Plaintiff
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association, et al.
Defendant
Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission, et al.
Plaintiff's Claim
That the county planning and zoning commission's decision to allow the creation of a private landfill in an area in which most of the residents were blackwas motivated by racial discrimination, and thus unconstitutional
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Lonzy F. Edwards
Chief Defense Lawyer
O. Hale Almand
Judge
Wilbur D. Owens
Place
Macon, Georgia
Date of Decision
16 February 1989
Decision
That the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the planning and zoning commission's decision was impermissibly motivated by racial discrimination.
Significance
The court's decision exemplifies the difficult task facing citizens bringingclaims that government officials took certain actions for racially discriminatory reasons. The court's decision makes clear that these hurdles to establishing discrimination apply equally to claims of environmental discrimination as they do to other claims of discrimination.
In the 1980s, both the government and the public became increasingly aware ofenvironmental problems such as waste disposal and the need for better ways of protecting the environment. At the same time, the courts continued to recognize the problems of racism and prohibit discrimination on the part of stateand local government officials. This led to the rise during this time of claims of environmental racism in the federal courts. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission represents a typical environmental discrimination case.
In 1986, Robert Mullis applied to the joint planning commission of the City of Macon and Bibb County, Georgia, for a permit to operate a waste landfill inBibb County. The proposed landfill was to occupy an area populated predominantly by black citizens. On 30 June 1986, the commission denied the application concluding that the landfill was unacceptable because it would be located in a predominantly residential area and would involve increased noise and truck traffic through the area. However, Mullis sought and was granted a rehearing on his application. At the second hearing, Mullis addressed the concerns raised by the commission when it initially denied his application. In opposition to the application, a number of citizens expressed concern over the proposed landfill, specifically arguing that it would lower property values, increase noise and traffic, present health risks associated with vermin and insect infestation, and effect the water supply. Apparently satisfied with Mullis's resolution of the commission's concerns, the commission approved the application to operate a landfill at the proposed site.
Following the commission's approval of Mullis's application, the East Bibb Neighborhood Association and a number of individual residents in the area fileda lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the commission, the commission's members, and Mullis. The plaintiffs alleged that the commission's decision to locate the landfill in a predominantlyblack area was based on racial discrimination, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The case was tried beforeDistrict Judge Wilbur Owens, who concluded that there was no evidence that the commission's decision was racially motivated.
Commission's Decision Not Racially Motivated
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This provision prohibits a state or local government from discriminating against groups of people based on so-called "suspect classifications," such as race or national origin. In order to prove discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must establish that the governmental officers acted with a discriminatory intent and that the action of those officers had a discriminatory impact. In the 1977 caseArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. the U.S. Supreme Courtrecognized five factors as relevant in determining whether the government officials acted with a discriminatory purpose. First, the court must look at whether the challenged action affects one racial group more heavily than another. Second, the court looks at the historical background of the decision to see if it exhibits any indications that the governmental action was based on adiscriminatory purpose. Third, the court should look at the specific events leading up to the governmental action. Fourth, the court must examine whetherthe decision making process was different in the challenged case than in other similar cases. Finally, the court should look to the legislative or administrative history of the challenged decision.
Applying these factors to the commission's decision, Judge Owens concluded that "the Commission's decision to approve [the landfill] was not motivated bythe intent to discriminate against black persons." With respect to the firstArlington Heights factor, Judge Owens concluded that the commission'sdecision did not disproportionately affect black citizens. He noted that although the approved landfill was located in a predominantly black neighborhood,the only other privately operated landfill in the county was located in a predominately white neighborhood. Judge Owens also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the historical background showed that the commission had a historyof locating undesirable land uses in predominantly black areas. He reasonedthat this argument was rebutted by the fact that the only other privately operated landfill was located in a white area, and by the fact that the commission cannot choose to place landfills anywhere on its own. Rather, the commission only considers applications by private parties, and considers each such application separately.
With respect to the third Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens concluded that the specific sequence of events leading up to the commission's decision to grant Mullis's application did not evidence any discriminatory purpose. He noted that the plaintiffs had failed to offer any evidence of specific events showing that the commission acted with a discriminatory purpose. Rather, Judge Owens concluded, "[t]he statements of the various commissioners during their deliberations indicates a real concern about both the desires of theopposing citizens and the needs of the community in general. Similarly, withrespect to the fourth Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens found no evidence that the commission had deviated from its normal practice in a discriminatory manner. He noted that although the commission requested input from both the city of Macon and Bibb County, the commission's seeking of this inputwas based on its desire to come up with a comprehensive plan for addressingthe community's waste management problems, rather than for any improper, racially motivated purpose.
