United States v. Guest

Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Herbert Guest, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That the respondent conspired to deprive black citizens of their rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Thurgood Marshall, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
James E. Hudson, Charles J. Bloch
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, Abe Fortas, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II, Earl Warren
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 March 1966
Decision
Reversed the judgment of the district court and held that the allegation of state involvement in conspiracy was sufficient to charge a violation of rightsprotected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The allegation of false arrest of black citizens was broad enough to cover a charge of active connivance by stateagents, constituting a denial of rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Thus the district court should not have dismissed that part of the indictment.
Significance
The Supreme Court clarified when the federal law against conspiracy can be used in a case involving interference in the right to travel freely between states. The purpose of the conspiracy must be to impede or prevent interstate travel or to oppress a person exercising that right. Then, whether or not racial discrimination is the motivation, the conspiracy falls under the federal conspiracy law.
Lyndon B. Johnson became president of the United States in November 1963, upon the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As a memorial to the slainpresident, Johnson proposed to Congress that it act on a civil rights bill. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 increased federal powers to give access to all races to public facilities, to protect voting rights, and to desegregate schools. Title II of this act made it a federal offense to discriminate against anycustomer in a place of public accommodation. Six months later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Commerce Clause could be used to bar private discrimination. The Commerce Clause is part of the Constitution that grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce. Freedom marches and riots marked the era when blacks fought for their civil rights. United States v. Guest took place against the backdrop of the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement.
Six men were accused of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate black citizens in Athens, Georgia, beginning in 1964. The men were indicted by a U.S. grand jury in the Middle District of Georgia. They were indictedunder 18 U.S.C. Sec. 241, a federal law dealing with conspiracy, for conspiring to deprive black citizens of the free exercise and enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. In particular, the indictment noted the right to use state facilities without discrimination by race, the right freely to engage in interstate travel, and the right to equal enjoyment of privately owned places of public accommodation. These rights hadrecently been guaranteed by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The indictment listed how the accused had conspired to deprive blacks of their rights: shooting, beating, killing, damaging or destroying property, pursuing andthreatening with guns, making threatening phone calls, wearing disguises on the highway and premises of others, causing the arrest of blacks by making false reports, and burning crosses at night in public view.
The district court dismissed the indictment against the men on the grounds that it did not involve rights which are attributes of national citizenship. The district court, regarding the right to equal use of public facilities thatare owned or operated by the state of Georgia, ruled that 18 U.S.C. 241 did not encompass any Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection. The court also decided that any broader interpretationof sec. 241 would "render it void for indefiniteness." The district court further held that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to private action,but only to state action. The court claimed that the public-accommodation allegation was inadequate because it did not show that discrimination was the motivation.
Intent to Interfere
The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. The Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of interference with the right to use public accommodations because of adefect in pleading.
Regarding the district court's claim of "indefiniteness," Justice Stewart noted in his opinion that "inclusion of Fourteenth Amendment rights within the compass of 18 U.S.C. sec. 241 does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague." Because the charge is one of conspiracy, the requirement that the offender must have had the intent to interfere with federal rights is satisfied.
Contrary to the argument of the litigants, the indictment contained an allegation of state involvement. This related to the charge of "causing the arrestof Negroes by means of false reports." This allegation was sufficient to prevent this part of the indictment from being dismissed.
The fourth part of the indictment dealt with conspiracy to prevent free travel from and to Georgia and to prevent the use of highway facilities and otherinstrumentalities of interstate commerce within Georgia. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court should not have dismissed this part of the indictment because the right of interstate travel is protected by 18 U.S.C. sec. 241. However, a specific intent to interfere with this federal right must be proved.
Justice Clark noted in his concurrence that the specific language of sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing allconspiracies--with or without state action--that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." In other words, Congress has the power to outlaw private conspiracies that violate civil rights.
The Right To Travel
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. Harlan noted that themajority's decision to hold that the right to travel is protected against private interference is questionable. Harlan felt it "either unwise or impermissible so to read the Constitution." He noted that nothing in the Constitutionguarantees the right to travel, but that the right to travel is an aspect ofthe liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. That clause refers only togovernmental action, so it would not apply to United States v. Guest.
Harlan added that it is arguable whether conspiracy to discriminate in publicaccommodations, thus impeding interstate commerce, is dealt with under sec.241, unaided by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Congress can legislate in this area, "it seems unnecessary . . . to strain to find a dubious constitutional right."
Impact
United States v. Guest has been cited in many cases dealing with the right of interstate travel. It has been used to show that the constitutional right of interstate travel is a fundamental right. In a 1993 case, Jayne Bray, et al., Petitioners v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic et al., involving a woman's right to travel interstate to reach an abortion clinic, the opinion cited United States v. Guest. The respondents in the abortion clinic case relied upon the right to interstate travel, which in at least somecontexts, is a right constitutionally protected against private interference.But all that the clinic noted with respect to that particular right was thedistrict court's finding that many women seeking the services of the clinicsin the Washington Metropolitan area travel on the interstate to get there. "That is not enough," noted the opinion. Quoting United States v. Guest:Only "if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person becauseof his exercise of that right, then . . . the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal conspiracy law."
Related Cases

• United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
  
• Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
  
• United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U.S. 442 (1943).
  
• Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
  
• United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
  
• Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
  
• Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
  
• Jayne Bray, et al., Petitioners v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic etal., 506 U.S. 263 (1993).

Burden of Proof
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove an asserted fact. Two concepts embody the burden of proof: the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward. The latter is also called production burden or burden of evidence.
The burden of persuasion requires the plaintiff or prosecutor to convince thejury, or the judge in non-jury trials, of all the pertinent facts in the case. The degree of proof varies depending on whether the case is a civil or criminal proceeding. In civil cases, the burden must be met by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance means the facts are merely more convincing or more probable to the judge or jury than the opposing evidence. Criminal casesrequire the persuasion burden to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must be so conclusive that it erases all reasonable doubts. The burden of persuasion is always the responsibility of the prosecution.
The burden of going forward requires either party to prove wrong any evidencethat damages their position. To avoid early dismissal by the judge, the prosecution's proof of evidence must prevail. The burden of going forward shiftsback and forth from prosecution to defense during the course of a trial.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1998.