Appellant
Thelma B. Stanton
Appellee
James Lawrence Stanton, Jr.
Appellant's Claim
That a Utah statute was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional becauseit set the age of majority for females at 18 and males at 21, thus denying due process and equal protection as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendmentto the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
J. Dennis Frederick
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Bryce E. Roe
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun (writing for the Court), William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 April 1975
Decision
That the basis for the statute's establishment of different ages of majoritywas not rational, and that it denied women equal protection under the law.
Significance
Stanton v. Stanton followed Reed v. Reed (1971) in applying thestandard of rationality to questions of preference for males. The latter hadbeen the first case in which the Supreme Court directly challenged the issueof discrimination against females to the extent of declaring a state law invalid; with Stanton the Court solidified this stance. Together the cases helped usher in an era of increased attention to equal protection for womenunder the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thelma B. Stanton, who would become the appellant in Stanton v. Stanton, married James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., in Elko, Nevada, in February of 1951.Two years later, in February of 1953, they had a daughter they named SherriLyn; and in January of 1955, the Stantons had a son, Rick Arlund. The couplemoved to Utah, and in 1960, when Sherri was seven years old and Rick five, the Stantons divorced. As part of the divorce proceedings in the District Courtof Salt Lake County, the court awarded custody of the children to their mother and provided for alimony and child support as follows:
When Thelma Stanton remarried, the court changed its decree to relieve her former husband James from continuing to make alimony payments; the stipulationsas to child support, however, would remain in effect until the children reached majority. James also remarried, and continued making child-support payments-- until some time shortly after 12 February 1971, when Sherri became 18 years old. Two years later, in May of 1973, Thelma asked the divorce court to enter a judgment in her favor and against James for a variety of issues, particularly the support of the children during the period after each had attainedthe age of 18. The court, however, judged that on 12 February 1971, Sherri had attained her majority in accordance with Section 15-2-1 of Utah Code Annotated 1953. According to the Supreme Court, the latter is like many state statutes in having "little or no [available] legislative history," but seems to be based on an 1852 territorial act. It defines the "period of minority" thus:"The period of minority extends in males to the age of 21years and in females to that of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage." Therefore, the divorce court denied Thelma Stanton's motion, ruling that the "defendant is not obligated to plaintiff for maintenance and support of Sherri Lyn Stanton since that date [12 February 1971]."
Thelma Stanton appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. In her case before thestate's highest court, she held that Section 15-2-1 was discriminatory, and denied due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court responded that the statute did indeed treat males and females differently, but that differences in treatment were to be excused "so long asthere is a reasonable basis for the classification, which is related to the purposes of the act, and it applies equally and uniformly to all persons within the class."
One might have assumed that a law which incorporated what the court called "old notions" would have established a lower age of majority for males than forfemales, not a higher one. But the establishment of a lower age of majoritywas based on the following ideas, in the court's words: "that generally it isthe man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials"; that"it is a salutary thing for [the man] to get a good education and/or training before he undertakes those responsibilities"; and that "girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys" and "they generally tend to marry earlier." Thus while a young male--in 1852, at least, if not in 1975--might be continuing his education in preparation for a career inwhich he would be expected to support a wife and family, a female might already be married and under the care of another male. On the basis of that logic,the Utah high court concluded that "there is no basis upon which we would bejustified in concluding that the statute is so beyond a reasonable doubt inconflict with constitutional provisions that it should be stricken down as invalid." Therefore the law stood, and Thelma was entitled to support for Rickuntil he turned 21; but she was not entitled to support for Sherri after thelatter turned 18.
Challenging "Old Notions"
After Thelma Stanton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, James Stanton's counsel attempted to show the Court that she lacked standing for two reasons. Ingiving the opinion for an 8- 1 Court, however, Justice Blackmun rejected bothof these arguments. First, James had posited that the support issue was mootbecause, by the time the case went before the Court, Sherri was 21 years old, having reached her majority by any state's standard in February of 1974. Second, James tried to contend that because Thelma herself did not belong to the age group identified by the Utah statute, she therefore lacked a personal stake in the proceedings; and that furthermore she had agreed to Utah's definition of the age of majority when she signed the papers stipulating support payments back in 1960.
