Petitioners
Keyes, et al.
Respondent
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado
Petitioners' Claim
That the deliberate segregation of Park Hill neighborhood schools rendered the entire Denver Public School system liable to enforced desegregation.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioners
James M. Nabrit III, Gordon G. Greiner
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
William K. Ris
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist (Byron R. White did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 June 1973
Decision
Stated that segregation of any portion of a school system showed prima facie evidence of overall segregation.
Significance
This case marked the first time that the Court ruled on a school segregationissue in a jurisdiction which had never operated under statutes mandating racial separation. In its decision the Court considered the distinction betweende jure segregation, defined as racial separation that is required bylaw, and de facto segregation, defined as racial separation that was not created by state action or statute.
The development of the Denver, Colorado, area in the years following World War II was typical of American cities during the period. The city grew rapidlybetween 1940 and 1980 although, beginning in the mid-1950s, much of the growth occurred in suburban areas surrounding the original city. By the 1970s, thepopulation of Denver proper was declining, while that of the suburbs grew byapproximately 30 percent during the decade.
As Denver's economy diversified during and after the war, its minority populations began to grow. By 1980, 12 percent of Denver's population was African American and 19 percent was Hispanic. Many Denverites of African American descent traditionally lived east of the central business district in a neighborhood known as Five Points, while Denver's Hispanic population traditionally occupied an area just west of the central business district. These traditional residence patterns began to change in the early 1960s, with African Americansmoving into neighborhoods bordering Five Points, including the Park Hill district.
Schools in Transition
Racial segregation had always existed in the Denver schools. Traditional housing patterns made segregation inevitable, since few Denver neighborhoods wereracially integrated. School authorities exacerbated the situation by drawingschool boundaries along racial lines in integrated neighborhoods such as Park Hill. Heightened public awareness of racial discrimination led to the creation of the Vorhees Special Study Committee on Equality in Educational Opportunity in the Denver Public Schools in 1962. The Vorhees Committee recommendedthat Denver's traditionally segregated school system be gradually integratedby the redrawing of school boundaries and other measures, and the school board resolved to put the committee's recommendations into practice. When it appeared that progress under the Vorhees Committee's recommendations was inadequate, a second study group, the Berge Committee, was formed in 1966. The BergeCommittee recommended more fundamental action to redress segregation in the Denver Public Schools, and in 1968 the school board directed the superintendent of schools to prepare a comprehensive desegregation plan. In April of 1969the school board approved the superintendent's plan to integrate the Denver Public Schools, which included busing of some students to ensure racial diversity throughout the school system. Forced busing became the central issue in the citywide school board election of May of 1969, in which a record number ofvoters turned out to defeat incumbent board members favoring the superintendent's plan. In June of 1969 the new school board voted to scrap the desegregation plan proposed by the superintendent, replacing it with a voluntary program.
Mixed Legal Messages
Ten days later a group of eight parents brought suit to enjoin the implementation of the superintendent's plan. The parents' suit also sought a declaratory judgement that abandonment of the desegregation plan constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A preliminary injunction was granted by the district court, which found that the Denver school board had pursued segregationist policies in the Park Hill neighborhood inthe ten years preceding approval of the superintendent's plan. The districtcourt also ruled that schools in the core city area of Denver, whose studentbodies were almost completely African American and whose facilities were substandard, would have to be overhauled to ensure equality of educational opportunity throughout the school system. This latter ruling was made despite the fact that the district court found no proof of discriminatory school board action in the core city school districts. The school board appealed the case tothe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed that remedial action would have to be taken to integrate schools in the Park Hill district, but vacated the preliminary injunction as it applied to the core city schools. The court of appeals based its decision on the grounds that the deliberate segregation of one school district did not constitute proof of deliberate segregation throughout the school system.
The parents appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 12 October 1972. Their case rested on two points: that the district court erred in its finding that Denver's core city schools were not intentionallysegregated due to its failure to consider African Americans and Hispanics asone category of student; and that in any case the proven, intentional segregation of the Park Hill school district made the Denver school system as a whole liable to definition as segregated. The school board also cross-petitionedthe court, seeking reversal of the court of appeals' finding insofar as it agreed with the district court.
