Plaintiff
Margaret Bean and other Houston residents
Defendant
Southwestern Waste Management Corp.
Plaintiff's Claim
That a decision to issue a permit for a solid waste facility constituted racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Linda McKeever Bullard
Chief Defense Lawyer
Sim Lake
Judge
McDonald
Place
Houston, Texas
Date of Decision
21 December 1979
Decision
Found in favor of Southwestern and denied a preliminary injunction against the facility siting decision.
Significance
The decision established various factors that must be met by an individual insuccessfully charging that a land use decision is discriminatory. An intentto discriminate must be demonstrated. Decisions that may appear poorly basedto some people are not necessarily unconstitutional or illegal. The requirement to establish intent was much more difficult than simply showing that the effects of a governmental decision was unequal on different racial groups.
Following the rise of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, a series of cases reached the Supreme Court in the 1970s in which individuals challenged government actions due to the disproportionate impacts on ethnic minorities. In Washington v. Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977), the Court established tough standards for citizens to prove discrimination. In Davis, African American police officer candidates challenged the constitutionality of written tests as being racially discriminatory and in Arlington Heights African American Illinois residents challenged the denial of a zoning change by a city blocking a low-income housing development.
In both cases, the Court held that proving a discriminatory racial impact wasnot enough. The alleged victim must prove an intent to discriminate motivated the decision-makers. Many considered the decisions a blow to the civil rights movement. The Court asserted that a person pressing such a case must not only describe the actual effect of the official action, but also explore the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leadingto the challenged decision, how the action may have been a departure from normal procedures, if normal factors were weighed in the decision, and what wasthe administrative history of the decision. This standard was viewed as almost insurmountable by many.
An earlier case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), involved refusal of a license by the City of San Francisco to a Chinese laundry operator. The Court established a stringent statistical process for examining the disproportionate effect of government actions on minority populations.
Waste Management in Houston
In 1979 the Texas Department of Health (TDH) granted a permit to SouthwesternWaste Management Corporation for the construction and operation of a new solid waste facility in East Houston. In reaction, Margaret Bean and several other local residents filed a complaint in October of 1979, challenging the decision. Bean and the other plaintiffs contended the decision was at least partly motivated by racial discrimination in violation of federal law and requested a court order to revoke the permit.
Southwestern denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the case asserting that the state of Texas was the more responsible party for issuing the permit.Southwestern also argued that the district court should not hear the case since Bean had failed to previously request that the TDH conduct a rehearing onthe permit.
Laches and State Action
The district court first addressed Southwestern's motion to dismiss the lawsuit and arguments concerning procedural matters. Then the court would considerBean's request for a preliminary injunction. Judge McDonald, writing for thecourt, ruled against Southwestern's procedural argument. He pointed out thatthe Solid Waste Disposal Act allowed revoking a permit through rehearings only in regard to the issues "pertaining to public health, air or water pollution, land use, or violation of this Act or of any other applicable laws or regulations controlling the disposal of solid waste." Bean and the other plaintiffs, instead, sought revocation for none of these reasons, but for an allegedviolation of federal law.
Southwestern's request for dismissal of the case was based on the equitable doctrine of laches.Three separate criteria must be established before applyinglaches. In the Bean case, Southwestern must show that a delay occurred in Bean asserting a right or a claim, that no valid reason for Bean's delayexisted, and that Bean displayed unreasonable bias against Southwestern. McDonald determined that, based on the evidence, laches was not relevant in thecase. Although the site was near completion, and a well attended public hearing had been held on the permit application, McDonald concluded Bean did not know of the site placement until late in the process. Because Bean and the other plaintiffs were not able to exercise their rights, the request for delay was justified.
Southwestern also argued that the lack of state involvement meant the case was not valid and should be dismissed. McDonald found that state action did exist. The permit granted by the TDH was the state action. Therefore, the key question was whether the TDH itself discriminated or supported discrimination in any way. If so, then Bean would be entitled to an injunction to stop operation of the facility.
Next, turning to Bean's request for an injunction, McDonald considered four factors. Bean must demonstrate that: (1) the case had a substantial likelihoodof success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreversible injury existed; (3) the threat of injury to Bean was greater than the potential harm of an injunction against Southwestern; and, (4) a preliminary injunction wouldnot harm the public interest.