With regard to the first argument, Blackmun wrote that the claim of mootness
Far from being moot, then, the issue at hand was "a continuing live case or controversy." As for James's claim that Thelma had no direct interest in the case, the Court similarly dismissed this: "We are satisfied that it makes no difference whether the appellant's interest . . . is regarded as an interest personal to appellant or as that of a fiduciary." As the person responsible for a minor child, the custodial parent in this situation (i.e., Thelma) wouldactually be the one who had a right to support money--not the minor child herself. Furthermore, the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which had been in effect in Utah since 1957, stated that "Every woman shall support her child"; hence, "the appellant herself thus had a legal obligation under Utah law to support her daughter until Sherri became 21 . . . Her interest in the controversy . . . is distinct and significant and . . . assures . . . proper standing on her part."
Turning to the specific merits of the case, Blackmun addressed each side's position. Whereas the appellant contended that the statute denied equal protection, the appellee claimed in turn that it was a test of rationality--i.e., that the difference in ages of majority had a logical basis, and was not a result of discrimination. In evaluating these claims, the Court used Reed v. Reed (1971) as its guide. The earlier case had sprung from an equal protection challenge to an Idaho law which gave preference to males over females when it came to a question of who should act as administrator over the estate of a deceased child. In its ruling, which struck down the Idaho statute, the Court had adopted a position first established in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia (1920), stating that "a classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarlycircumstanced shall be treated alike.'"
Seen under the light of this logic, the Utah statute lacked rationality. Thiswas particularly so with regard to the Utah court's position that females tend to marry earlier than males; since the law in that state indicated that "all minors obtain their majority by marriage," this was a meaningless point. More importantly, the Court held, whether or not one endorsed the "old notions" embodied in the Utah statute, the Utah court had imposed "criteria wholly unrelated to the objectivity of that statute." Not only was a minor a minor, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, whether male or female, but "no longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."
In a further statement of the changing positions of women, the Court continued:
After reviewing a variety of other state statutes regarding the ages of majority--including other statements in Utah's own code--the Court concluded thatthere was no rational basis for the law. Finally, it was the Court's judgmentthat Section 15-2-1 "denies the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteedby the Fourteenth Amendment."
Dissent and a Postscript
Justice Rehnquist offered dissent on the basis that the case before the Courtwas not a proper constitutional question. "This case," he wrote, "arises only because appellant and appellee made no provision in their property settlement agreement fixing the age at which appellee's obligation to support his sonor daughter would terminate." The age-of-majority question had arisen because the Utah Supreme Court had simply turned to what seemed the most appropriate state law for establishing a cut-off point. Furthermore, Utah had in place,in its Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, a provision defining "child"as "a son or daughter under the age of twenty-one years." For these and other reasons, including the Court's "established policy of avoiding unnecessaryconstitutional adjudication," Rehnquist moved to dismiss the appeal.
A postscript to the case came two years later, with Stanton v. Stanton(1977), or "Stanton II." At the conclusion of the first Stanton case,the Court noted the fact that it had not fully settled the issues of the appellee's actual monetary obligation to the appellant. This was especially so since James Stanton was asserting that if the ages of majority should be madeequal, they should both be set at the age of 18. At the end of the 1975 case,the Court had remanded it to Utah's high court so that the latter could resolve the state-law issues involved. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court used the opportunity to allege the constitutionality of the age-of-majority statute once again.