Modification and Remand
On 21 June 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the case, upholding the petitioners' claims by a 7-1 margin and rejecting the cross-petition of the respondents. The Court modified the ruling of the court of appeals to vacate ratherthan reverse the district court's findings with regard to the core city schools. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, stated that African Americans and Hispanics must be considered one group in determining the segregation of Denver's schools, and that the district court should reconsider its findingregarding the overall segregation of the Denver schools. The Court further observed that "finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in ameaningful portion of a school system . . . establishes . . . a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities."As such, the Court directed that upon review of the case by the district court, the school board would bear the burden of proving that its actions in districts other than Park Hill were not segregationist in intent, or that Park Hill represented a "separate, identifiable and unrelated section of the schooldistrict that should be treated as isolated from the rest of the district."Significantly, the Court's judgement relied on its definition of de facto as opposed to de jure segregation, first established in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), in that it required some proof of intention to segregate in cases brought from jurisdictions that had never imposed racial segregation by statute. Justices Douglas and Powell,although concurring with the majority, argued that this distinction be dropped altogether and that segregation should be remedied regardless of the circumstances that caused it.
Resolution
The district court ruled on remand that the school board's segregative actions in the Park Hill area did substantially affect schools outside the district, and ordered both parties in the case to submit plans for the desegregationof the Denver Public Schools by 13 December 1973. The district court found both plans unacceptable, and a third party was brought in, drafting a plan incorporating rezoned attendance areas, reassignment of elementary school students, and busing of students. This plan was adopted on 17 April 1974, and a permanent injunction against the school board was also imposed by the district court. Despite the apparent resolution of the case, efforts to desegregate Denver's schools have proven largely ineffective.
Impact
Keyes v School Board No. 1 marked the first time that the Supreme Court identified discrimination in a state that had never imposed racial segregation by statute. This case also served to reinforce the Court's distinction between de facto and de jure segregation, a position further developed in Milliken v. Bradley (1974). Finally, Keyes establishedthat racially segregative actions in one portion of a school system could render the entire system liable to definition as segregated.
Despite the apparent victory for desegregation seen in Keyes, many schools in the United States remain, essentially, segregated. Majority flight tothe suburbs increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, rendering intrasystemremedies increasingly ineffective. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court ruled that demographic shifts (such as flight to the suburbs) not caused by state action could not be redressed by judicial action. As such, intersystem desegregation could only occur on a voluntary basis, and has rarely been attempted.
Related Cases
Keyes, et al.
Respondent
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado
Petitioners' Claim
That the deliberate segregation of Park Hill neighborhood schools rendered the entire Denver Public School system liable to enforced desegregation.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioners
James M. Nabrit III, Gordon G. Greiner
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
William K. Ris
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist (Byron R. White did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 June 1973
Decision
Stated that segregation of any portion of a school system showed prima facie evidence of overall segregation.
Significance
This case marked the first time that the Court ruled on a school segregationissue in a jurisdiction which had never operated under statutes mandating racial separation. In its decision the Court considered the distinction betweende jure segregation, defined as racial separation that is required bylaw, and de facto segregation, defined as racial separation that was not created by state action or statute.
The development of the Denver, Colorado, area in the years following World War II was typical of American cities during the period. The city grew rapidlybetween 1940 and 1980 although, beginning in the mid-1950s, much of the growth occurred in suburban areas surrounding the original city. By the 1970s, thepopulation of Denver proper was declining, while that of the suburbs grew byapproximately 30 percent during the decade.
As Denver's economy diversified during and after the war, its minority populations began to grow. By 1980, 12 percent of Denver's population was African American and 19 percent was Hispanic. Many Denverites of African American descent traditionally lived east of the central business district in a neighborhood known as Five Points, while Denver's Hispanic population traditionally occupied an area just west of the central business district. These traditional residence patterns began to change in the early 1960s, with African Americansmoving into neighborhoods bordering Five Points, including the Park Hill district.
Schools in Transition
Racial segregation had always existed in the Denver schools. Traditional housing patterns made segregation inevitable, since few Denver neighborhoods wereracially integrated. School authorities exacerbated the situation by drawingschool boundaries along racial lines in integrated neighborhoods such as Park Hill. Heightened public awareness of racial discrimination led to the creation of the Vorhees Special Study Committee on Equality in Educational Opportunity in the Denver Public Schools in 1962. The Vorhees Committee recommendedthat Denver's traditionally segregated school system be gradually integratedby the redrawing of school boundaries and other measures, and the school board resolved to put the committee's recommendations into practice. When it appeared that progress under the Vorhees Committee's recommendations was inadequate, a second study group, the Berge Committee, was formed in 1966. The BergeCommittee recommended more fundamental action to redress segregation in the Denver Public Schools, and in 1968 the school board directed the superintendent of schools to prepare a comprehensive desegregation plan. In April of 1969the school board approved the superintendent's plan to integrate the Denver Public Schools, which included busing of some students to ensure racial diversity throughout the school system. Forced busing became the central issue in the citywide school board election of May of 1969, in which a record number ofvoters turned out to defeat incumbent board members favoring the superintendent's plan. In June of 1969 the new school board voted to scrap the desegregation plan proposed by the superintendent, replacing it with a voluntary program.
