Petitioner
The Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois
Respondent
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation and several individual residents
Petitioner's Claim
That a decision to deny rezoning on land owned by Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation was not racially motivated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and conformed to the 1968 Fair Housing Act.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
F. Willis Caruso
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Jack M. Siegel
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White (John Paul Stevensdid not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
11 January 1977
Decision
Ruled in favor of Arlington Heights by reversing a lower court decision and refusing to issue an injunction against a rezoning decision, but sent the caseback to the lower courts for further deliberation.
Significance
The case established a key standard for determining when the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated due to racial discriminationin housing. The simple fact that a decision may result in unequal effects ondifferent racial groups was not sufficient evidence to prove racial discrimination. Those contesting an action on such grounds must also prove an intentto discriminate in the decision-making process. Fair housing proponents claimed the decision perpetuated deceptive segregation decisions made through theprocess of urban zoning.
Urban zoning gained substantial acceptance in the United States shortly afterthe beginning of the twentieth century. Zoning is a form of police power provided by the states to their local municipal governments. By limiting certainpersonal freedoms, communities can better provide for the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Importantly, zoning regulations must be reasonable and conform with constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of the law. Despite being born from good ideals, zoning was frequentlyused as a means to keep people of lower social status out of certain areas tomaintain market values of property. This form of zoning was labeled exclusionary zoning and was condemned by many. In 1968 Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, the first open housing act of the twentieth century. The act supported the notion that citizens should be free to live wherever they choose and can afford. The law prohibited discrimination in the sale and renting of certain types of housing on the basis of race and religion. The Supreme Court, alsoin 1968, ruled that federal law against housing discrimination applied to all housing. Despite the 1968 law and Court ruling, cases of housing discrimination against African American citizens pervasively continued.
Residential Zoning in Arlington Heights
Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago, is located approximately 25 miles northwest of the city's downtown area. Most land in the community was zoned fordetached single family homes. During the 1960s, the community saw substantialgrowth while the population of racial minorities remained low, similar to other communities in northwest Cook County. Near the center of Arlington Heights, a religious order owned an 80-acre parcel. In 1970, the order of St. Viator decided to allocate some of its land for low and moderate income housing. St. Viator chose Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a nonprofit developer experienced in using federal housing assistance programs, to organizethe project and develop 190 clustered town house units. Metropolitan was alsoclose to completing another project near Arlington Heights at the time.
Metropolitan and St. Viator signed a 99-year lease agreement for a 15-acre parcel in the southeast corner of the order's property. The agreement was dependent upon Metropolitan obtaining a zoning clearance from Arlington Heights and federal housing assistance. The proposed high density residential development clearly did not conform to Arlington Heights' low density zoning ordinance. Therefore, the project could not be built unless the community rezoned theparcel for multiple family housing. If Metropolitan was unsuccessful in securing either the clearance or the funding, the lease would terminate.
Metropolitan filed a petition for rezoning with the community's planning commission. It became the subject of a series of three public meetings in the spring of 1971. Though a number of community groups supported the rezoning, a majority opposed the project. Opponents stressed that many neighboring residents had built or purchased property there relying on the single-family zone classification. Such a rezoning could potentially cause property values for neighboring homes to substantially decline. By the close of the third meeting, the planning commission adopted a motion to recommend denial of the rezoning request to Arlington Heights' board of trustees.
In June of 1972, Metropolitan and three African American Illinois citizens filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Arlington Heights to block the rezoning denial. They claimed the denial violated the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of the law guarantee. The district court ruled in favor of the community by finding they were not motivated by racial discrimination or discrimination against low income groups when they denied rezoning. Their primary concernwas to protect existing property values. Metropolitan appealed the decisionto the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appeals court reversed the ruling by finding that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial was aracial bias.
Intent Versus Effect
Arlington Heights then appealed to the Supreme Court which accepted the case.Justice Powell, writing for the 5-3 majority, could find no evidence the denial was racially motivated. Instead, Powell, agreeing with the district court's decision, found substantial evidence indicating the zoning decision was primarily prompted by a desire to protect property values and to preserve the zoning plan's integrity.