The Utah Supreme Court then passed the case on to the District Court of SaltLake County, which in the U.S. Supreme Court's words "correctly recognized .. . that the only issue before it was whether . . . both sexes should be deemed to attain majority either at age 18 or at age 21." That court chose twenty-one as the proper age, and ordered Thelma Stanton a judgment of more than $3,600, consisting of $2,700 past due support money, more than $500 in interest, and the remainder in costs. The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed thison appeal, and further reinforced its allegiance to Section 15-2-1 with the statement that "regardless of what a judge may think about equality, his thinking cannot change the facts of life . . . " On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Utah court's judgment was vacated. By this point, even James Stantonwas starting to back down, to judge from a footnote in the case: "Even the appellee recognizes the impropriety of the reversal of the costs factor . . . "
Impact
Stanton would bear heavily on Craig v. Boren (1976), a case challenging an Oklahoma statute that set the legal drinking age at twenty-one for males and eighteen for females. Once again the Court would rule, this time7-2, that the statute relied on gender classifications that were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) also relied on Stanton in its attack on gender-based classifications. Stanton helped signal a trend throughout the 1970s,one which continued into the 1990s, of attempts to establish equality of males and females before the law.
Related Cases
Parental Responsibility
When an adult commits a crime, or causes damage to property that belongs to someone else, that adult is held legally liable; but when a child is the responsible party, the question of liability is more involved.
Most states have some sort of law governing the degree of a parent's financial responsibility for damage done by his or her child. Oregon and Louisiana have the most stringent laws, holding parents liable for damage caused by a child in any type of circumstance, whether such damage was willful and maliciousor not.
Eight states have particularly liberal laws, at least from the standpoint ofparental liability. In Oklahoma, Iowa, West Virginia, and Maryland, parents are liable only if a child commits a crime involving malicious or willful property damage, or personal injury. Florida, Delaware, New Jersey, and New Yorkare even more permissive: in those four states, the standard is malicious orwillful criminal activity involving property damage (without the inclusion ofincidents involving personal injury).
Sources
Fast, Julius, and Timothy Fast. The Legal Atlas of the United States.New York: Facts on File, 1997.
Thelma B. Stanton
Appellee
James Lawrence Stanton, Jr.
Appellant's Claim
That a Utah statute was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional becauseit set the age of majority for females at 18 and males at 21, thus denying due process and equal protection as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendmentto the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
J. Dennis Frederick
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Bryce E. Roe
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun (writing for the Court), William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 April 1975
Decision
That the basis for the statute's establishment of different ages of majoritywas not rational, and that it denied women equal protection under the law.
Significance
Stanton v. Stanton followed Reed v. Reed (1971) in applying thestandard of rationality to questions of preference for males. The latter hadbeen the first case in which the Supreme Court directly challenged the issueof discrimination against females to the extent of declaring a state law invalid; with Stanton the Court solidified this stance. Together the cases helped usher in an era of increased attention to equal protection for womenunder the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thelma B. Stanton, who would become the appellant in Stanton v. Stanton, married James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., in Elko, Nevada, in February of 1951.Two years later, in February of 1953, they had a daughter they named SherriLyn; and in January of 1955, the Stantons had a son, Rick Arlund. The couplemoved to Utah, and in 1960, when Sherri was seven years old and Rick five, the Stantons divorced. As part of the divorce proceedings in the District Courtof Salt Lake County, the court awarded custody of the children to their mother and provided for alimony and child support as follows:
Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month as child support and alimony, $100.00 per month for each child as child support and $100.00per month as alimony, to be paid on or before the 1st day of each month through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.
When Thelma Stanton remarried, the court changed its decree to relieve her former husband James from continuing to make alimony payments; the stipulationsas to child support, however, would remain in effect until the children reached majority. James also remarried, and continued making child-support payments-- until some time shortly after 12 February 1971, when Sherri became 18 years old. Two years later, in May of 1973, Thelma asked the divorce court to enter a judgment in her favor and against James for a variety of issues, particularly the support of the children during the period after each had attainedthe age of 18. The court, however, judged that on 12 February 1971, Sherri had attained her majority in accordance with Section 15-2-1 of Utah Code Annotated 1953. According to the Supreme Court, the latter is like many state statutes in having "little or no [available] legislative history," but seems to be based on an 1852 territorial act. It defines the "period of minority" thus:"The period of minority extends in males to the age of 21years and in females to that of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage." Therefore, the divorce court denied Thelma Stanton's motion, ruling that the "defendant is not obligated to plaintiff for maintenance and support of Sherri Lyn Stanton since that date [12 February 1971]."
