Petitioner
Steiney Richards
Respondent
State of Wisconsin
Petitioner's Claim
That police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using deception and forceto enter his hotel room on a drug-related case.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Henry Schultz, David Karpe, John Wesley Hall, Jr.
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
James E. Doyle, Stephen W. Kleinmaier
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 April 1997
Decision
That the evidence in this case established the reasonableness of the officers' decision not to knock and announce their presence, and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
Significance
Richards v. Wisconsin clarified the Court's position in Wilson v. Arkansas (1995). The Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the common law "knock and announce" rule whereby police are required to knock on the door of a suspect's dwelling and announce their identity and purpose before forcing entry. Richards tested the limits of the "no knock" concept, whereby officers were allowed to enter without announcing themselves, on the basis that todo otherwise would give the suspect too much time to destroy evidence.
The Police Knock on Richards's Door
Madison, Wisconsin police had been investigating Steiney Richards for some time before they obtained a warrant to search his hotel room on the last day of1991. They suspected Richards of conducting illegal drug sales out of his room, and had requested a warrant that would give them authorization for "no knock" entry--that is, a warrant which would permit them to enter the room without knocking on the door. It was an advantage the officers believed they needed, because Richards would otherwise be able to destroy evidence or flee before they could make an arrest. The magistrate, however, denied their request.
Proceeding with an ordinary warrant requiring them to "knock and announce," the officers arrived at Richard's room at 3:40 a.m., presumably on 1 January 1992. Dressed as a maintenance man, Officer Pharo, the team leader, approachedthe door. Around and behind him stood several others, at least one of them in a police uniform. When Pharo knocked on the door, a voice from inside askedwho was there, and Pharo responded that he was the maintenance man. Richardsslowly cracked the door, with the chain still on it.
The next sequence of events would be disputed, but apparently as soon as he saw the uniformed officer behind Pharo, Richards slammed the door shut. Two orthree seconds later, the officers began kicking the door down, shouting allthe while--according to their later testimony--that they were police officers. Finally entering the room after breaking through the door, the officers caught Richards attempting to flee through a window, and a search revealed cashand cocaine hidden above the tiles in the bathroom ceiling.
At the subsequent trial, Richards filed a motion seeking suppression of the evidence from his hotel room on the grounds that the officers had not knockedor announced their presence before forcing their way into his dwelling. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the strange behavior Richards exhibited in opening and then rapidly closing the door justified the police officers' reaction. Given the disposable nature of the drugs involved, the judge noted, the police were justified in making their way across the threshold as quickly as they could.
Richards appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court. They used as their guide the U.S. Supreme Court's holdingin Wilson, and reviewed this in light of their own decision in State v. Stevens (1995). In the latter case, the Wisconsin high court held that "when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possessionwith intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist." That would justify a no knock entry. Wilson did not negate Stevens; it was possible to apply exceptions tothe knock and announce rule. This is so particularly in light of "today's drug culture," which often involves violence, as well as substances such as cocaine that could be rapidly destroyed by flushing them down the toilet. Felonydrug crimes involve "an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police," the court held.
The Supreme Court Strikes a Balance
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Wisconsin's decision by a unanimous vote. Justice Stevens, who gave the Court's opinion, began by noting that the ruling did not provide a constitutional justification for a "blanket exception" to the knock and announce requirement in felony drug cases. Rather, exceptions could be made to that requirement on a case-by-case basis in view of certain factors. These included the possibility of physical violence or fears that, if the police took the time to knock and announce, the suspect would use the leadtime to destroy evidence or flee--as Richards had apparently attempted to do. Exceptions could be created, Justice Stevens wrote, but they had to be subjected to the scrutiny of courts as needed, and they had to take into account"at least two serious concerns." The first of these was the fact that officers might attempt to include within the special exceptions some drug investigations that did not really involve special risks, and this would place too manysuch cases outside the watchful eyes of judges. Second, "an exception in onecategory can, relatively easily, be applied to others." It was not the Court's desire to create a series of exceptions, and the application of exceptionsin every situation that posed a threat to officers would simply render the knock and announce requirement meaningless.
