Petitioners
Walker L. Chandler, et al.
Respondent
Zell D. Miller, Governor of Georgia
Petitioners' Claim
That Georgia's requirement for a negative urinalysis to qualify for candidacyviolated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and FourteenthAmendments.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Walker L. Chandler
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Patricia Guilday
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg (writing for the Court), Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens,Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 April 1997
Decision
The Court found that the state of Georgia violated the constitutional rightsof the petitioner because the negative drug test constituted a suspicionlesssearch.
Significance
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution gives states the right to set qualifications and protocol for state elections, the Court viewed Georgia's statute as an unreasonable, suspicionless search. Moreover, this decision definitively stipulated that regardless of purpose, in orderfor any state to engage in any act that involved suspicionless search there had to exist a viable, compelling government interest or special need to justify infringement on individual rights granted under the U.S. Constitution.
Political Nominees Challenged Mandatory Drug Testing
In 1990, the state of Georgia enacted a statute that required every candidatefor a designated state office to submit to a urinalysis drug test. Thus, Georgia became the first and only state that required drug screening for state office nominees. Test results had to be negative and verified by a state approved laboratory at least 30 days before balloting for nomination or election to state offices. (Candidates could choose whether to be tested in a laboratory approved by the state or by their own physician.)
Libertarian Party nominee for the office of lieutenant governor, Walker L. Chandler, and two other nominees of the Libertarian Party, believed that theirconstitutional right to privacy would be violated. They sought protection from what they felt constituted an unreasonable search. The action, filed in theU.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia claimed the "creators" of the statute inappropriately used state power under the U.S. Constitution's Tenth Amendment to enact their statute. Because the petitioners felt that their rights had been constitutionally violated, they requested declaratoryand injunctive relief barring implementation and enforcement of the act. Thedistrict court, however, refused their request to obtain a preliminary injunction; final judgment of the district court was also delayed until after theelection. When the court ultimately rendered its decision, the Georgia statute was upheld.
Chandler appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; however, the court affirmed. (Interestingly, the circuit court cited as justification for its ruling the same three cases that the U.S. Supreme Court would claim as precedence which rendered the Georgia statute as unconstitutional.) Thecourt's opinion stated that although drug testing qualified as a search, thestate had compelling reason to have nominees for state office submit to drugtesting. The circuit panel further reasoned that the import of administrativeand policy decision-making in which elected officials engaged rendered the state's rationale as valid. Moreover, the state's "special needs" went beyondthe limits of normal law enforcement and so a warrant or reasonable suspicionwas not necessarily incident to the "search" (drug tests). Finally, being permitted to take tests in the office of their private physician, nominees could simply forfeit their candidacy if they tested positive; thus, the court felt that there existed no potential that an individual's privacy might be violated. The Eleventh Circuit Court ultimately ruled that the Georgia statute wasconstitutionally valid because the state's interests outweighed individual expectations of privacy.
State Cited Three Earlier Decisions Involving Drug Testing
When the case was argued before the Supreme Court, the state of Georgia focused on drug testing programs previously upheld by the Supreme Court. These included two cases decided in 1989. The first was Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. This case involved drug and alcohol tests performed on railway employees involved in train accidents and for those who violated particular safety rules. The second 1989 case was Treasury Employees v. Von Raab. The Treasury Employees case addressed the use of drug tests forU.S. Customs Service employees who sought transfer or promotion to certain positions. A third case cited as precedence had been decided in 1995, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, and concerned the use of random drug testing of students who participated in interscholastic sports.
These were the same cases cited and recognized by the Eleventh Circuit Courtas the examples of reasonable searches for the purpose of identifying drug abuse. Counsel for the state of Georgia reasoned that these related cases focused on a state's interest to have programs to prevent drug abuse in special circumstances wherein lack of testing could have a serious, deleterious effect.Counsel pointed out that, as written, the Georgia statute did not have any invasive elements since nominees submitted to testing in the privacy of theirown physician's office. Therefore the state could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. Finally, the respondent's attorney maintained that the existenceof such a statute was warranted because use of illicit drugs in society waspervasive, and could conceivably involve even candidates who ran for state office.