Finally, with respect to the fifth Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens found nothing in the legislative history of the commission's decision to indicate that racial considerations played a role in the commission's approvalof the landfill. The plaintiffs argued that because the commission originally denied the application, but later approved it, the commission's reconsideration of its position must have been motivated by some racial purpose. He noted that the three commissioners who changed their votes had expressed reservations concerning the impact of the landfill on the citizens of the area at thefirst hearing on Mullis's application. However, they stated at the second hearing that they changed their votes because they were satisfied that their reservations were unfounded based on a report by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources approving the site and on their own personal inspections of thesite. Having found that none of the Arlington Heights factors supported a finding of racial discrimination, Judge Owens concluded:
Impact
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. That court affirmed Judge Owens's decision, for the reasons reflected in his opinion. East Bibb represents a fairlytypical equal protection case alleging that government officials took a particular action based on impermissible racial discrimination. The court's decision demonstrates the difficulty plaintiffs have in establishing such racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Related Cases
"Not In My Back Yard"
A common aspect of life in American society late in the twentieth century wascommunity opposition to the siting of public facilities. Known as the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome, community planners faced increasing difficulty in locating various public service facilities. The facilities included landfills, prisons, power plants, homes for the elderly and mentally-retarded,substance-abuse facilities, group homes for HIV-AIDS infected persons, childdaycare centers, outpatient medical facilities, and schools. NIMBY became quite effective at killing much-needed projects for the population at-large.
Neighborhood-based opposition originally grew from fear of decreased propertyvalue in addition to anticipated introduction of unwanted persons, noise, pollution, traffic, and odors, among other things seen as threats to the residents' quality of life. Earlier on, such facilities were routinely placed in lower income, inner-city neighborhoods less able to raise resistance. Facilitysaturation of some areas resulted. Eventually, these communities became increasingly mobilized to correct the past inequities. The NIMBY syndrome became relevant across all class, socioeconomic, and racial boundaries.
In reaction to the NIMBY trend, planners attempted education strategies, cooperative planning, fair-share policies, forced siting, community compensation,and conflict resolution techniques to varying degrees of success. Fair-sharepolicies involved coercing neighborhoods to accept responsibility for theirshare of larger community and regional needs.
Sources
Morris, Jane Anne. Not In My Back Yard: The Handbook. San Diego, CA: Silvercat Publications, 1994.
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association, et al.
Defendant
Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission, et al.
Plaintiff's Claim
That the county planning and zoning commission's decision to allow the creation of a private landfill in an area in which most of the residents were blackwas motivated by racial discrimination, and thus unconstitutional
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Lonzy F. Edwards
Chief Defense Lawyer
O. Hale Almand
Judge
Wilbur D. Owens
Place
Macon, Georgia
Date of Decision
16 February 1989
Decision
That the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the planning and zoning commission's decision was impermissibly motivated by racial discrimination.
Significance
The court's decision exemplifies the difficult task facing citizens bringingclaims that government officials took certain actions for racially discriminatory reasons. The court's decision makes clear that these hurdles to establishing discrimination apply equally to claims of environmental discrimination as they do to other claims of discrimination.
In the 1980s, both the government and the public became increasingly aware ofenvironmental problems such as waste disposal and the need for better ways of protecting the environment. At the same time, the courts continued to recognize the problems of racism and prohibit discrimination on the part of stateand local government officials. This led to the rise during this time of claims of environmental racism in the federal courts. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission represents a typical environmental discrimination case.
In 1986, Robert Mullis applied to the joint planning commission of the City of Macon and Bibb County, Georgia, for a permit to operate a waste landfill inBibb County. The proposed landfill was to occupy an area populated predominantly by black citizens. On 30 June 1986, the commission denied the application concluding that the landfill was unacceptable because it would be located in a predominantly residential area and would involve increased noise and truck traffic through the area. However, Mullis sought and was granted a rehearing on his application. At the second hearing, Mullis addressed the concerns raised by the commission when it initially denied his application. In opposition to the application, a number of citizens expressed concern over the proposed landfill, specifically arguing that it would lower property values, increase noise and traffic, present health risks associated with vermin and insect infestation, and effect the water supply. Apparently satisfied with Mullis's resolution of the commission's concerns, the commission approved the application to operate a landfill at the proposed site.
Following the commission's approval of Mullis's application, the East Bibb Neighborhood Association and a number of individual residents in the area fileda lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the commission, the commission's members, and Mullis. The plaintiffs alleged that the commission's decision to locate the landfill in a predominantlyblack area was based on racial discrimination, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The case was tried beforeDistrict Judge Wilbur Owens, who concluded that there was no evidence that the commission's decision was racially motivated.
