Petitioner
State of Maryland
Respondent
Sandra Ann Craig
Petitioner's Claim
That allowing an alleged victim of child abuse to testify by closed circuit television violates the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront their accusers in court.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William H. Murphy, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 June 1990
Decision
The Supreme Court found that because the closed circuit procedure did not rule out cross-examination, it satisfied the essential purpose of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
Significance
Craig was a significantly different interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The Court justified going outside the clear meaning of the text byciting the special circumstances of victims of child abuse.
Sandra Ann Craig owned and operated a kindergarten and prekindergarten daycare center in Howard County, Maryland. In October of 1986, she was charged by agrand jury with sexually assaulting a six-year-old girl who had been in hercare from August of 1984 to June of 1986. Before the case went to trial, theprosecution invoked a state law that allowed victims of child abuse to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The law permitted the child witness,the prosecutor, and the defense lawyer to withdraw to a separate room, wherethe witness was examined and cross-examined while a video monitor relayed these events to the judge, jury, and defendant in the courtroom. During this time, the child cannot see the defendant, but the defendant remains in electronic communication with defense counsel.
The Maryland statute permitted the procedure to be invoked only in situationswhere the child witness would suffer emotional distress to the extent of being unable to communicate if obliged to be in contact with his or her allegedattacker. In support of its request to use this procedure in Craig, the prosecution named a number of older children who had also allegedly been sexually abused by Sandra Craig and who an expert witness declared would sufferemotional distress if forced to testify in Craig's presence. Craig objectedto use of the procedure, but the trial court allowed it, and Craig was convicted on all counts. After her conviction was upheld by two state appellate courts, Craig took her case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Court Overrides Plain Language of the Sixth Amendment
The section of the Sixth Amendment at issue in Craig's case reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confrontedwith the witnesses against him." By the time the Supreme Court heard Craig, it was settled law that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Confrontation Clause applicable in state courts. Writing for the one-vote majority thatupheld the Maryland statute, Justice O'Connor was obliged to ignore the plainmeaning of the Constitution:
O'Connor went on to explain that the procedure authorized by the Maryland statute violated neither the truth-seeking nor the "symbolic" purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The procedure required the child witness to testify underoath, and permitted both cross-examination and observation of the witness'sdemeanor.
The four dissenters--Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens--did not agree that the purposes of the Confrontation Clause were symbolic. While conceding that the Maryland procedure conformed to "currently favored public policy" andmight not be unfair, they did not believe that the Court had any business substituting social policy for the plain meaning of the Constitution. As recently as 1988, the Court had unequivocally stated, in Coy v. Iowa that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
In a companion case to Craig, Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Courtruled by a vote of 5-4 that a physician's account of a child's statements about his alleged sexual abuse by another adult were inadmissible because theywere unreliable. The issue of the proper procedure for trying alleged child molesters remained largely unresolved.
Related Cases
State of Maryland
Respondent
Sandra Ann Craig
Petitioner's Claim
That allowing an alleged victim of child abuse to testify by closed circuit television violates the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront their accusers in court.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William H. Murphy, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 June 1990
Decision
The Supreme Court found that because the closed circuit procedure did not rule out cross-examination, it satisfied the essential purpose of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
Significance
Craig was a significantly different interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The Court justified going outside the clear meaning of the text byciting the special circumstances of victims of child abuse.
Sandra Ann Craig owned and operated a kindergarten and prekindergarten daycare center in Howard County, Maryland. In October of 1986, she was charged by agrand jury with sexually assaulting a six-year-old girl who had been in hercare from August of 1984 to June of 1986. Before the case went to trial, theprosecution invoked a state law that allowed victims of child abuse to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The law permitted the child witness,the prosecutor, and the defense lawyer to withdraw to a separate room, wherethe witness was examined and cross-examined while a video monitor relayed these events to the judge, jury, and defendant in the courtroom. During this time, the child cannot see the defendant, but the defendant remains in electronic communication with defense counsel.
The Maryland statute permitted the procedure to be invoked only in situationswhere the child witness would suffer emotional distress to the extent of being unable to communicate if obliged to be in contact with his or her allegedattacker. In support of its request to use this procedure in Craig, the prosecution named a number of older children who had also allegedly been sexually abused by Sandra Craig and who an expert witness declared would sufferemotional distress if forced to testify in Craig's presence. Craig objectedto use of the procedure, but the trial court allowed it, and Craig was convicted on all counts. After her conviction was upheld by two state appellate courts, Craig took her case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Court Overrides Plain Language of the Sixth Amendment
The section of the Sixth Amendment at issue in Craig's case reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confrontedwith the witnesses against him." By the time the Supreme Court heard Craig, it was settled law that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Confrontation Clause applicable in state courts. Writing for the one-vote majority thatupheld the Maryland statute, Justice O'Connor was obliged to ignore the plainmeaning of the Constitution:
[T]hough we reaffirm the importanceof face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at the trial, we cannot say that such confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's accusers . . . This interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is consistent with our cases holding that other Sixth Amendment rights must also be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process . . . We see no reason to treat the face-to-face component of the confrontation right any differently, and indeed we think it would be anomalous to do so.
O'Connor went on to explain that the procedure authorized by the Maryland statute violated neither the truth-seeking nor the "symbolic" purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The procedure required the child witness to testify underoath, and permitted both cross-examination and observation of the witness'sdemeanor.
The four dissenters--Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens--did not agree that the purposes of the Confrontation Clause were symbolic. While conceding that the Maryland procedure conformed to "currently favored public policy" andmight not be unfair, they did not believe that the Court had any business substituting social policy for the plain meaning of the Constitution. As recently as 1988, the Court had unequivocally stated, in Coy v. Iowa that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
In a companion case to Craig, Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Courtruled by a vote of 5-4 that a physician's account of a child's statements about his alleged sexual abuse by another adult were inadmissible because theywere unreliable. The issue of the proper procedure for trying alleged child molesters remained largely unresolved.
Related Cases
- Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
- Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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