McDonald found that Bean demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable injury by arguing they were denied their constitutional rights. McDonald wrote that opening the facility could affect the entire community including "its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health and safety of its inhabitants, and the operation of Smiley High School, located" nearby. McDonald foundthat "public interest would not be disserved by granting the plaintiffs an injunction."
McDonald noted that a key issue was that Bean had not established a substantial likelihood of a successful lawsuit based on the facts of the case. Bean would have to prove that decision to issue the permit was based on an intent todiscriminate on the basis of race. Statistical evidence was used to establish discriminatory intent in some earlier cases. McDonald also applied the other standards of proof established in Arlington Heights.
One avenue for demonstrating racial discrimination was to show how the permitapproval by the TDH was part of a geographic pattern of discriminating in the solid waste site placement. However, the available statistical data, both city-wide and in the immediate area, failed to establish such a pattern. For example, city data for 17 sites operating with permits since July of 1978 showed over half of the sites granted permits were actually located in areas with25 percent or less minority population at the time of their opening. Eighty-two percent of the sites were located in areas with 50 percent or less minority population at the time of their opening. McDonald found that no pattern ofdiscrimination was clearly evident. In addition, no evidence existed as outlined in the Arlington Heights case to establish a pattern of discrimination by the TDH.
Next, Bean attempted to prove that the TDH's approval of the permit, in a historical context, constituted discrimination. Three data sets were used to support this argument. However, each set failed to approach standards established in Yick Wo and Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960). One set of datafocused on two solid waste sites used by the City of Houston. McDonald responded that just two sites were not considered a statistically significant number. However, for those two sites census information revealed that though theproposed site was within an area of 58 percent minority population, the othersite was in an area of only 18 percent minority. McDonald concluded that, obviously, no inference of discrimination could be made from this data.
Bean also argued that East Houston contained 15 percent of Houston's solid waste sites, but only seven percent of its population. In addition, only 32 percent of the sites were located in the western half of the city where 73 percent of the white population lived. Since the proposed site location had a 70 percent minority population, Bean argued the statistical disparity indicated racial discrimination. McDonald wrote, "Even considering the 70 percent minority population of the target area, when one looks at where in the target areathese particular sites are located, the inference of racial discrimination dissolves." Actually, city-wide data indicated that half of the solid waste sites in Houston were in areas with over 70 percent white population.
However, McDonald noted that in fact a large number of the sites in East Houston were located around the ship channel which contained Houston's industry and not its population. McDonald noted that Houston's population was 39 percent minority, yet only 42 percent of the solid waste sites in the city of Houston were located in tracts with population greater than 39 percent minority. To McDonald this was not a statistically significant difference.
Lastly, Bean asserted that 1975 census data revealed 11 solid waste sites were located in areas with 100 percent minority population, but none were located in census tracts with 100 percent white population. McDonald discounted the1975 data as not reliable compared to both 1970 and 1979 census data, with the 1975 data appearing to overcount minority population.
Judge McDonald wrote,
McDonald ruled that Bean failed to establish a substantial likelihood that the TDH's decision to issue the permit was motivated by purposeful discrimination.
Impact
Bean represented a classic example of citizens fighting the placementof public facilities in their community or neighborhood based on constitutional allegations. Such facilities were often placed in low-income, inner-city,ethnic neighborhoods. However, the Bean decision highlighted that whatmay be considered poor governmental decisions in some situations were not necessarily unlawful. Bean also reinforced tough standards that citizensmust meet in legally challenging the placement of public service facilities.
Later known as the "Not in My Back Yard" syndrome, strategies for citizens combating siting decisions of public service facilities grew more sophisticatedin the 1990s. Such grass-roots efforts were driven by fears over health risks, lowering property values, higher traffic volume, and noise and air pollution introduced by the developments. As population growth continued in many areas, community planners and governmental decision-makers found it increasinglydifficult to place new public service facilities, such as waste disposal sites, without organized opposition from local residents.
To combat the disproportionate effects of more frequently placing non-desirable public facilities in poor and ethnic areas, President Bill Clinton in the1990s signed an executive order on "environmental justice." The order stressed greater sensitivity of such communities in project planning processes wherefederal funds were involved.
Related Cases
Margaret Bean and other Houston residents
Defendant
Southwestern Waste Management Corp.
