Petitioner
State of Washington
Respondent
Harold Glucksberg
Petitioner's Claim
That Washington's ban on assisting or aiding a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
William L. Williams, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Kathryn L. Tucker
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1997
Decision
That Washington's ban on assisted suicide does not violate the constitutionalrights of terminally ill patients.
Significance
The Court's decision made it clear that the Constitution does not protect a person's right to commit suicide, thus upholding the laws of a majority of states which prohibit a person from assisting another in committing suicide.
Since the founding of the United States, a vast majority of states have upheld laws which prohibit a person from assisting another in committing suicide.Although not often enforced over much of the nation's history, these laws became the focus of an intense debate over issues of death and dying in the 1990s. Primarily, this debate focused on the right of terminally ill patients toreceive assistance from doctors or others in committing suicide. In light ofthis debate and an apparent increase in the number of physician-assisted suicides, a number of states began to enforce their already existing, but rarelyapplied, assisted suicide laws. A number of other states passed new laws dealing with the issue, either banning assisted suicide altogether or severely limiting the circumstances in which it could be performed. Finally, bills to legalize physician-assisted suicide were proposed in a number of state legislatures.
Washington Law Challenged
Since its establishment as a U.S. territory in 1854, Washington had a law making it a crime to assist another in committing or attempting to commit suicide. In 1994, a group of doctors and terminally ill patients filed a suit against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging the constitutionality of the law. The district court found thatterminally ill patients have a liberty interest protected by the Constitution to commit physician-assisted suicide, and that the Washington law thereforeviolated the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district court decision. Washington then appealed thedecision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the district court and court of appeals.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Although the Due Process Clause literally reads in terms of the fairness of a procedure used to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause also protects certain substantive fundamental rights and liberty interests regardless of the fairness of the procedure used to deprive a person of that liberty. This is known as "substantivedue process." Thus, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protectsa person's right to: marry; have children; raise children and direct his or her education; marital privacy; use contraception; bodily integrity; and abortion. Also, in the 1990 case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court recognized that a person has a right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. However, the Court concluded that the Due ProcessClause does not protect a person's right to commit physician-assisted suicide.
In determining whether a liberty interest is "fundamental," and thus protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court applies a two-part test. First, the asserted right must have historically been regarded as fundamental, that is, itmust be "deeply rooted in [the] Nation's history and tradition." (Quoting Moore v. East Cleveland [1977]) Second, the asserted right must be carefully described and defined. The Court concluded that the asserted right to physician assisted suicide did not meet either of these requirements. With respect to this second requirement, the Court concluded that the right at issue was not the right to die or to determine the time and manner of one's death, as the court of appeals had defined the issue. Rather, the Court looked at themore narrow issue of whether there was a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.
The Court then analyzed whether this right had a historical basis. With respect to the historical question, the Court reasoned that the right to assistedsuicide was not rooted in history because almost every state and most democratic nations have laws banning assisted suicide. Further, "for over 700 years,the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished and otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Thus, the Court concluded:
The Court also rejected the argument that its earlier decision in the Cruzan case established a right to assisted suicide. The Court reasoned thatits decision in Cruzan simply affirmed that a person has a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, that issue is far different from whether a person has the right to assistance in committing suicide. Further, the Court noted that the right to refuse medical treatment differs from the right to assistance in committing suicide because historically a person has hadthe right to refuse medical treatment. Finally, in Cruzan the Court noted that most states outlawed assisted suicide but the Court did not suggestthat such laws were unconstitutional.
Although the justices did not entirely agree on the reasoning, all nine justices agreed that there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide. Thus, theCourt's decision left it up to each individual state to determine in what circumstances physician-assisted suicide would or would not be permitted. As theCourt concluded its opinion: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."
Related Cases
Jack Kevorkian
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, also known as the "suicide doctor," says "when your conscience says law is immoral, don't follow it."
Kevorkian, a retired pathologist, claims to observe rigorous standards beforeconducting an assisted-physician suicide. However, others contend that he does not always follow his own procedures.
Before assisting in a suicide, Kevorkian mandates that candidates receive extensive counseling. Additionally, a psychiatrist examines every candidate. A doctor who specializes in pain control examines patients who complain of constant pain. Kevorkian reviews patients' medical records before assisting with asuicide. Another requirement, before Kevorkian will assist with a suicide, is that the patient suffer from an illness that cannot be cured or treated without unbearable side effects. Kevorkian will not perform an assisted-suicideuntil at least 24-hours have passed once the patient makes the final request.Kevorkian was recently convicted of second-degree murder in a trial in Michigan.
Sources
Cheyfitz, Kirk. "He Breaks His Own Rules: Kevorkian Rushes to Fulfill His Clients' Desire to Die." Detroit Free Press, 3 March 1997.
