Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Christopher Lee Armstrong, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That the government need not provide discovery (relevant documents) in a caseof alleged selective prosecution unless the respondent provides a plausiblebasis for believing that others in similar situations have not been prosecuted.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Drew S. Days III
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Barbara E. O'Connor
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas,
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
13 May 1996
Decision
Upheld the government's claim that African Americans prosecuted for drug offenses failed to provide enough evidence to obtain discovery supporting their claim of selective prosecution. They failed to show that the government chosenot to prosecute those in similar situations.
Significance
The Supreme Court's reversal of a circuit court's decision meant that the government did not have to open its files in response to the charge that AfricanAmericans were being selectively targeted for federal prosecution of crack cocaine offenses.
For three months in 1992, three informants infiltrated an alleged crack distribution ring at the behest of agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and police officers from Inglewood, California. During thistime, the informants purchased a total of 124.3 grams of crack from the suspects. When agents arrested Christopher Lee Armstrong and an accomplice, theydiscovered more crack and a loaded firearm. Two other members of the crack ring were arrested later. Armstrong was indicted in April of 1992 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on charges of conspiringto possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and federal firearms offenses.
Those arrested filed a motion for discovery or dismissal on the grounds thatthey were chosen for federal prosecution because they were African Americans.Discovery refers to turning over for examination documents relevant to a person's defense. To support their motion, the defendants offered an affidavit from a paralegal specialist stating that of the 24 similar cases closed by thefederal public defender in the previous year, all the defendants had been black.
Although the government opposed the discovery motion, the district court granted it. The court ordered that the government supply a list of all cases fromthe last three years that involved both cocaine and firearms offenses, identifying the race of the defendants and the levels of law enforcement involvedin the investigations. The government was also asked to explain how it decided to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.
The government asked the court to reconsider its discovery order, with federal and local agents explaining that race played no role in their investigation. A government attorney noted that they decided to prosecute because the caseinvolved over 100 grams of cocaine base, multiple sales took place with multiple defendants, many federal firearms offenses occurred combined with drug dealing, and audio and video tapes of the activity existed. Also, several of the defendants had criminal histories that included narcotics and firearms violations. All this led the agents to believe that the defendants were a fairlysubstantial crack cocaine ring. The government also provided a report whichnoted that Jamaicans, Haitians, and black street gangs controlled the makingand selling of crack.
The defendants' attorneys responded by submitting an affidavit from an intakecoordinator at a drug treatment center who noted that an equal number of Caucasians and minorities were drug dealers and users. A "study" noted that of all 24 similar cases closed by the federal public defenders office in 1991, all the defendants were black. A criminal defense attorney, David R. Reed, stated that in his experience, he had never handled nor heard of a crack cocainecase involving non-black defendants in federal court and that many nonblacksare prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court for crack offenses. A newspaper article noted that federal crack defendants receive a harsher punishment than if they had been arrested for having powder cocaine and that most ofthem are black.
The district court would not reconsider its request that the government provide the documents. The government refused to comply with the discovery order,so the court dismissed the case against the defendants.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. They stated that to get the requested documents in a selective-prosecution claim, the defendants would need to show a strong reason to believethat others in similar situations had not been prosecuted. Selective prosecution refers to prosecuting only people belonging to a certain group for a specific offense.
However, when all the judges of the court of appeals reheard the case, they affirmed the earlier dismissal, stating that the defendants were not requiredto show that the government failed to prosecute others in similar situations.The court also noted that the district court judge did have the power to order the discovery.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the case on 26 February 1996 to determine the appropriate standard for discovery for a selective-prosecution claim. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion.
Selective Prosecution Claims
Armstrong's attorney, Barbara E. O'Connor, felt that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which dealt with discovery in criminal cases, supported the result reached in the court of appeals. The rule stated that the governmentwould provide to the defendant documents which are relevant to the defendant's defense, or which will be used by the government as evidence, or were obtained from the defendant. O'Connor argued that government documents that discussed prosecution strategy in cocaine cases were relevant to the selective-prosecution claim. Rehnquist interpreted the rule to mean that documents need only be provided for the defendant's response to the case-in-chief, not for thepreparation of selective-prosecution claims.
Rehnquist noted that a selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over the executive branch's responsibility to prosecute. Rehnquist expressed concern that the performance of a prosecutor's duties not be impaired. If the basis of a prosecution is examined, it delays the criminal proceedings, chills law enforcement, and might undermine the effectiveness of prosecutors by making known the government's enforcement policy.