Plaintiff's Claim
That a decision to issue a permit for a solid waste facility constituted racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Linda McKeever Bullard
Chief Defense Lawyer
Sim Lake
Judge
McDonald
Place
Houston, Texas
Date of Decision
21 December 1979
Decision
Found in favor of Southwestern and denied a preliminary injunction against the facility siting decision.
Significance
The decision established various factors that must be met by an individual insuccessfully charging that a land use decision is discriminatory. An intentto discriminate must be demonstrated. Decisions that may appear poorly basedto some people are not necessarily unconstitutional or illegal. The requirement to establish intent was much more difficult than simply showing that the effects of a governmental decision was unequal on different racial groups.
Following the rise of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, a series of cases reached the Supreme Court in the 1970s in which individuals challenged government actions due to the disproportionate impacts on ethnic minorities. In Washington v. Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977), the Court established tough standards for citizens to prove discrimination. In Davis, African American police officer candidates challenged the constitutionality of written tests as being racially discriminatory and in Arlington Heights African American Illinois residents challenged the denial of a zoning change by a city blocking a low-income housing development.
In both cases, the Court held that proving a discriminatory racial impact wasnot enough. The alleged victim must prove an intent to discriminate motivated the decision-makers. Many considered the decisions a blow to the civil rights movement. The Court asserted that a person pressing such a case must not only describe the actual effect of the official action, but also explore the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leadingto the challenged decision, how the action may have been a departure from normal procedures, if normal factors were weighed in the decision, and what wasthe administrative history of the decision. This standard was viewed as almost insurmountable by many.
An earlier case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), involved refusal of a license by the City of San Francisco to a Chinese laundry operator. The Court established a stringent statistical process for examining the disproportionate effect of government actions on minority populations.
Waste Management in Houston
In 1979 the Texas Department of Health (TDH) granted a permit to SouthwesternWaste Management Corporation for the construction and operation of a new solid waste facility in East Houston. In reaction, Margaret Bean and several other local residents filed a complaint in October of 1979, challenging the decision. Bean and the other plaintiffs contended the decision was at least partly motivated by racial discrimination in violation of federal law and requested a court order to revoke the permit.
Southwestern denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the case asserting that the state of Texas was the more responsible party for issuing the permit.Southwestern also argued that the district court should not hear the case since Bean had failed to previously request that the TDH conduct a rehearing onthe permit.
Laches and State Action
The district court first addressed Southwestern's motion to dismiss the lawsuit and arguments concerning procedural matters. Then the court would considerBean's request for a preliminary injunction. Judge McDonald, writing for thecourt, ruled against Southwestern's procedural argument. He pointed out thatthe Solid Waste Disposal Act allowed revoking a permit through rehearings only in regard to the issues "pertaining to public health, air or water pollution, land use, or violation of this Act or of any other applicable laws or regulations controlling the disposal of solid waste." Bean and the other plaintiffs, instead, sought revocation for none of these reasons, but for an allegedviolation of federal law.
Southwestern's request for dismissal of the case was based on the equitable doctrine of laches.Three separate criteria must be established before applyinglaches. In the Bean case, Southwestern must show that a delay occurred in Bean asserting a right or a claim, that no valid reason for Bean's delayexisted, and that Bean displayed unreasonable bias against Southwestern. McDonald determined that, based on the evidence, laches was not relevant in thecase. Although the site was near completion, and a well attended public hearing had been held on the permit application, McDonald concluded Bean did not know of the site placement until late in the process. Because Bean and the other plaintiffs were not able to exercise their rights, the request for delay was justified.
Southwestern also argued that the lack of state involvement meant the case was not valid and should be dismissed. McDonald found that state action did exist. The permit granted by the TDH was the state action. Therefore, the key question was whether the TDH itself discriminated or supported discrimination in any way. If so, then Bean would be entitled to an injunction to stop operation of the facility.
Next, turning to Bean's request for an injunction, McDonald considered four factors. Bean must demonstrate that: (1) the case had a substantial likelihoodof success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreversible injury existed; (3) the threat of injury to Bean was greater than the potential harm of an injunction against Southwestern; and, (4) a preliminary injunction wouldnot harm the public interest.
McDonald found that Bean demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable injury by arguing they were denied their constitutional rights. McDonald wrote that opening the facility could affect the entire community including "its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health and safety of its inhabitants, and the operation of Smiley High School, located" nearby. McDonald foundthat "public interest would not be disserved by granting the plaintiffs an injunction."