The U.S. Supreme Court based its decision on four points of law. The Court agreed with petitioners that the Georgia statute's requirements were unconstitutional because respondents failed to prove and justify their reasons for authoring such a statute. Justices did not consider as valid the respondent's claim that requirements for drug testing were reasonable because there was no "individualized suspicion of wrong doing" which justified unwarranted search and seizure (a description which even the lower court applied to the drug testing requirement). Further, the Court reasoned that a state's power under the Tenth Amendment to establish criteria and procedure for state elections did not entitle a state to challenge personal rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Majority of Justices Believed Testing Unnecessary
Justices specifically felt there were no "special needs" that permitted violation of Fourth Amendment rights which protect society against unreasonable searches; neither was there a proven, compelling necessity to require drug tests for nominees to the ballot. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg observed that personal rights "diminished for a symbol's sake" did not constitutea valid reason to infringe on personal rights of nominees. Justices found the respondent's arguments as spurious that there existed a potential for drugabuse among politicians. Instead, the majority opinion went on to reason, thestate's fears seemed more hypothetical than real. Nominees for state officewere exposed to the public, their conduct attracted the attention of societyand they were thus likely to find such exposure sufficient reason to refrainfrom drug use. Moreover, the Court felt that "state officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, and required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort." Furthermore the Court reasoned that Georgia's certification requirement did not succeed in its effort to identify drug abusers because tests were given with advance notice. Unlike Skinner, Treasury Employees, and Vernonia School District, where tests were scheduled without precise timing, users of illegal drugs could thus abstain for a period prior to testing long enough not to be detected. The Supreme Courtthus felt that the Georgia statute was not only unconstitutional, but procedurally flawed.
During oral arguments brought before the Court, justices questioned the respondent's attorney as to whether there were real indications that Georgia has special problems with drug abuse among state officeholders. Counsel for the respondent said, "No, there is no such evidence . . . and to be frank, there isno such problem as we sit here today." Accordingly, the justices held that there was no argument showing real need for establishing a suspicionless program of drug testing among nominees for state office. Thus, cases and rationaleon which the respondent based its defense were rendered impertinent to the facts of the case. In her final statement, Justice Ginsburg summarized the Court's characterization of Georgia's attempt to require drug testing for nominees running for state office. The justices almost unanimously agreed. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. The majority of justices held that the existence ofthe Georgia statute was "symbolic." They asserted that there existed no discernible "special" need that served the state's argument. Additionally, the Court concluded with this commentary: "We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as `reasonable.' But where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged."
The only justice who dissented, Chief Justice Rehnquist, thought that the majority opinion, "had been distorted with novelty of the case." Agreeing that the state of Georgia had reason to fear political leaders may succumb to drugabuse, Rehnquist pointed out that drug abuse is one of the most dangerous problems that exists in the United States, and therefore the state was presentedwith a potential dilemma that could not be ignored. It was not unreasonableto assume that usage of drugs might be extended even to candidates for publicoffice. Rehnquist therefore considered the Georgia statute a correct exercise of a state's legal right, under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, tocreate such a "prophylactic mechanism."
Impact
Although responding to a real, rather than perceived threat--that of illicitdrug use--the state of Georgia appeared to the Court as misguided in its attempt to force political nominees to prove their worthiness as candidates by submitting to drug testing. This case demonstrated how personal rights, protected by the Fourth Amendment, could not be infringed upon or overwhelmed even if a state was acting in response to what it perceived to be a justifiable threat. Because drug testing without suspicion qualified as a warrantless search(a fact uncontested among the lower courts as well), the U.S. Supreme Courtmaintained that the state had no compelling interest or "special needs" whichcould justify compelling candidates for political office to submit to drug testing. To do so constituted an invasion of reasonable expectations of privacy guaranteed under the Constitution when there existed little or no real threat that such strata of American society were especially prone to drug abuse.Neither was it appropriate to subject individuals to protocol that exceeded the ordinary needs of law enforcement. The public interest did not, under suchcircumstances, outweigh individual expectations of privacy. In reversing thedecisions of the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court further defined the limitations which states were compelled to observe when establishing drug testing mechanisms but outlined the constraints under which states could extend their Tenth Amendment right to set and administer electoral balloting within their jurisdiction.
Related Cases
Walker L. Chandler, et al.
Respondent
Zell D. Miller, Governor of Georgia
Petitioners' Claim
That Georgia's requirement for a negative urinalysis to qualify for candidacyviolated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and FourteenthAmendments.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Walker L. Chandler
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Patricia Guilday
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg (writing for the Court), Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens,Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
15 April 1997
Decision
The Court found that the state of Georgia violated the constitutional rightsof the petitioner because the negative drug test constituted a suspicionlesssearch.
Significance
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution gives states the right to set qualifications and protocol for state elections, the Court viewed Georgia's statute as an unreasonable, suspicionless search. Moreover, this decision definitively stipulated that regardless of purpose, in orderfor any state to engage in any act that involved suspicionless search there had to exist a viable, compelling government interest or special need to justify infringement on individual rights granted under the U.S. Constitution.