Thelma Stanton appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. In her case before thestate's highest court, she held that Section 15-2-1 was discriminatory, and denied due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court responded that the statute did indeed treat males and females differently, but that differences in treatment were to be excused "so long asthere is a reasonable basis for the classification, which is related to the purposes of the act, and it applies equally and uniformly to all persons within the class."
One might have assumed that a law which incorporated what the court called "old notions" would have established a lower age of majority for males than forfemales, not a higher one. But the establishment of a lower age of majoritywas based on the following ideas, in the court's words: "that generally it isthe man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials"; that"it is a salutary thing for [the man] to get a good education and/or training before he undertakes those responsibilities"; and that "girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys" and "they generally tend to marry earlier." Thus while a young male--in 1852, at least, if not in 1975--might be continuing his education in preparation for a career inwhich he would be expected to support a wife and family, a female might already be married and under the care of another male. On the basis of that logic,the Utah high court concluded that "there is no basis upon which we would bejustified in concluding that the statute is so beyond a reasonable doubt inconflict with constitutional provisions that it should be stricken down as invalid." Therefore the law stood, and Thelma was entitled to support for Rickuntil he turned 21; but she was not entitled to support for Sherri after thelatter turned 18.
Challenging "Old Notions"
After Thelma Stanton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, James Stanton's counsel attempted to show the Court that she lacked standing for two reasons. Ingiving the opinion for an 8- 1 Court, however, Justice Blackmun rejected bothof these arguments. First, James had posited that the support issue was mootbecause, by the time the case went before the Court, Sherri was 21 years old, having reached her majority by any state's standard in February of 1974. Second, James tried to contend that because Thelma herself did not belong to the age group identified by the Utah statute, she therefore lacked a personal stake in the proceedings; and that furthermore she had agreed to Utah's definition of the age of majority when she signed the papers stipulating support payments back in 1960.
With regard to the first argument, Blackmun wrote that the claim of mootness
overlooks the fact that what is at issue is support for the daughter during her years between 18 and 21. If appellee, under the divorce decree, is obligated for Sherri's support during that period, it is an obligation that has not been fulfilled, and there is an amount past due and owing from the appellee.
Far from being moot, then, the issue at hand was "a continuing live case or controversy." As for James's claim that Thelma had no direct interest in the case, the Court similarly dismissed this: "We are satisfied that it makes no difference whether the appellant's interest . . . is regarded as an interest personal to appellant or as that of a fiduciary." As the person responsible for a minor child, the custodial parent in this situation (i.e., Thelma) wouldactually be the one who had a right to support money--not the minor child herself. Furthermore, the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which had been in effect in Utah since 1957, stated that "Every woman shall support her child"; hence, "the appellant herself thus had a legal obligation under Utah law to support her daughter until Sherri became 21 . . . Her interest in the controversy . . . is distinct and significant and . . . assures . . . proper standing on her part."
Turning to the specific merits of the case, Blackmun addressed each side's position. Whereas the appellant contended that the statute denied equal protection, the appellee claimed in turn that it was a test of rationality--i.e., that the difference in ages of majority had a logical basis, and was not a result of discrimination. In evaluating these claims, the Court used Reed v. Reed (1971) as its guide. The earlier case had sprung from an equal protection challenge to an Idaho law which gave preference to males over females when it came to a question of who should act as administrator over the estate of a deceased child. In its ruling, which struck down the Idaho statute, the Court had adopted a position first established in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia (1920), stating that "a classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarlycircumstanced shall be treated alike.'"
Seen under the light of this logic, the Utah statute lacked rationality. Thiswas particularly so with regard to the Utah court's position that females tend to marry earlier than males; since the law in that state indicated that "all minors obtain their majority by marriage," this was a meaningless point. More importantly, the Court held, whether or not one endorsed the "old notions" embodied in the Utah statute, the Utah court had imposed "criteria wholly unrelated to the objectivity of that statute." Not only was a minor a minor, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, whether male or female, but "no longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."