Arlington Heights argued before the Court that Metropolitan lacked legal standing to pursue their claim because it suffered no economic injury. The city argued that Metropolitan was not the actual property owner of the parcel sinceits agreement with St. Viator was contingent upon the rezoning. Powell, therefore, first examined the issue of standing. Powell observed that Arlington Heights' action effectively blocked the housing construction. He wrote that ifMetropolitan was able to block the denial, which they could only accomplishthrough this petition, the barrier to low cost housing would be fully removed.
After consideration, Powell rejected Arlington Heights' argument. It seemed likely that Metropolitan would suffer some economic injury from its denial torezone. Metropolitan, after all, had already invested thousands of dollars indeveloping plans for the proposed Lincoln Green community and for studies submitted to Arlington Heights supporting the rezoning request. Powell observedthat the plans and studies would be worthless without the rezoning. Despitethese factors, Powell wrote that Arlington Heights misunderstood the standingrequirement. Sustaining an economic injury was not necessary. Metropolitan,a nonprofit corporation committed to providing low cost housing in areas where it was scarce, held a general interest. Therefore, Metropolitan readily satisfied the standing requirement of the Court.
In support of their petition for rezoning, Metropolitan argued that, as established in Euclid v Ambler Realty Co. (1926), it had the right to be free of arbitrary or illogical zoning actions. Metropolitan claimed Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone discriminated against racial minorities and was inviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell found, however, that Metropolitan, being a corporation, had no racial identity and thus could not be discriminated against.
However, a Mr. Ransom, named in the lawsuit along with Metropolitan, was an African American Illinois resident. Working in an Arlington Heights' factory,Ransom lived approximately 20 miles away in a five room Evanston house with his mother and son. Ransom sought and qualified for the housing Metropolitan was to build. He claimed racial discrimination because the housing was blocked.
Powell responded that to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination, a proof of intent or purpose was necessary. Intent could be determined by examining both circumstantial and direct evidence available. Factors to consider when evaluating racial discrimination includedthe decision's potential impact, the historical trends and decisions, the sequence of events leading to the decision, and any deviation from normal procedures in making the decision.
In examining Arlington Heights' decision to not rezone, Powell concluded thecommunity had consistently applied its zoning laws following its usual procedures. A buffer zone policy to protect property values existed well before Metropolitan's petition appeared. Powell then applied a recent job discrimination case ruling of the Court in Washington v. Davis (1976). He wrote that, with no convincing evidence offered of discriminatory intent, the mere fact that the denial for rezoning happened to have a racially discriminatory effect was "without independent constitutional significance." The Court upheld the Arlington Heights' denial to rezone by reversing the appeals court's decision, but also sent the case back to the appeals court to consider the allegedviolation of the Fair Housing Act.
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan, dissented. White contended that the majority should have adhered to traditional Court principles to not apply a precedent that was set after the appeals court had madeits decision. The case should have been sent back to the appeals court for them to apply the precedent set in Davis. The Davis decision hadbeen delivered by the Court after the appeals court had heard the Arlington Heights case.
Impact
Ruling in favor of Metropolitan, the appeals court in July of 1977 ruled thatthe refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing Act because the effect was discriminatory even though there may have been no intent. The court held thatactions predictably perpetuating racial discrimination were as harmful as intentional discrimination. Besides, the goal of the Fair Housing Act was to racially integrate housing throughout the nation.
The Arlington Heights decision established the standard for determining racial discrimination in housing by applying the standard established in Davis. Governmental actions should not be considered discriminatory solely on the basis of unequal effects. Proof of the intent to discriminate was also necessary. The evidence to be considered included the effect of the official action. Did it weigh more heavily on one minority group than another? Secondly, the historical background of the decision was to be reviewed to determine if the series of official actions were intentionally malicious. Thirdly,did the decision-makers deviate from the normal process. Lastly, any deviations would be assessed to determine if any important facts to the specific casecould strongly favor a different resulting decision quite different than theone reached. Proof of such a racially discriminatory intent was required toestablish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Fair housing advocates criticized the decision. They believed the Court perpetuated the abuse of zoning powers maintaining status quo segregation and social class distinctions. Such exclusionary zoning hardly served the general welfare of the communities or the nation, they contended. However, the Arlington Heights decision perpetuated the Court's reluctance to rule against local zoning decisions.
