two lower court decisions by finding that Oncale was deserving of damages for sexual harassment.
Significance
The ruling recognized that individuals have the right to file sexual harassment complaints against employers based on same-sex sexual harassment claims. The Court found that Title VII applies equally to all sexual harassment situations. The decision ensured for the first time that men taunted or abused by other men, and women harassed by women can sue for damages. The harassment must be based on gender in some manner, but not necessarily by sexual desire. Following a set of Supreme Court decisions in 1998, employers scrambled to reassess their policies and institute more vigorous training for their employees.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discriminationbased on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. In 1986 the Courtruled that sexual harassment was a form of job discrimination and fell undercivil rights law when leading to a job loss, or hostile working environment.Courts had recognized two types of sexual harassment, quid pro quo andhostile working environment. Quid pro quo is more straightforward bycommonly involving blatant demands for sexual favors related to employment, hiring, promotion, and retention decisions. Hostile working environment harassment, recognized by the Court in 1986, is often much less clear. A hostile working environment is created when the workplace becomes filled with such persistent intimidation, ridicule, and insults that the workplace conditions aresubstantially changed.
In the wake of the Anita Hill accusations at Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, many firms, particularly large corporations, established policies expressly forbidding unwelcomed advances or sexual harassment between employees. Such guidelines were written broadly enough that any behavior of a sexual nature was clearly prohibited, regardless of gender. Others, especiallysmaller businesses, were often less thorough in setting or enforcing policies.
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
In regard to the appropriateness of sexual harassment claims when the allegedvictim was the same sex as the alleged harasser, the lower courts were extraordinarily inconsistent in their rulings. The District of Columbia Circuit inBarnes v. Costle (1977) acknowledged the possibility of sexual harassment under Title VII where a homosexual employer harassed an employee of either gender. In the Second Circuit case of Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital (1993), the court observed that harassment is harassment regardlessof whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex. In Gliddens v. Shell Oil Co. (1993), a court elaborated that male-on-male harassment with sexual overtones was not sex discrimination unless the employee could demonstrate that the employer treated him differently because of his sex. However, the Garcia v. Elf Atochem (1994) ruling barred all same-sex sexual harassment claims. In a heterosexual harassment case, the Seventh Circuit in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co. (1995) noted that, although sexual harassment of women by men was the most common kind, same sex claims should not be excluded from Title VII consideration. The possibility existed thatsexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women could be subject to claims in appropriate cases. However, the Fourth Circuit in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors (1996) held that harassment among heterosexuals of the same sex cannot give rise to a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII. Clearly the lower courts lacked consensus on the whether Title VII applied to same-sex sexual harassment cases.
Sexual Assault or Horseplay
Joseph Oncale, at age 21, was hired in August of 1991 as a roustabout by Sundowner Offshore Services in Houma, Louisiana. After a few weeks of working with an eight-man crew on a Chevron USA oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico, he began to be subjected to a series of humiliating and sexually threatening actions by the other men. On one occasion, two supervisors and another coworker physically assailed him in a sexual manner on a small boat between two oil platforms. The assaults continued through the following day accompanied with threats of rape over the next several weeks. At one point, he was sexually accosted in a shower. Oncale complained to company officials, but received no helpful response as Sundowner's workers denied all allegations and no company investigation was initiated. Sundowner, in fact, claimed it was only horseplay.In November, only a few months after being hired, Oncale quit for fear of eventually being raped.
Oncale filed a sex discrimination suit against Sundowner and three of his former coworkers with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans seekingdamages for the humiliating harassment that led to his being run off the job.Citing Garcia, the court dismissed the case asserting that no federallaw recognized sexual discrimination by one man against another. He appealedto the federal appeals court which affirmed the district court's decision. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), urged the Supreme Court to take up the case. The Court issued awrit of certiorari, a written order commanding the lower court to forward the proceedings of the case for review.
Oncale, with assistance from the EEOC, argued before the Court that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination and the Court's previous sexual harassment decisions were all stated in gender-neutral terms. Thus, all discrimination based on sex is prohibited, regardless of the genders involved. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted that in "hostile work environment claims state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances." When Congress enacted Title VII, male-on-male sexual harassment in theworkplace was not considered an issue. In regard to that observation, Sundowner argued that recognizing liability for same-sex sexual harassment would make Title VII more of a general civility code for the workplace rather than discrimination code for which it was intended. Scalia rejected the argument noting that the risk was no greater for same-sex sexual harassment than for opposite-sex sexual harassment.
Scalia wrote that sexual harassment in the work place clearly violated TitleVII if it constituted quid pro quo harassment regardless of gender. Ifa supervisor conditions job benefits, either explicitly or implicitly, or anemployee participates in sexual activity, it is "quid pro quo." Scalia reversed the two lower court decisions that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to same-sex sexual harassment.
Impact
At the time of decision, Oncale was 27 years of age, married, with two children. For the first time the Court clarified an employers, liability for instances of sexual harassment between two people of the same gender. Critics of the Oncale decision quickly claimed the Court distorted the Civil RightsAct which they asserted was specifically intended to protect female employees from discrimination by male supervisors. The distinction between rowdy behavior, perhaps involving assault, was blurred with sexual harassment.
The Court decided two other sexual harassment cases later in 1998 in additionto Oncale. The three cases posed substantial changes to many businesses. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the Court ruled that anemployer held responsibility for harassment situations, regardless of whetherit was aware of an harassment situation. In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth (1998), the Court ruled that a harassed employee did not need to demonstrate a tangible job loss to successfully prove sexually harassment. The victim, in fact, never reported the incidents of sexual harassment and actuallyreceived a promotion before resigning and 15 months later filing the lawsuit.
Oncale as well as the other cases raised the issue of what the word "sex" means in sexual discrimination law. Debates continued as to whether sex referred to the gender of the victim, gender of the harasser, the type of behavior involved, or all three. Same-sex issues highlighted that for behavior tobe unlawful, it must be motivated by hostility as well as sexual desire. Infact, sexual desire need not be a factor. Hostility based on the gender of the victim could be sufficient to prove a case. However, hostility without thefactor of gender does not constitute sexual harassment and does not generallyviolate federal law. Employers were put on alert that their legal liabilityfor sexual harassment could arise from diverse situations, not just the commonly imagined male harassment of female form. Many employers reassessed theirsexual harassment policies and enhanced their employee training programs.
Related Cases
- Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F.3d 134 (1993).
- Garcia v. Elf Atochem No. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (1994).
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1998).
- Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, No. 97-569 (1998).
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