Hence, Justice Stevens held, a no knock entry could be justified in situations where the police had reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence would be "dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." To thus permit exceptions, but to forbid blanket exceptions to the knock and announce requirement struck "the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no knock entries."
Having addressed the general question, Justice Stevens turned to the specificsituation involved in Richards. The evidence in the present case justified the decision on the part of the officers not to announce their presence, Justice Stevens held, and thus they had not violated the Fourth Amendment.As for the objection that the magistrate had specifically refused a no knockwarrant, this meant only "that at the time warrant was requested there was insufficient evidence for a no knock entry. However, the officers' decision toenter the room must be evaluated as to the time of entry."
Impact
Both civil libertarians and upholders of law and order found something to applaud in the balance Justice Stevens had applied in Richards. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers (NACDL), which had provided Richards's defense, issued a statement on 28 April 1997 calling the Court's decision "a victory for the Fourth Amendment." Despite the fact that their client had not gained the relief he sought,the two organizations expressed pleasure with the Court's decision not to uphold the blanket exception. Certainly police officers and others on the "lawand order" side could appreciate the Court's willingness to uphold certain exceptions to the knock and announce rule. In an FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin article published prior to the Court's decision in Richards, Michael J. Bulzomi made the government's case obliquely by noting the many perils officers face when approaching a suspect's dwelling. "A police officer making a high-risk warrant entry," Bulzomi wrote, "is not on an even playing field with the occupants of the premises . . . [T]he armed occupants know what they intend to do, whereas the officers can only infer whether [they] intend tofight, flee, or surrender." Perhaps because of such perils, "The point of entry into a house, be it a door or a window, is referred to as the fatal funnel." Ira Mickenberg in The National Law Journal reviewed the decision as one of several in the 1996-97 term that favored police and prosecutors.
Related Cases
Steiney Richards
Respondent
State of Wisconsin
Petitioner's Claim
That police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using deception and forceto enter his hotel room on a drug-related case.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Henry Schultz, David Karpe, John Wesley Hall, Jr.
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
James E. Doyle, Stephen W. Kleinmaier
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 April 1997
Decision
That the evidence in this case established the reasonableness of the officers' decision not to knock and announce their presence, and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
Significance
Richards v. Wisconsin clarified the Court's position in Wilson v. Arkansas (1995). The Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the common law "knock and announce" rule whereby police are required to knock on the door of a suspect's dwelling and announce their identity and purpose before forcing entry. Richards tested the limits of the "no knock" concept, whereby officers were allowed to enter without announcing themselves, on the basis that todo otherwise would give the suspect too much time to destroy evidence.
The Police Knock on Richards's Door
Madison, Wisconsin police had been investigating Steiney Richards for some time before they obtained a warrant to search his hotel room on the last day of1991. They suspected Richards of conducting illegal drug sales out of his room, and had requested a warrant that would give them authorization for "no knock" entry--that is, a warrant which would permit them to enter the room without knocking on the door. It was an advantage the officers believed they needed, because Richards would otherwise be able to destroy evidence or flee before they could make an arrest. The magistrate, however, denied their request.
Proceeding with an ordinary warrant requiring them to "knock and announce," the officers arrived at Richard's room at 3:40 a.m., presumably on 1 January 1992. Dressed as a maintenance man, Officer Pharo, the team leader, approachedthe door. Around and behind him stood several others, at least one of them in a police uniform. When Pharo knocked on the door, a voice from inside askedwho was there, and Pharo responded that he was the maintenance man. Richardsslowly cracked the door, with the chain still on it.
The next sequence of events would be disputed, but apparently as soon as he saw the uniformed officer behind Pharo, Richards slammed the door shut. Two orthree seconds later, the officers began kicking the door down, shouting allthe while--according to their later testimony--that they were police officers. Finally entering the room after breaking through the door, the officers caught Richards attempting to flee through a window, and a search revealed cashand cocaine hidden above the tiles in the bathroom ceiling.