Related Cases
The Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois
Respondent
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation and several individual residents
Petitioner's Claim
That a decision to deny rezoning on land owned by Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation was not racially motivated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and conformed to the 1968 Fair Housing Act.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
F. Willis Caruso
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Jack M. Siegel
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White (John Paul Stevensdid not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
11 January 1977
Decision
Ruled in favor of Arlington Heights by reversing a lower court decision and refusing to issue an injunction against a rezoning decision, but sent the caseback to the lower courts for further deliberation.
Significance
The case established a key standard for determining when the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated due to racial discriminationin housing. The simple fact that a decision may result in unequal effects ondifferent racial groups was not sufficient evidence to prove racial discrimination. Those contesting an action on such grounds must also prove an intentto discriminate in the decision-making process. Fair housing proponents claimed the decision perpetuated deceptive segregation decisions made through theprocess of urban zoning.
Urban zoning gained substantial acceptance in the United States shortly afterthe beginning of the twentieth century. Zoning is a form of police power provided by the states to their local municipal governments. By limiting certainpersonal freedoms, communities can better provide for the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Importantly, zoning regulations must be reasonable and conform with constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process of the law. Despite being born from good ideals, zoning was frequentlyused as a means to keep people of lower social status out of certain areas tomaintain market values of property. This form of zoning was labeled exclusionary zoning and was condemned by many. In 1968 Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, the first open housing act of the twentieth century. The act supported the notion that citizens should be free to live wherever they choose and can afford. The law prohibited discrimination in the sale and renting of certain types of housing on the basis of race and religion. The Supreme Court, alsoin 1968, ruled that federal law against housing discrimination applied to all housing. Despite the 1968 law and Court ruling, cases of housing discrimination against African American citizens pervasively continued.
Residential Zoning in Arlington Heights
Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago, is located approximately 25 miles northwest of the city's downtown area. Most land in the community was zoned fordetached single family homes. During the 1960s, the community saw substantialgrowth while the population of racial minorities remained low, similar to other communities in northwest Cook County. Near the center of Arlington Heights, a religious order owned an 80-acre parcel. In 1970, the order of St. Viator decided to allocate some of its land for low and moderate income housing. St. Viator chose Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a nonprofit developer experienced in using federal housing assistance programs, to organizethe project and develop 190 clustered town house units. Metropolitan was alsoclose to completing another project near Arlington Heights at the time.
Metropolitan and St. Viator signed a 99-year lease agreement for a 15-acre parcel in the southeast corner of the order's property. The agreement was dependent upon Metropolitan obtaining a zoning clearance from Arlington Heights and federal housing assistance. The proposed high density residential development clearly did not conform to Arlington Heights' low density zoning ordinance. Therefore, the project could not be built unless the community rezoned theparcel for multiple family housing. If Metropolitan was unsuccessful in securing either the clearance or the funding, the lease would terminate.
Metropolitan filed a petition for rezoning with the community's planning commission. It became the subject of a series of three public meetings in the spring of 1971. Though a number of community groups supported the rezoning, a majority opposed the project. Opponents stressed that many neighboring residents had built or purchased property there relying on the single-family zone classification. Such a rezoning could potentially cause property values for neighboring homes to substantially decline. By the close of the third meeting, the planning commission adopted a motion to recommend denial of the rezoning request to Arlington Heights' board of trustees.
In June of 1972, Metropolitan and three African American Illinois citizens filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Arlington Heights to block the rezoning denial. They claimed the denial violated the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of the law guarantee. The district court ruled in favor of the community by finding they were not motivated by racial discrimination or discrimination against low income groups when they denied rezoning. Their primary concernwas to protect existing property values. Metropolitan appealed the decisionto the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appeals court reversed the ruling by finding that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial was aracial bias.
Intent Versus Effect
Arlington Heights then appealed to the Supreme Court which accepted the case.Justice Powell, writing for the 5-3 majority, could find no evidence the denial was racially motivated. Instead, Powell, agreeing with the district court's decision, found substantial evidence indicating the zoning decision was primarily prompted by a desire to protect property values and to preserve the zoning plan's integrity.