State of Washington
Respondent
Harold Glucksberg
Petitioner's Claim
That Washington's ban on assisting or aiding a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
William L. Williams, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Kathryn L. Tucker
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1997
Decision
That Washington's ban on assisted suicide does not violate the constitutionalrights of terminally ill patients.
Significance
The Court's decision made it clear that the Constitution does not protect a person's right to commit suicide, thus upholding the laws of a majority of states which prohibit a person from assisting another in committing suicide.
Since the founding of the United States, a vast majority of states have upheld laws which prohibit a person from assisting another in committing suicide.Although not often enforced over much of the nation's history, these laws became the focus of an intense debate over issues of death and dying in the 1990s. Primarily, this debate focused on the right of terminally ill patients toreceive assistance from doctors or others in committing suicide. In light ofthis debate and an apparent increase in the number of physician-assisted suicides, a number of states began to enforce their already existing, but rarelyapplied, assisted suicide laws. A number of other states passed new laws dealing with the issue, either banning assisted suicide altogether or severely limiting the circumstances in which it could be performed. Finally, bills to legalize physician-assisted suicide were proposed in a number of state legislatures.
Washington Law Challenged
Since its establishment as a U.S. territory in 1854, Washington had a law making it a crime to assist another in committing or attempting to commit suicide. In 1994, a group of doctors and terminally ill patients filed a suit against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging the constitutionality of the law. The district court found thatterminally ill patients have a liberty interest protected by the Constitution to commit physician-assisted suicide, and that the Washington law thereforeviolated the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district court decision. Washington then appealed thedecision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the district court and court of appeals.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Although the Due Process Clause literally reads in terms of the fairness of a procedure used to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause also protects certain substantive fundamental rights and liberty interests regardless of the fairness of the procedure used to deprive a person of that liberty. This is known as "substantivedue process." Thus, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause protectsa person's right to: marry; have children; raise children and direct his or her education; marital privacy; use contraception; bodily integrity; and abortion. Also, in the 1990 case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court recognized that a person has a right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. However, the Court concluded that the Due ProcessClause does not protect a person's right to commit physician-assisted suicide.
In determining whether a liberty interest is "fundamental," and thus protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court applies a two-part test. First, the asserted right must have historically been regarded as fundamental, that is, itmust be "deeply rooted in [the] Nation's history and tradition." (Quoting Moore v. East Cleveland [1977]) Second, the asserted right must be carefully described and defined. The Court concluded that the asserted right to physician assisted suicide did not meet either of these requirements. With respect to this second requirement, the Court concluded that the right at issue was not the right to die or to determine the time and manner of one's death, as the court of appeals had defined the issue. Rather, the Court looked at themore narrow issue of whether there was a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.
The Court then analyzed whether this right had a historical basis. With respect to the historical question, the Court reasoned that the right to assistedsuicide was not rooted in history because almost every state and most democratic nations have laws banning assisted suicide. Further, "for over 700 years,the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished and otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Thus, the Court concluded:
The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, the asserted `right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Court also rejected the argument that its earlier decision in the Cruzan case established a right to assisted suicide. The Court reasoned thatits decision in Cruzan simply affirmed that a person has a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, that issue is far different from whether a person has the right to assistance in committing suicide. Further, the Court noted that the right to refuse medical treatment differs from the right to assistance in committing suicide because historically a person has hadthe right to refuse medical treatment. Finally, in Cruzan the Court noted that most states outlawed assisted suicide but the Court did not suggestthat such laws were unconstitutional.
Although the justices did not entirely agree on the reasoning, all nine justices agreed that there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide. Thus, theCourt's decision left it up to each individual state to determine in what circumstances physician-assisted suicide would or would not be permitted. As theCourt concluded its opinion: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."
Related Cases
- Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
- Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Jack Kevorkian
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, also known as the "suicide doctor," says "when your conscience says law is immoral, don't follow it."
Kevorkian, a retired pathologist, claims to observe rigorous standards beforeconducting an assisted-physician suicide. However, others contend that he does not always follow his own procedures.
Before assisting in a suicide, Kevorkian mandates that candidates receive extensive counseling. Additionally, a psychiatrist examines every candidate. A doctor who specializes in pain control examines patients who complain of constant pain. Kevorkian reviews patients' medical records before assisting with asuicide. Another requirement, before Kevorkian will assist with a suicide, is that the patient suffer from an illness that cannot be cured or treated without unbearable side effects. Kevorkian will not perform an assisted-suicideuntil at least 24-hours have passed once the patient makes the final request.Kevorkian was recently convicted of second-degree murder in a trial in Michigan.
Sources
Cheyfitz, Kirk. "He Breaks His Own Rules: Kevorkian Rushes to Fulfill His Clients' Desire to Die." Detroit Free Press, 3 March 1997.
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