A selective-prosecution claim requires that the claimant demonstrate that thefederal prosecutorial policy "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." To show the effect was discriminatory in a race case, "the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals ofa different race were not prosecuted." Because discovery imposes many costson the government, diverts prosecutors' resources, and may disclose strategy,the standard for discovery must be as rigorous as the standard for proving aselective-prosecution claim.
The court of appeals made its decision based on the concept that people of all races commit all types of crimes, but statistics do not support this. In fact, statistics show that 90 percent of the people sentenced in 1994 for crackcocaine trafficking were black; 93.4 percent of convicted LSD dealers were white; 91 percent of those convicted for pornography or prostitution were white.
The materials that Armstrong presented failed to show the existence of the essential elements of a selective-prosecution claim. The "study" did not identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the sameoffenses, but who were not prosecuted. The newspaper article was not relevant to discrimination in decisions to prosecute. The affidavits recounted hearsay, personal conclusions, and anecdotal evidence. Rehnquist noted, "We thinkthe required threshold--a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons--adequately balances the Government's interest in vigorousprosecution and the defendant's interest in avoiding selective prosecution."The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case was remanded.
Justice Breyer concurred but noted that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 should not limit the defendant's discovery rights to the government's case-in-chief. Breyer held that the rule should provide a broad authorization for discovery.
Judicial Vigilance Necessary in Drug Prosecutions
Justice Stevens dissented in this case. He agreed that the facts presented tothe district court showing that the defendants had been singled out becauseof race were not sufficient. However, he felt that the district judge did notabuse her discretion when she concluded that the facts were sufficiently disturbing to require some response from the government. Breyer pointed out thatthree circumstances underscore the need for judicial vigilance in certain types of drug prosecutions. First, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 establishedhigh penalties for the possession and selling of crack cocaine. One gram of crack is treated as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine, resulting in sentences for crack offenders that average three to eight times longer thanfor powder offenders. The prison terms for those convicted in state systemsin crack cases are much shorter than in the federal system. "Finally, it is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal penalties falls heavily on blacks. While 65 percent of the persons who have used crack are white, in 1993they represented only 4 percent of the federal offenders convicted of trafficking in crack. Eighty-eight percent of such offenders were black."
These troubling racial patterns of enforcement call for concern about the fairness of how people are charged with crack offenses. The federal judges in the Central District of California need to scrutinize the evidence that black defendants are prosecuted in federal court, but other races are prosecuted instate court. Breyer noted that the district judge was within her discretion to ask for information that would show what standards governed the choice between a prosecution in federal versus state court.
Breyer disagreed with the majority that the affidavits submitted by Armstrongwere hearsay and anecdotal. He felt that evidence based on a drug counselor's personal observations or an attorney's practice in state and federal courtcan tend to show the existence of a selective prosecution. Breyer summed up his dissent by stating, "In this case, the evidence was sufficiently disturbing to persuade the District Judge to order discovery that might help explain the conspicuous racial pattern of cases before her Court."
Impact
As a result of the Court's decision, the Federal Public Defender's office inLos Angeles said it will look for comparable crack cocaine cases of non-African Americans that were prosecuted in state court, as opposed to federal court. Although United States v. Armstrong was seen as a setback for defense attorneys, they continue to find creative ways to attack crack penalties.
Related Cases
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), chartered in 1971, is an agency of the U.S. Department of Treasury headquartered in Washington, D.C. The ATF has wide ranging responsibilities in the areas of regulating alcohol and tobacco, collecting alcohol and tobacco taxes, regulating firearms and explosives, and law enforcement.
By regulating the production and distribution of alcohol and tobacco, the ATFcontrols advertising and labeling, and directs the relationships between producers, wholesalers, and retailers. The agency inspects factories and businesses, issues licenses, and tests products. The ATF collects billions of dollars in taxes from alcohol and tobacco manufacturers every year.
Likewise, the ATF oversees laws regulating the manufacturers, dealers, and importers of firearms, ammunition, and explosives. In addition, ATF special agents, working closely with other law enforcement agencies, investigate illegalpossession and use of firearms and explosives, smugglers, bombers, arsonists, gangs, and criminal organizations.
The agency lost its relative anonymity with its controversial involvement inthe siege of the Branch Davidians of Waco, Texas in 1993. Believing weapons and explosives were stockpiled, ATF blockaded and finally took the compound byforce. Eighty-five members of the cult perished. Throughout the 1990s, the visibility of ATF in combating violent anti-government groups substantially increased.
Sources
Vizzard, William J. In the Cross Fire: A Political History of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997.