Arlington Heights argued before the Court that Metropolitan lacked legal standing to pursue their claim because it suffered no economic injury. The city argued that Metropolitan was not the actual property owner of the parcel sinceits agreement with St. Viator was contingent upon the rezoning. Powell, therefore, first examined the issue of standing. Powell observed that Arlington Heights' action effectively blocked the housing construction. He wrote that ifMetropolitan was able to block the denial, which they could only accomplishthrough this petition, the barrier to low cost housing would be fully removed.
After consideration, Powell rejected Arlington Heights' argument. It seemed likely that Metropolitan would suffer some economic injury from its denial torezone. Metropolitan, after all, had already invested thousands of dollars indeveloping plans for the proposed Lincoln Green community and for studies submitted to Arlington Heights supporting the rezoning request. Powell observedthat the plans and studies would be worthless without the rezoning. Despitethese factors, Powell wrote that Arlington Heights misunderstood the standingrequirement. Sustaining an economic injury was not necessary. Metropolitan,a nonprofit corporation committed to providing low cost housing in areas where it was scarce, held a general interest. Therefore, Metropolitan readily satisfied the standing requirement of the Court.
In support of their petition for rezoning, Metropolitan argued that, as established in Euclid v Ambler Realty Co. (1926), it had the right to be free of arbitrary or illogical zoning actions. Metropolitan claimed Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone discriminated against racial minorities and was inviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell found, however, that Metropolitan, being a corporation, had no racial identity and thus could not be discriminated against.
However, a Mr. Ransom, named in the lawsuit along with Metropolitan, was an African American Illinois resident. Working in an Arlington Heights' factory,Ransom lived approximately 20 miles away in a five room Evanston house with his mother and son. Ransom sought and qualified for the housing Metropolitan was to build. He claimed racial discrimination because the housing was blocked.
Powell responded that to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination, a proof of intent or purpose was necessary. Intent could be determined by examining both circumstantial and direct evidence available. Factors to consider when evaluating racial discrimination includedthe decision's potential impact, the historical trends and decisions, the sequence of events leading to the decision, and any deviation from normal procedures in making the decision.
In examining Arlington Heights' decision to not rezone, Powell concluded thecommunity had consistently applied its zoning laws following its usual procedures. A buffer zone policy to protect property values existed well before Metropolitan's petition appeared. Powell then applied a recent job discrimination case ruling of the Court in Washington v. Davis (1976). He wrote that, with no convincing evidence offered of discriminatory intent, the mere fact that the denial for rezoning happened to have a racially discriminatory effect was "without independent constitutional significance." The Court upheld the Arlington Heights' denial to rezone by reversing the appeals court's decision, but also sent the case back to the appeals court to consider the allegedviolation of the Fair Housing Act.
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan, dissented. White contended that the majority should have adhered to traditional Court principles to not apply a precedent that was set after the appeals court had madeits decision. The case should have been sent back to the appeals court for them to apply the precedent set in Davis. The Davis decision hadbeen delivered by the Court after the appeals court had heard the Arlington Heights case.
Impact
Ruling in favor of Metropolitan, the appeals court in July of 1977 ruled thatthe refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing Act because the effect was discriminatory even though there may have been no intent. The court held thatactions predictably perpetuating racial discrimination were as harmful as intentional discrimination. Besides, the goal of the Fair Housing Act was to racially integrate housing throughout the nation.
The Arlington Heights decision established the standard for determining racial discrimination in housing by applying the standard established in Davis. Governmental actions should not be considered discriminatory solely on the basis of unequal effects. Proof of the intent to discriminate was also necessary. The evidence to be considered included the effect of the official action. Did it weigh more heavily on one minority group than another? Secondly, the historical background of the decision was to be reviewed to determine if the series of official actions were intentionally malicious. Thirdly,did the decision-makers deviate from the normal process. Lastly, any deviations would be assessed to determine if any important facts to the specific casecould strongly favor a different resulting decision quite different than theone reached. Proof of such a racially discriminatory intent was required toestablish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Fair housing advocates criticized the decision. They believed the Court perpetuated the abuse of zoning powers maintaining status quo segregation and social class distinctions. Such exclusionary zoning hardly served the general welfare of the communities or the nation, they contended. However, the Arlington Heights decision perpetuated the Court's reluctance to rule against local zoning decisions.
Related Cases
- Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
User Comments Add a comment…