Mixed Legal Messages
Ten days later a group of eight parents brought suit to enjoin the implementation of the superintendent's plan. The parents' suit also sought a declaratory judgement that abandonment of the desegregation plan constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A preliminary injunction was granted by the district court, which found that the Denver school board had pursued segregationist policies in the Park Hill neighborhood inthe ten years preceding approval of the superintendent's plan. The districtcourt also ruled that schools in the core city area of Denver, whose studentbodies were almost completely African American and whose facilities were substandard, would have to be overhauled to ensure equality of educational opportunity throughout the school system. This latter ruling was made despite the fact that the district court found no proof of discriminatory school board action in the core city school districts. The school board appealed the case tothe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed that remedial action would have to be taken to integrate schools in the Park Hill district, but vacated the preliminary injunction as it applied to the core city schools. The court of appeals based its decision on the grounds that the deliberate segregation of one school district did not constitute proof of deliberate segregation throughout the school system.
The parents appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 12 October 1972. Their case rested on two points: that the district court erred in its finding that Denver's core city schools were not intentionallysegregated due to its failure to consider African Americans and Hispanics asone category of student; and that in any case the proven, intentional segregation of the Park Hill school district made the Denver school system as a whole liable to definition as segregated. The school board also cross-petitionedthe court, seeking reversal of the court of appeals' finding insofar as it agreed with the district court.
Modification and Remand
On 21 June 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the case, upholding the petitioners' claims by a 7-1 margin and rejecting the cross-petition of the respondents. The Court modified the ruling of the court of appeals to vacate ratherthan reverse the district court's findings with regard to the core city schools. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, stated that African Americans and Hispanics must be considered one group in determining the segregation of Denver's schools, and that the district court should reconsider its findingregarding the overall segregation of the Denver schools. The Court further observed that "finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in ameaningful portion of a school system . . . establishes . . . a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities."As such, the Court directed that upon review of the case by the district court, the school board would bear the burden of proving that its actions in districts other than Park Hill were not segregationist in intent, or that Park Hill represented a "separate, identifiable and unrelated section of the schooldistrict that should be treated as isolated from the rest of the district."Significantly, the Court's judgement relied on its definition of de facto as opposed to de jure segregation, first established in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), in that it required some proof of intention to segregate in cases brought from jurisdictions that had never imposed racial segregation by statute. Justices Douglas and Powell,although concurring with the majority, argued that this distinction be dropped altogether and that segregation should be remedied regardless of the circumstances that caused it.
Resolution
The district court ruled on remand that the school board's segregative actions in the Park Hill area did substantially affect schools outside the district, and ordered both parties in the case to submit plans for the desegregationof the Denver Public Schools by 13 December 1973. The district court found both plans unacceptable, and a third party was brought in, drafting a plan incorporating rezoned attendance areas, reassignment of elementary school students, and busing of students. This plan was adopted on 17 April 1974, and a permanent injunction against the school board was also imposed by the district court. Despite the apparent resolution of the case, efforts to desegregate Denver's schools have proven largely ineffective.
Impact
Keyes v School Board No. 1 marked the first time that the Supreme Court identified discrimination in a state that had never imposed racial segregation by statute. This case also served to reinforce the Court's distinction between de facto and de jure segregation, a position further developed in Milliken v. Bradley (1974). Finally, Keyes establishedthat racially segregative actions in one portion of a school system could render the entire system liable to definition as segregated.
Despite the apparent victory for desegregation seen in Keyes, many schools in the United States remain, essentially, segregated. Majority flight tothe suburbs increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, rendering intrasystemremedies increasingly ineffective. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court ruled that demographic shifts (such as flight to the suburbs) not caused by state action could not be redressed by judicial action. As such, intersystem desegregation could only occur on a voluntary basis, and has rarely been attempted.
Related Cases
- Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
- Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
- Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
- Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1974).
- Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1358 (1979).
- Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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