United States
Respondent
Christopher Lee Armstrong, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That the government need not provide discovery (relevant documents) in a caseof alleged selective prosecution unless the respondent provides a plausiblebasis for believing that others in similar situations have not been prosecuted.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Drew S. Days III
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Barbara E. O'Connor
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas,
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
13 May 1996
Decision
Upheld the government's claim that African Americans prosecuted for drug offenses failed to provide enough evidence to obtain discovery supporting their claim of selective prosecution. They failed to show that the government chosenot to prosecute those in similar situations.
Significance
The Supreme Court's reversal of a circuit court's decision meant that the government did not have to open its files in response to the charge that AfricanAmericans were being selectively targeted for federal prosecution of crack cocaine offenses.
For three months in 1992, three informants infiltrated an alleged crack distribution ring at the behest of agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and police officers from Inglewood, California. During thistime, the informants purchased a total of 124.3 grams of crack from the suspects. When agents arrested Christopher Lee Armstrong and an accomplice, theydiscovered more crack and a loaded firearm. Two other members of the crack ring were arrested later. Armstrong was indicted in April of 1992 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on charges of conspiringto possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and federal firearms offenses.
Those arrested filed a motion for discovery or dismissal on the grounds thatthey were chosen for federal prosecution because they were African Americans.Discovery refers to turning over for examination documents relevant to a person's defense. To support their motion, the defendants offered an affidavit from a paralegal specialist stating that of the 24 similar cases closed by thefederal public defender in the previous year, all the defendants had been black.
Although the government opposed the discovery motion, the district court granted it. The court ordered that the government supply a list of all cases fromthe last three years that involved both cocaine and firearms offenses, identifying the race of the defendants and the levels of law enforcement involvedin the investigations. The government was also asked to explain how it decided to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.
The government asked the court to reconsider its discovery order, with federal and local agents explaining that race played no role in their investigation. A government attorney noted that they decided to prosecute because the caseinvolved over 100 grams of cocaine base, multiple sales took place with multiple defendants, many federal firearms offenses occurred combined with drug dealing, and audio and video tapes of the activity existed. Also, several of the defendants had criminal histories that included narcotics and firearms violations. All this led the agents to believe that the defendants were a fairlysubstantial crack cocaine ring. The government also provided a report whichnoted that Jamaicans, Haitians, and black street gangs controlled the makingand selling of crack.
The defendants' attorneys responded by submitting an affidavit from an intakecoordinator at a drug treatment center who noted that an equal number of Caucasians and minorities were drug dealers and users. A "study" noted that of all 24 similar cases closed by the federal public defenders office in 1991, all the defendants were black. A criminal defense attorney, David R. Reed, stated that in his experience, he had never handled nor heard of a crack cocainecase involving non-black defendants in federal court and that many nonblacksare prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court for crack offenses. A newspaper article noted that federal crack defendants receive a harsher punishment than if they had been arrested for having powder cocaine and that most ofthem are black.
The district court would not reconsider its request that the government provide the documents. The government refused to comply with the discovery order,so the court dismissed the case against the defendants.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. They stated that to get the requested documents in a selective-prosecution claim, the defendants would need to show a strong reason to believethat others in similar situations had not been prosecuted. Selective prosecution refers to prosecuting only people belonging to a certain group for a specific offense.
However, when all the judges of the court of appeals reheard the case, they affirmed the earlier dismissal, stating that the defendants were not requiredto show that the government failed to prosecute others in similar situations.The court also noted that the district court judge did have the power to order the discovery.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the case on 26 February 1996 to determine the appropriate standard for discovery for a selective-prosecution claim. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion.
Selective Prosecution Claims
Armstrong's attorney, Barbara E. O'Connor, felt that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which dealt with discovery in criminal cases, supported the result reached in the court of appeals. The rule stated that the governmentwould provide to the defendant documents which are relevant to the defendant's defense, or which will be used by the government as evidence, or were obtained from the defendant. O'Connor argued that government documents that discussed prosecution strategy in cocaine cases were relevant to the selective-prosecution claim. Rehnquist interpreted the rule to mean that documents need only be provided for the defendant's response to the case-in-chief, not for thepreparation of selective-prosecution claims.
Rehnquist noted that a selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over the executive branch's responsibility to prosecute. Rehnquist expressed concern that the performance of a prosecutor's duties not be impaired. If the basis of a prosecution is examined, it delays the criminal proceedings, chills law enforcement, and might undermine the effectiveness of prosecutors by making known the government's enforcement policy.