In a further statement of the changing positions of women, the Court continued:
Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life whereeducation is a desirable, if not always necessary . . . is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he attains his education and training, so, too, is it for the girl. To distinguish between the twoon educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported as long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.
After reviewing a variety of other state statutes regarding the ages of majority--including other statements in Utah's own code--the Court concluded thatthere was no rational basis for the law. Finally, it was the Court's judgmentthat Section 15-2-1 "denies the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteedby the Fourteenth Amendment."
Dissent and a Postscript
Justice Rehnquist offered dissent on the basis that the case before the Courtwas not a proper constitutional question. "This case," he wrote, "arises only because appellant and appellee made no provision in their property settlement agreement fixing the age at which appellee's obligation to support his sonor daughter would terminate." The age-of-majority question had arisen because the Utah Supreme Court had simply turned to what seemed the most appropriate state law for establishing a cut-off point. Furthermore, Utah had in place,in its Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, a provision defining "child"as "a son or daughter under the age of twenty-one years." For these and other reasons, including the Court's "established policy of avoiding unnecessaryconstitutional adjudication," Rehnquist moved to dismiss the appeal.
A postscript to the case came two years later, with Stanton v. Stanton(1977), or "Stanton II." At the conclusion of the first Stanton case,the Court noted the fact that it had not fully settled the issues of the appellee's actual monetary obligation to the appellant. This was especially so since James Stanton was asserting that if the ages of majority should be madeequal, they should both be set at the age of 18. At the end of the 1975 case,the Court had remanded it to Utah's high court so that the latter could resolve the state-law issues involved. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court used the opportunity to allege the constitutionality of the age-of-majority statute once again.
The Utah Supreme Court then passed the case on to the District Court of SaltLake County, which in the U.S. Supreme Court's words "correctly recognized .. . that the only issue before it was whether . . . both sexes should be deemed to attain majority either at age 18 or at age 21." That court chose twenty-one as the proper age, and ordered Thelma Stanton a judgment of more than $3,600, consisting of $2,700 past due support money, more than $500 in interest, and the remainder in costs. The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed thison appeal, and further reinforced its allegiance to Section 15-2-1 with the statement that "regardless of what a judge may think about equality, his thinking cannot change the facts of life . . . " On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Utah court's judgment was vacated. By this point, even James Stantonwas starting to back down, to judge from a footnote in the case: "Even the appellee recognizes the impropriety of the reversal of the costs factor . . . "
Impact
Stanton would bear heavily on Craig v. Boren (1976), a case challenging an Oklahoma statute that set the legal drinking age at twenty-one for males and eighteen for females. Once again the Court would rule, this time7-2, that the statute relied on gender classifications that were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) also relied on Stanton in its attack on gender-based classifications. Stanton helped signal a trend throughout the 1970s,one which continued into the 1990s, of attempts to establish equality of males and females before the law.
Related Cases
- Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
- Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
- Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
- Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
- Stanton v. Stanton II, 429 U.S. 501 (1977).
- University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Parental Responsibility
When an adult commits a crime, or causes damage to property that belongs to someone else, that adult is held legally liable; but when a child is the responsible party, the question of liability is more involved.
Most states have some sort of law governing the degree of a parent's financial responsibility for damage done by his or her child. Oregon and Louisiana have the most stringent laws, holding parents liable for damage caused by a child in any type of circumstance, whether such damage was willful and maliciousor not.
Eight states have particularly liberal laws, at least from the standpoint ofparental liability. In Oklahoma, Iowa, West Virginia, and Maryland, parents are liable only if a child commits a crime involving malicious or willful property damage, or personal injury. Florida, Delaware, New Jersey, and New Yorkare even more permissive: in those four states, the standard is malicious orwillful criminal activity involving property damage (without the inclusion ofincidents involving personal injury).
Sources
Fast, Julius, and Timothy Fast. The Legal Atlas of the United States.New York: Facts on File, 1997.
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