Appellant
State of North Carolina
Appellee
T. D. R. (an unidentified juvenile)
Appellate's Claim
That denial of a request for a two-week trial extension to gather new evidence did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Michael F. Easley
Chief Lawyer for Appelee
Kevin P. Bradley
Justice for the Court
Burley B. Mitchell, Jr. (writing for the court)
Place
Durham, North Carolina
Date of Decision
6 February 1998
Decision
Upheld the state of North Carolina's claim by reversing two lower courts' decisions and returning the case to the lower courts for reinstatement of indictments against T. D. R.
Significance
The ruling recognized flexibility lower state courts have in trying violent juvenile offenders as adults. The case characterized the responsiveness of state governments, including court systems, to public demands for toughening punishment measures of violent and destructive crimes, even when performed by youths.
To many the juvenile justice system had fallen into chaos toward the end of the twentieth century. While violent crime in the United States decreased in general through the 1990s, violent crime by teens rose dramatically. The juvenile court system, originally established to try youths under the age of 18, was increasingly accused of letting violent teen criminals off with nothing more than "a slap on the wrist."
Traditionally, the age of the juvenile and the seriousness of the offense were the key criteria considered when determining whether to try a juvenile as an adult. With respect to age, 21 states had no minimum age requirement for ajuvenile to be tried as an adult, and of the remaining 29 states, minimum agerequirements ranged from seven to 16 years of age. The primary offenses forwhich juveniles were tried as adults included the more serious crimes such asmurder, offenses involving serious personal injury, property crimes, publicorder offenses, and drug offenses. Some states tried juveniles as adults if their alleged offense would normally constitute a felony and evidence existedof prior felony convictions. Moreover, some states allowed juveniles to be tried as adults if they were considered unlikely to respond to the treatment available in juvenile detention facilities.
Trying juveniles in the adult court system always sparked heated debate. Fearof random violence committed by young teens became one of the nation's greatest concerns by the late 1990s. Encouraged by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, many state legislatures enacted "get tough" measures ensuring violent teen offenders would be punished "appropriately" for their crime. Two prominent viewpoints existed in the debate of trying teens as adults. The conservative position maintained that treating teens as adults wasan effective way to express public outrage for the offenses of wayward youthby ensuring punishment. The opposing viewpoint contended that trying teens as adults was too harsh. Embracing the motto that "children are the future ofthis country," juvenile advocates contended that society had a responsibilityto rehabilitate youth while plenty of time still existed to lead productivelives. Also, juveniles incarcerated with hardened adult criminals were easy prey for sexual assault and other forms of violence. However, a seeming increase of highly publicized violent crimes committed by the hands of young teensand even pre-teens occurred through the 1990s, including an outbreak of school shootings. The rehabilitation stance gradually lost ground to the more conservative punishment stance to appease the public's outcry for more severe treatment of violent teen offenders.
Teen Assault and Court Jurisdiction
In August of 1996 a 15-year-old juvenile, known as T. D. R., broke into a woman's home. He forced the woman into a bedroom where at knife point he sexually assaulted her. Before leaving, T. D. R. cut off the victim's hair and forced her into a closet. Upon apprehension, the state of North Carolina filed a juvenile petition alleging T. D. R. a delinquent as a result of committing first-degree rape and burglary.
In a district court hearing, T. D. R. waived his right to present evidence and agreed that probable cause did exist, that he in fact committed the crime.T. D. R. also requested a two-week continuance, a request for more time before the trial would begin, in order to undergo psychological evaluations. The evaluations could then be admitted as evidence concerning the issue of whetherhis case should be transferred to superior court for trial as an adult. Thedistrict court denied the continuance, and transferred jurisdiction, the power to hear and determine a case, over T. D. R. to superior court to try him asan adult on both charges in addition to first-degree kidnapping.
In February of 1997 the superior court determined that the district court denied T. D. R. "due process of law and fundamental fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the juvenile's evidence with regard to the appropriateness ofretaining jurisdiction in the district court." The court ordered the indictments dismissed and sent the case back to the district court. The state of North Carolina appealed the decision.
In March of 1997, the appeals court overruled the February superior court decision and sent the case back to superior court with the indictments reinstated. The court of appeals ruled that district court orders transferring jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court were subject to review by the court of appeals only after the final judgement of the superior court. While T. D. R. had not focused on the issue of jurisdiction in his appeal, the juvenile did claim he was denied due process after the district court had not granted the continuance he had originally requested. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed to hear the case.