Commission's Decision Not Racially Motivated
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This provision prohibits a state or local government from discriminating against groups of people based on so-called "suspect classifications," such as race or national origin. In order to prove discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must establish that the governmental officers acted with a discriminatory intent and that the action of those officers had a discriminatory impact. In the 1977 caseArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. the U.S. Supreme Courtrecognized five factors as relevant in determining whether the government officials acted with a discriminatory purpose. First, the court must look at whether the challenged action affects one racial group more heavily than another. Second, the court looks at the historical background of the decision to see if it exhibits any indications that the governmental action was based on adiscriminatory purpose. Third, the court should look at the specific events leading up to the governmental action. Fourth, the court must examine whetherthe decision making process was different in the challenged case than in other similar cases. Finally, the court should look to the legislative or administrative history of the challenged decision.
Applying these factors to the commission's decision, Judge Owens concluded that "the Commission's decision to approve [the landfill] was not motivated bythe intent to discriminate against black persons." With respect to the firstArlington Heights factor, Judge Owens concluded that the commission'sdecision did not disproportionately affect black citizens. He noted that although the approved landfill was located in a predominantly black neighborhood,the only other privately operated landfill in the county was located in a predominately white neighborhood. Judge Owens also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the historical background showed that the commission had a historyof locating undesirable land uses in predominantly black areas. He reasonedthat this argument was rebutted by the fact that the only other privately operated landfill was located in a white area, and by the fact that the commission cannot choose to place landfills anywhere on its own. Rather, the commission only considers applications by private parties, and considers each such application separately.
With respect to the third Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens concluded that the specific sequence of events leading up to the commission's decision to grant Mullis's application did not evidence any discriminatory purpose. He noted that the plaintiffs had failed to offer any evidence of specific events showing that the commission acted with a discriminatory purpose. Rather, Judge Owens concluded, "[t]he statements of the various commissioners during their deliberations indicates a real concern about both the desires of theopposing citizens and the needs of the community in general. Similarly, withrespect to the fourth Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens found no evidence that the commission had deviated from its normal practice in a discriminatory manner. He noted that although the commission requested input from both the city of Macon and Bibb County, the commission's seeking of this inputwas based on its desire to come up with a comprehensive plan for addressingthe community's waste management problems, rather than for any improper, racially motivated purpose.
Finally, with respect to the fifth Arlington Heights factor, Judge Owens found nothing in the legislative history of the commission's decision to indicate that racial considerations played a role in the commission's approvalof the landfill. The plaintiffs argued that because the commission originally denied the application, but later approved it, the commission's reconsideration of its position must have been motivated by some racial purpose. He noted that the three commissioners who changed their votes had expressed reservations concerning the impact of the landfill on the citizens of the area at thefirst hearing on Mullis's application. However, they stated at the second hearing that they changed their votes because they were satisfied that their reservations were unfounded based on a report by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources approving the site and on their own personal inspections of thesite. Having found that none of the Arlington Heights factors supported a finding of racial discrimination, Judge Owens concluded:
Thevoluminous transcript of the hearings before and the deliberations by the Commission portray the Commissioners as concerned citizens and effective publicservants. At no time does it appear to this court that the Commission abdicated its responsibility either to the public at large, to the particular concerned citizens, or to [Mullis]. Rather, it appears to this court that the Commission carefully and thoughtfully addressed a serious problem and that it made a decision based upon the merits and not upon any improper racial animus.Accordingly, Judge Owens rejected the plaintiff's equal protectionchallenge and entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
Impact
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. That court affirmed Judge Owens's decision, for the reasons reflected in his opinion. East Bibb represents a fairlytypical equal protection case alleging that government officials took a particular action based on impermissible racial discrimination. The court's decision demonstrates the difficulty plaintiffs have in establishing such racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Related Cases
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
- R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144 (1991).
- Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (1996).
"Not In My Back Yard"
A common aspect of life in American society late in the twentieth century wascommunity opposition to the siting of public facilities. Known as the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome, community planners faced increasing difficulty in locating various public service facilities. The facilities included landfills, prisons, power plants, homes for the elderly and mentally-retarded,substance-abuse facilities, group homes for HIV-AIDS infected persons, childdaycare centers, outpatient medical facilities, and schools. NIMBY became quite effective at killing much-needed projects for the population at-large.
Neighborhood-based opposition originally grew from fear of decreased propertyvalue in addition to anticipated introduction of unwanted persons, noise, pollution, traffic, and odors, among other things seen as threats to the residents' quality of life. Earlier on, such facilities were routinely placed in lower income, inner-city neighborhoods less able to raise resistance. Facilitysaturation of some areas resulted. Eventually, these communities became increasingly mobilized to correct the past inequities. The NIMBY syndrome became relevant across all class, socioeconomic, and racial boundaries.
In reaction to the NIMBY trend, planners attempted education strategies, cooperative planning, fair-share policies, forced siting, community compensation,and conflict resolution techniques to varying degrees of success. Fair-sharepolicies involved coercing neighborhoods to accept responsibility for theirshare of larger community and regional needs.
Sources
Morris, Jane Anne. Not In My Back Yard: The Handbook. San Diego, CA: Silvercat Publications, 1994.
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