McDonald noted that a key issue was that Bean had not established a substantial likelihood of a successful lawsuit based on the facts of the case. Bean would have to prove that decision to issue the permit was based on an intent todiscriminate on the basis of race. Statistical evidence was used to establish discriminatory intent in some earlier cases. McDonald also applied the other standards of proof established in Arlington Heights.
One avenue for demonstrating racial discrimination was to show how the permitapproval by the TDH was part of a geographic pattern of discriminating in the solid waste site placement. However, the available statistical data, both city-wide and in the immediate area, failed to establish such a pattern. For example, city data for 17 sites operating with permits since July of 1978 showed over half of the sites granted permits were actually located in areas with25 percent or less minority population at the time of their opening. Eighty-two percent of the sites were located in areas with 50 percent or less minority population at the time of their opening. McDonald found that no pattern ofdiscrimination was clearly evident. In addition, no evidence existed as outlined in the Arlington Heights case to establish a pattern of discrimination by the TDH.
Next, Bean attempted to prove that the TDH's approval of the permit, in a historical context, constituted discrimination. Three data sets were used to support this argument. However, each set failed to approach standards established in Yick Wo and Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960). One set of datafocused on two solid waste sites used by the City of Houston. McDonald responded that just two sites were not considered a statistically significant number. However, for those two sites census information revealed that though theproposed site was within an area of 58 percent minority population, the othersite was in an area of only 18 percent minority. McDonald concluded that, obviously, no inference of discrimination could be made from this data.
Bean also argued that East Houston contained 15 percent of Houston's solid waste sites, but only seven percent of its population. In addition, only 32 percent of the sites were located in the western half of the city where 73 percent of the white population lived. Since the proposed site location had a 70 percent minority population, Bean argued the statistical disparity indicated racial discrimination. McDonald wrote, "Even considering the 70 percent minority population of the target area, when one looks at where in the target areathese particular sites are located, the inference of racial discrimination dissolves." Actually, city-wide data indicated that half of the solid waste sites in Houston were in areas with over 70 percent white population.
However, McDonald noted that in fact a large number of the sites in East Houston were located around the ship channel which contained Houston's industry and not its population. McDonald noted that Houston's population was 39 percent minority, yet only 42 percent of the solid waste sites in the city of Houston were located in tracts with population greater than 39 percent minority. To McDonald this was not a statistically significant difference.
Lastly, Bean asserted that 1975 census data revealed 11 solid waste sites were located in areas with 100 percent minority population, but none were located in census tracts with 100 percent white population. McDonald discounted the1975 data as not reliable compared to both 1970 and 1979 census data, with the 1975 data appearing to overcount minority population.
Judge McDonald wrote,
If this Court were TDH, it might very wellhave denied this permit. It simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a high school, particularly with no air conditioning . . . Itis not my responsibility to decide whether to grant this site a permit. It is my responsibility to decide whether to grant the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. From the evidence before me, I can say that the plaintiffs have established that the decision to grant a permit was both unfortunate and insensitive. I cannot say that the plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of proving that the decision to grant the permit was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination . . .
McDonald ruled that Bean failed to establish a substantial likelihood that the TDH's decision to issue the permit was motivated by purposeful discrimination.
Impact
Bean represented a classic example of citizens fighting the placementof public facilities in their community or neighborhood based on constitutional allegations. Such facilities were often placed in low-income, inner-city,ethnic neighborhoods. However, the Bean decision highlighted that whatmay be considered poor governmental decisions in some situations were not necessarily unlawful. Bean also reinforced tough standards that citizensmust meet in legally challenging the placement of public service facilities.
Later known as the "Not in My Back Yard" syndrome, strategies for citizens combating siting decisions of public service facilities grew more sophisticatedin the 1990s. Such grass-roots efforts were driven by fears over health risks, lowering property values, higher traffic volume, and noise and air pollution introduced by the developments. As population growth continued in many areas, community planners and governmental decision-makers found it increasinglydifficult to place new public service facilities, such as waste disposal sites, without organized opposition from local residents.
To combat the disproportionate effects of more frequently placing non-desirable public facilities in poor and ethnic areas, President Bill Clinton in the1990s signed an executive order on "environmental justice." The order stressed greater sensitivity of such communities in project planning processes wherefederal funds were involved.
Related Cases
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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