When Juveniles Are Adults
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the court of appeal's ruling. Chief Justice Mitchell, writing for the court, found that the court of appealshad authority to hear any direct appeal in a juvenile transfer order, not just those with final decisions. Since the juvenile transfer order terminated district court jurisdiction by sending the case to a superior court, the district court action was completed. In addition, Mitchell ruled the superior courtdid not have legal authority to conduct a review of district court transferorder. Only the court of appeals possessed proper jurisdiction for review ofdistrict court orders transferring jurisdiction over juveniles to the superior court.
Mitchell found that the district court had legal authority to transfer T. D.R.'s case to superior court for adult trial since he was (1) older than 13 years-of-age; (2) had allegedly committed an offense constituting a Class A felony if committed by an adult; and, (3) had completed a district court probable cause hearing.
If the district court had found probable cause, but the offense was not a Class A felony, the district court would have had to determine whether the "needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer of the case to Superior Court." Mitchell wrote that in order to avoid due process constitutionality challenges as addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court inSchall v. Martin, the district court should have allowed T. D. R. a hearing in which the juvenile, represented by counsel, could have testified onhis own behalf, calling and examining witnesses, and producing other evidence dealing with the issue of whether the he should be sent to the superior court to be tried as an adult. Mitchell held that juveniles should be afforded the same constitutional guarantees as adults in criminal prosecutions.
Mitchell also concluded that the superior court had authority to review the indictment against T. D. R. and to dismiss charges if T. D. R.'s rights had been "flagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant's preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution." Mitchell held this requirement for dismissal was not satisfied since T. D. R. was merely denied more time to gather evidence to respond to the state's expert witness, which T. D. R. argued was available had the additionaltime been granted. Mitchell wrote that denial of such motions are reviewed on appeal only if the defendant can demonstrate "gross abuse" of discretion. Mitchell asserted T. D. R. had over three months to gather evidence, and at notime offered an explanation why this time was not sufficient. In fact, T. D.R. not only had ample time to gather evidence, but the district court delayed the hearing date more than once, and assisted T. D. R. in gathering evidence when requested. As a result, Mitchell concluded the district court neitherabused its discretion nor committed any constitutional error in denying T. D.R.'s motion for continuance.
Consequently, Mitchell continued, the superior court order dismissing the indictments, and returning the case to district court was in error, and should have been reversed by the court of appeals. To set the case record straight again, Mitchell reversed the court of appeals' ruling and the superior court'sorder. He then returned the case to the court of appeals under orders to return the matter to the superior court for reinstatement of the indictments against T. D. R. Any further proceedings should be in accordance with trying T. D. R. as an adult.
Impact
Criminal punishment became increasingly politicized in the 1990s. Trying children as adults was often justified on grounds that teens who committed violent crimes should receive punishment comparable to their crimes. In addition, it was believed by many that stiff penalties served as deterrents to other teens who might commit murder or other serious crimes. The prospect of serving life with hardened criminals in adult prison might make those teens think twice. The possibility of only being sent to a juvenile detention for several years, it was argued, in no way provided the same deterrent. Legislatures were hesitant to pass any legislation that could be seen as being soft on crime. The public outcry for stiffer penalties became deafening, and the legislators were not about to deny the public what it yearned for. Previously, trying a juvenile as an adult was seen as a last resort after all avenues of the juvenile system had been utilized. By the 1990s, however, juveniles were being initially tried as adults because of public demand in most states. Whether this trend was the best avenue of trial and punishment was basically irrelevant in the politically conservative environment that existed.
Juvenile advocates, on the other hand, maintained that trying juveniles as adults was only a short-sighted, "knee-jerk" solution to a complex social condition. They argued that in satisfying the public's rage against violent teen perpetrators, the system was merely setting these offenders up for a reappearance into society with a criminal label, and in all likelihood, becoming evenmore dangerous to society after being locked up with adult criminals. Those supporting this contention believed that rather than locking these teens up, society as a whole needed to devise a community solution, since crime has traditionally been viewed as a community disease.
As youth crime escalated through the 1990s with few plausible alternatives totrying teens as adults who commit violent crimes, submersing teens into adult criminal systems remained society's popular response. Many believed that until the juvenile system experienced a complete overhaul to more effectively deal with violent teens, such as the use of juries in the process, eliminationof legal counsel shortcomings, and applying consistently stricter punishmentfor violent crimes, states would continue to escalate trying juveniles as adults.
Related Cases
State of North Carolina
Appellee
T. D. R. (an unidentified juvenile)
Appellate's Claim
That denial of a request for a two-week trial extension to gather new evidence did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Michael F. Easley
Chief Lawyer for Appelee
Kevin P. Bradley
Justice for the Court
Burley B. Mitchell, Jr. (writing for the court)
Place
Durham, North Carolina
Date of Decision
6 February 1998
Decision
Upheld the state of North Carolina's claim by reversing two lower courts' decisions and returning the case to the lower courts for reinstatement of indictments against T. D. R.
