Appellant
Walter E. Washington
Appellee
Alfred E. Davis
Appellant's Claim
That job qualification tests which minorities fail in disproportionate numbers do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
David P. Sutton
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Richard B. Sobol
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
7 June 1976
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the job tests were not unconstitutional.
Significance
In Washington, the Court clearly states that some evidence of discriminatory intent is necessary to demonstrate that employment tests are unconstitutional. What that evidence consists of, however, was not made clear.
On 10 April 1970, two African American police officers filed suit against officials of the police department in Washington, D.C. Their initial claim was that the department's promotions policy was racially discriminatory. Their suit was joined by others who alleged that their applications to become police officers had been rejected, at least in part, because of a written personnel test which African Americans failed in disproportionate numbers. The plaintiffs claimed that police department policies in the District of Columbia--whichis governed by federal laws--violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which reads: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law."
The federal district court ruled in favor of the police department. On appeal, however, Davis and the other complainants prevailed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the standard set by the U.S. SupremeCourt in the seminal employment discrimination case, Griggs v. Duke PowerCompany (1971), which held that tests which operate to exclude minoritygroups are unconstitutional. According to Griggs, this presumption canonly be mitigated if the employer can demonstrate that the tests are substantially related to job performance. Holding that lack of discriminatory intentin administering hiring and promotion exams was irrelevant, the appellate court reversed the decision of the district court. The police officials then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of this decision.
Supreme Court Holds that Evidence of Discriminatory Intent Is Necessary toProve Racial Discrimination
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Writing for the Court, Justice White clearly indicated that the so-called "disproportionate impact" test developed in Griggs did not apply here. While Griggs interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the same standards did not apply to the applicable law in this case--the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment:
Although the Court stated that a showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to make out a claim under the Constitution, it was less clear about what sort of showing might pass the test. Justice White indicated that a discriminatory purpose might be inferred from all the facts--including the disproportionate impact of tests or other factors on racial minorities--relevant to a particular case of alleged employment discrimination. But as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, discriminatory purpose cannot always be distinguished from discriminatory impact.
When the Court revisited the issue in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979), this test was clarified: if the potential discriminatory effects ofan employment practice were foreseeable and the employer carried them out anyway, this action constitutes discriminatory intent. The burden of proof--andit is a heavy one--was now shifted to the employee, who must show that the employer should have known that a certain practice would negatively impact minority employees.
Related Cases
Walter E. Washington
Appellee
Alfred E. Davis
Appellant's Claim
That job qualification tests which minorities fail in disproportionate numbers do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
David P. Sutton
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Richard B. Sobol
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
7 June 1976
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the job tests were not unconstitutional.
Significance
In Washington, the Court clearly states that some evidence of discriminatory intent is necessary to demonstrate that employment tests are unconstitutional. What that evidence consists of, however, was not made clear.
On 10 April 1970, two African American police officers filed suit against officials of the police department in Washington, D.C. Their initial claim was that the department's promotions policy was racially discriminatory. Their suit was joined by others who alleged that their applications to become police officers had been rejected, at least in part, because of a written personnel test which African Americans failed in disproportionate numbers. The plaintiffs claimed that police department policies in the District of Columbia--whichis governed by federal laws--violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which reads: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law."
The federal district court ruled in favor of the police department. On appeal, however, Davis and the other complainants prevailed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the standard set by the U.S. SupremeCourt in the seminal employment discrimination case, Griggs v. Duke PowerCompany (1971), which held that tests which operate to exclude minoritygroups are unconstitutional. According to Griggs, this presumption canonly be mitigated if the employer can demonstrate that the tests are substantially related to job performance. Holding that lack of discriminatory intentin administering hiring and promotion exams was irrelevant, the appellate court reversed the decision of the district court. The police officials then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of this decision.
Supreme Court Holds that Evidence of Discriminatory Intent Is Necessary toProve Racial Discrimination
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Writing for the Court, Justice White clearly indicated that the so-called "disproportionate impact" test developed in Griggs did not apply here. While Griggs interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the same standards did not apply to the applicable law in this case--the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment:
We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today. The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. It is also true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment containsan equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiouslydiscriminating between individuals or groups . . . But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory disproportionate impact.
Although the Court stated that a showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to make out a claim under the Constitution, it was less clear about what sort of showing might pass the test. Justice White indicated that a discriminatory purpose might be inferred from all the facts--including the disproportionate impact of tests or other factors on racial minorities--relevant to a particular case of alleged employment discrimination. But as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, discriminatory purpose cannot always be distinguished from discriminatory impact.
When the Court revisited the issue in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979), this test was clarified: if the potential discriminatory effects ofan employment practice were foreseeable and the employer carried them out anyway, this action constitutes discriminatory intent. The burden of proof--andit is a heavy one--was now shifted to the employee, who must show that the employer should have known that a certain practice would negatively impact minority employees.
Related Cases
- Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
- Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
- Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
- Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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