A selective-prosecution claim requires that the claimant demonstrate that thefederal prosecutorial policy "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." To show the effect was discriminatory in a race case, "the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals ofa different race were not prosecuted." Because discovery imposes many costson the government, diverts prosecutors' resources, and may disclose strategy,the standard for discovery must be as rigorous as the standard for proving aselective-prosecution claim.
The court of appeals made its decision based on the concept that people of all races commit all types of crimes, but statistics do not support this. In fact, statistics show that 90 percent of the people sentenced in 1994 for crackcocaine trafficking were black; 93.4 percent of convicted LSD dealers were white; 91 percent of those convicted for pornography or prostitution were white.
The materials that Armstrong presented failed to show the existence of the essential elements of a selective-prosecution claim. The "study" did not identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the sameoffenses, but who were not prosecuted. The newspaper article was not relevant to discrimination in decisions to prosecute. The affidavits recounted hearsay, personal conclusions, and anecdotal evidence. Rehnquist noted, "We thinkthe required threshold--a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons--adequately balances the Government's interest in vigorousprosecution and the defendant's interest in avoiding selective prosecution."The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case was remanded.
Justice Breyer concurred but noted that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 should not limit the defendant's discovery rights to the government's case-in-chief. Breyer held that the rule should provide a broad authorization for discovery.
Judicial Vigilance Necessary in Drug Prosecutions
Justice Stevens dissented in this case. He agreed that the facts presented tothe district court showing that the defendants had been singled out becauseof race were not sufficient. However, he felt that the district judge did notabuse her discretion when she concluded that the facts were sufficiently disturbing to require some response from the government. Breyer pointed out thatthree circumstances underscore the need for judicial vigilance in certain types of drug prosecutions. First, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 establishedhigh penalties for the possession and selling of crack cocaine. One gram of crack is treated as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine, resulting in sentences for crack offenders that average three to eight times longer thanfor powder offenders. The prison terms for those convicted in state systemsin crack cases are much shorter than in the federal system. "Finally, it is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal penalties falls heavily on blacks. While 65 percent of the persons who have used crack are white, in 1993they represented only 4 percent of the federal offenders convicted of trafficking in crack. Eighty-eight percent of such offenders were black."
These troubling racial patterns of enforcement call for concern about the fairness of how people are charged with crack offenses. The federal judges in the Central District of California need to scrutinize the evidence that black defendants are prosecuted in federal court, but other races are prosecuted instate court. Breyer noted that the district judge was within her discretion to ask for information that would show what standards governed the choice between a prosecution in federal versus state court.
Breyer disagreed with the majority that the affidavits submitted by Armstrongwere hearsay and anecdotal. He felt that evidence based on a drug counselor's personal observations or an attorney's practice in state and federal courtcan tend to show the existence of a selective prosecution. Breyer summed up his dissent by stating, "In this case, the evidence was sufficiently disturbing to persuade the District Judge to order discovery that might help explain the conspicuous racial pattern of cases before her Court."
Impact
As a result of the Court's decision, the Federal Public Defender's office inLos Angeles said it will look for comparable crack cocaine cases of non-African Americans that were prosecuted in state court, as opposed to federal court. Although United States v. Armstrong was seen as a setback for defense attorneys, they continue to find creative ways to attack crack penalties.
Related Cases
- Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
- Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
- Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
- Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), chartered in 1971, is an agency of the U.S. Department of Treasury headquartered in Washington, D.C. The ATF has wide ranging responsibilities in the areas of regulating alcohol and tobacco, collecting alcohol and tobacco taxes, regulating firearms and explosives, and law enforcement.
By regulating the production and distribution of alcohol and tobacco, the ATFcontrols advertising and labeling, and directs the relationships between producers, wholesalers, and retailers. The agency inspects factories and businesses, issues licenses, and tests products. The ATF collects billions of dollars in taxes from alcohol and tobacco manufacturers every year.
Likewise, the ATF oversees laws regulating the manufacturers, dealers, and importers of firearms, ammunition, and explosives. In addition, ATF special agents, working closely with other law enforcement agencies, investigate illegalpossession and use of firearms and explosives, smugglers, bombers, arsonists, gangs, and criminal organizations.
The agency lost its relative anonymity with its controversial involvement inthe siege of the Branch Davidians of Waco, Texas in 1993. Believing weapons and explosives were stockpiled, ATF blockaded and finally took the compound byforce. Eighty-five members of the cult perished. Throughout the 1990s, the visibility of ATF in combating violent anti-government groups substantially increased.
Sources
Vizzard, William J. In the Cross Fire: A Political History of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997.
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