Significance
The ruling recognized flexibility lower state courts have in trying violent juvenile offenders as adults. The case characterized the responsiveness of state governments, including court systems, to public demands for toughening punishment measures of violent and destructive crimes, even when performed by youths.
To many the juvenile justice system had fallen into chaos toward the end of the twentieth century. While violent crime in the United States decreased in general through the 1990s, violent crime by teens rose dramatically. The juvenile court system, originally established to try youths under the age of 18, was increasingly accused of letting violent teen criminals off with nothing more than "a slap on the wrist."
Traditionally, the age of the juvenile and the seriousness of the offense were the key criteria considered when determining whether to try a juvenile as an adult. With respect to age, 21 states had no minimum age requirement for ajuvenile to be tried as an adult, and of the remaining 29 states, minimum agerequirements ranged from seven to 16 years of age. The primary offenses forwhich juveniles were tried as adults included the more serious crimes such asmurder, offenses involving serious personal injury, property crimes, publicorder offenses, and drug offenses. Some states tried juveniles as adults if their alleged offense would normally constitute a felony and evidence existedof prior felony convictions. Moreover, some states allowed juveniles to be tried as adults if they were considered unlikely to respond to the treatment available in juvenile detention facilities.
Trying juveniles in the adult court system always sparked heated debate. Fearof random violence committed by young teens became one of the nation's greatest concerns by the late 1990s. Encouraged by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, many state legislatures enacted "get tough" measures ensuring violent teen offenders would be punished "appropriately" for their crime. Two prominent viewpoints existed in the debate of trying teens as adults. The conservative position maintained that treating teens as adults wasan effective way to express public outrage for the offenses of wayward youthby ensuring punishment. The opposing viewpoint contended that trying teens as adults was too harsh. Embracing the motto that "children are the future ofthis country," juvenile advocates contended that society had a responsibilityto rehabilitate youth while plenty of time still existed to lead productivelives. Also, juveniles incarcerated with hardened adult criminals were easy prey for sexual assault and other forms of violence. However, a seeming increase of highly publicized violent crimes committed by the hands of young teensand even pre-teens occurred through the 1990s, including an outbreak of school shootings. The rehabilitation stance gradually lost ground to the more conservative punishment stance to appease the public's outcry for more severe treatment of violent teen offenders.
Teen Assault and Court Jurisdiction
In August of 1996 a 15-year-old juvenile, known as T. D. R., broke into a woman's home. He forced the woman into a bedroom where at knife point he sexually assaulted her. Before leaving, T. D. R. cut off the victim's hair and forced her into a closet. Upon apprehension, the state of North Carolina filed a juvenile petition alleging T. D. R. a delinquent as a result of committing first-degree rape and burglary.
In a district court hearing, T. D. R. waived his right to present evidence and agreed that probable cause did exist, that he in fact committed the crime.T. D. R. also requested a two-week continuance, a request for more time before the trial would begin, in order to undergo psychological evaluations. The evaluations could then be admitted as evidence concerning the issue of whetherhis case should be transferred to superior court for trial as an adult. Thedistrict court denied the continuance, and transferred jurisdiction, the power to hear and determine a case, over T. D. R. to superior court to try him asan adult on both charges in addition to first-degree kidnapping.
In February of 1997 the superior court determined that the district court denied T. D. R. "due process of law and fundamental fairness by its refusal to hear or consider the juvenile's evidence with regard to the appropriateness ofretaining jurisdiction in the district court." The court ordered the indictments dismissed and sent the case back to the district court. The state of North Carolina appealed the decision.
In March of 1997, the appeals court overruled the February superior court decision and sent the case back to superior court with the indictments reinstated. The court of appeals ruled that district court orders transferring jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court were subject to review by the court of appeals only after the final judgement of the superior court. While T. D. R. had not focused on the issue of jurisdiction in his appeal, the juvenile did claim he was denied due process after the district court had not granted the continuance he had originally requested. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed to hear the case.
When Juveniles Are Adults
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the court of appeal's ruling. Chief Justice Mitchell, writing for the court, found that the court of appealshad authority to hear any direct appeal in a juvenile transfer order, not just those with final decisions. Since the juvenile transfer order terminated district court jurisdiction by sending the case to a superior court, the district court action was completed. In addition, Mitchell ruled the superior courtdid not have legal authority to conduct a review of district court transferorder. Only the court of appeals possessed proper jurisdiction for review ofdistrict court orders transferring jurisdiction over juveniles to the superior court.