At the subsequent trial, Richards filed a motion seeking suppression of the evidence from his hotel room on the grounds that the officers had not knockedor announced their presence before forcing their way into his dwelling. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the strange behavior Richards exhibited in opening and then rapidly closing the door justified the police officers' reaction. Given the disposable nature of the drugs involved, the judge noted, the police were justified in making their way across the threshold as quickly as they could.
Richards appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court. They used as their guide the U.S. Supreme Court's holdingin Wilson, and reviewed this in light of their own decision in State v. Stevens (1995). In the latter case, the Wisconsin high court held that "when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possessionwith intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist." That would justify a no knock entry. Wilson did not negate Stevens; it was possible to apply exceptions tothe knock and announce rule. This is so particularly in light of "today's drug culture," which often involves violence, as well as substances such as cocaine that could be rapidly destroyed by flushing them down the toilet. Felonydrug crimes involve "an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police," the court held.
The Supreme Court Strikes a Balance
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Wisconsin's decision by a unanimous vote. Justice Stevens, who gave the Court's opinion, began by noting that the ruling did not provide a constitutional justification for a "blanket exception" to the knock and announce requirement in felony drug cases. Rather, exceptions could be made to that requirement on a case-by-case basis in view of certain factors. These included the possibility of physical violence or fears that, if the police took the time to knock and announce, the suspect would use the leadtime to destroy evidence or flee--as Richards had apparently attempted to do. Exceptions could be created, Justice Stevens wrote, but they had to be subjected to the scrutiny of courts as needed, and they had to take into account"at least two serious concerns." The first of these was the fact that officers might attempt to include within the special exceptions some drug investigations that did not really involve special risks, and this would place too manysuch cases outside the watchful eyes of judges. Second, "an exception in onecategory can, relatively easily, be applied to others." It was not the Court's desire to create a series of exceptions, and the application of exceptionsin every situation that posed a threat to officers would simply render the knock and announce requirement meaningless.
Hence, Justice Stevens held, a no knock entry could be justified in situations where the police had reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence would be "dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." To thus permit exceptions, but to forbid blanket exceptions to the knock and announce requirement struck "the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no knock entries."
Having addressed the general question, Justice Stevens turned to the specificsituation involved in Richards. The evidence in the present case justified the decision on the part of the officers not to announce their presence, Justice Stevens held, and thus they had not violated the Fourth Amendment.As for the objection that the magistrate had specifically refused a no knockwarrant, this meant only "that at the time warrant was requested there was insufficient evidence for a no knock entry. However, the officers' decision toenter the room must be evaluated as to the time of entry."
Impact
Both civil libertarians and upholders of law and order found something to applaud in the balance Justice Stevens had applied in Richards. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers (NACDL), which had provided Richards's defense, issued a statement on 28 April 1997 calling the Court's decision "a victory for the Fourth Amendment." Despite the fact that their client had not gained the relief he sought,the two organizations expressed pleasure with the Court's decision not to uphold the blanket exception. Certainly police officers and others on the "lawand order" side could appreciate the Court's willingness to uphold certain exceptions to the knock and announce rule. In an FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin article published prior to the Court's decision in Richards, Michael J. Bulzomi made the government's case obliquely by noting the many perils officers face when approaching a suspect's dwelling. "A police officer making a high-risk warrant entry," Bulzomi wrote, "is not on an even playing field with the occupants of the premises . . . [T]he armed occupants know what they intend to do, whereas the officers can only infer whether [they] intend tofight, flee, or surrender." Perhaps because of such perils, "The point of entry into a house, be it a door or a window, is referred to as the fatal funnel." Ira Mickenberg in The National Law Journal reviewed the decision as one of several in the 1996-97 term that favored police and prosecutors.
Related Cases
- Wilson v. Arkansas 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
- State v. Stevens 515 U.S. 1102 (1995).
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