Mitchell found that the district court had legal authority to transfer T. D.R.'s case to superior court for adult trial since he was (1) older than 13 years-of-age; (2) had allegedly committed an offense constituting a Class A felony if committed by an adult; and, (3) had completed a district court probable cause hearing.
If the district court had found probable cause, but the offense was not a Class A felony, the district court would have had to determine whether the "needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer of the case to Superior Court." Mitchell wrote that in order to avoid due process constitutionality challenges as addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court inSchall v. Martin, the district court should have allowed T. D. R. a hearing in which the juvenile, represented by counsel, could have testified onhis own behalf, calling and examining witnesses, and producing other evidence dealing with the issue of whether the he should be sent to the superior court to be tried as an adult. Mitchell held that juveniles should be afforded the same constitutional guarantees as adults in criminal prosecutions.
Mitchell also concluded that the superior court had authority to review the indictment against T. D. R. and to dismiss charges if T. D. R.'s rights had been "flagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant's preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution." Mitchell held this requirement for dismissal was not satisfied since T. D. R. was merely denied more time to gather evidence to respond to the state's expert witness, which T. D. R. argued was available had the additionaltime been granted. Mitchell wrote that denial of such motions are reviewed on appeal only if the defendant can demonstrate "gross abuse" of discretion. Mitchell asserted T. D. R. had over three months to gather evidence, and at notime offered an explanation why this time was not sufficient. In fact, T. D.R. not only had ample time to gather evidence, but the district court delayed the hearing date more than once, and assisted T. D. R. in gathering evidence when requested. As a result, Mitchell concluded the district court neitherabused its discretion nor committed any constitutional error in denying T. D.R.'s motion for continuance.
Consequently, Mitchell continued, the superior court order dismissing the indictments, and returning the case to district court was in error, and should have been reversed by the court of appeals. To set the case record straight again, Mitchell reversed the court of appeals' ruling and the superior court'sorder. He then returned the case to the court of appeals under orders to return the matter to the superior court for reinstatement of the indictments against T. D. R. Any further proceedings should be in accordance with trying T. D. R. as an adult.
Impact
Criminal punishment became increasingly politicized in the 1990s. Trying children as adults was often justified on grounds that teens who committed violent crimes should receive punishment comparable to their crimes. In addition, it was believed by many that stiff penalties served as deterrents to other teens who might commit murder or other serious crimes. The prospect of serving life with hardened criminals in adult prison might make those teens think twice. The possibility of only being sent to a juvenile detention for several years, it was argued, in no way provided the same deterrent. Legislatures were hesitant to pass any legislation that could be seen as being soft on crime. The public outcry for stiffer penalties became deafening, and the legislators were not about to deny the public what it yearned for. Previously, trying a juvenile as an adult was seen as a last resort after all avenues of the juvenile system had been utilized. By the 1990s, however, juveniles were being initially tried as adults because of public demand in most states. Whether this trend was the best avenue of trial and punishment was basically irrelevant in the politically conservative environment that existed.
Juvenile advocates, on the other hand, maintained that trying juveniles as adults was only a short-sighted, "knee-jerk" solution to a complex social condition. They argued that in satisfying the public's rage against violent teen perpetrators, the system was merely setting these offenders up for a reappearance into society with a criminal label, and in all likelihood, becoming evenmore dangerous to society after being locked up with adult criminals. Those supporting this contention believed that rather than locking these teens up, society as a whole needed to devise a community solution, since crime has traditionally been viewed as a community disease.
As youth crime escalated through the 1990s with few plausible alternatives totrying teens as adults who commit violent crimes, submersing teens into adult criminal systems remained society's popular response. Many believed that until the juvenile system experienced a complete overhaul to more effectively deal with violent teens, such as the use of juries in the process, eliminationof legal counsel shortcomings, and applying consistently stricter punishmentfor violent crimes, states would continue to escalate trying juveniles as adults.
Related Cases
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
- Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
- In re Arthur, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
User Comments Add a comment…
5 months ago
I started doing some research for a school project in this subject of teens tried as adults. I didnt realize how deep into this subject i would become! i just wish someon could explain how a teen my age(17)and even younger can be tried as an adult but cannot be privledged the same awards as adults. For examople i can be tried for life but cant even vote, i could be living with women twice my age who will molest and beat me but i cant even drink a beer. please explain how teens can be punished like adults but not recognized as adults. Is the only time we get recognition as adults is if we kill an old couple????