Political Nominees Challenged Mandatory Drug Testing
In 1990, the state of Georgia enacted a statute that required every candidatefor a designated state office to submit to a urinalysis drug test. Thus, Georgia became the first and only state that required drug screening for state office nominees. Test results had to be negative and verified by a state approved laboratory at least 30 days before balloting for nomination or election to state offices. (Candidates could choose whether to be tested in a laboratory approved by the state or by their own physician.)
Libertarian Party nominee for the office of lieutenant governor, Walker L. Chandler, and two other nominees of the Libertarian Party, believed that theirconstitutional right to privacy would be violated. They sought protection from what they felt constituted an unreasonable search. The action, filed in theU.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia claimed the "creators" of the statute inappropriately used state power under the U.S. Constitution's Tenth Amendment to enact their statute. Because the petitioners felt that their rights had been constitutionally violated, they requested declaratoryand injunctive relief barring implementation and enforcement of the act. Thedistrict court, however, refused their request to obtain a preliminary injunction; final judgment of the district court was also delayed until after theelection. When the court ultimately rendered its decision, the Georgia statute was upheld.
Chandler appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals; however, the court affirmed. (Interestingly, the circuit court cited as justification for its ruling the same three cases that the U.S. Supreme Court would claim as precedence which rendered the Georgia statute as unconstitutional.) Thecourt's opinion stated that although drug testing qualified as a search, thestate had compelling reason to have nominees for state office submit to drugtesting. The circuit panel further reasoned that the import of administrativeand policy decision-making in which elected officials engaged rendered the state's rationale as valid. Moreover, the state's "special needs" went beyondthe limits of normal law enforcement and so a warrant or reasonable suspicionwas not necessarily incident to the "search" (drug tests). Finally, being permitted to take tests in the office of their private physician, nominees could simply forfeit their candidacy if they tested positive; thus, the court felt that there existed no potential that an individual's privacy might be violated. The Eleventh Circuit Court ultimately ruled that the Georgia statute wasconstitutionally valid because the state's interests outweighed individual expectations of privacy.
State Cited Three Earlier Decisions Involving Drug Testing
When the case was argued before the Supreme Court, the state of Georgia focused on drug testing programs previously upheld by the Supreme Court. These included two cases decided in 1989. The first was Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. This case involved drug and alcohol tests performed on railway employees involved in train accidents and for those who violated particular safety rules. The second 1989 case was Treasury Employees v. Von Raab. The Treasury Employees case addressed the use of drug tests forU.S. Customs Service employees who sought transfer or promotion to certain positions. A third case cited as precedence had been decided in 1995, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, and concerned the use of random drug testing of students who participated in interscholastic sports.
These were the same cases cited and recognized by the Eleventh Circuit Courtas the examples of reasonable searches for the purpose of identifying drug abuse. Counsel for the state of Georgia reasoned that these related cases focused on a state's interest to have programs to prevent drug abuse in special circumstances wherein lack of testing could have a serious, deleterious effect.Counsel pointed out that, as written, the Georgia statute did not have any invasive elements since nominees submitted to testing in the privacy of theirown physician's office. Therefore the state could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. Finally, the respondent's attorney maintained that the existenceof such a statute was warranted because use of illicit drugs in society waspervasive, and could conceivably involve even candidates who ran for state office.
The U.S. Supreme Court based its decision on four points of law. The Court agreed with petitioners that the Georgia statute's requirements were unconstitutional because respondents failed to prove and justify their reasons for authoring such a statute. Justices did not consider as valid the respondent's claim that requirements for drug testing were reasonable because there was no "individualized suspicion of wrong doing" which justified unwarranted search and seizure (a description which even the lower court applied to the drug testing requirement). Further, the Court reasoned that a state's power under the Tenth Amendment to establish criteria and procedure for state elections did not entitle a state to challenge personal rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Majority of Justices Believed Testing Unnecessary
Justices specifically felt there were no "special needs" that permitted violation of Fourth Amendment rights which protect society against unreasonable searches; neither was there a proven, compelling necessity to require drug tests for nominees to the ballot. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg observed that personal rights "diminished for a symbol's sake" did not constitutea valid reason to infringe on personal rights of nominees. Justices found the respondent's arguments as spurious that there existed a potential for drugabuse among politicians. Instead, the majority opinion went on to reason, thestate's fears seemed more hypothetical than real. Nominees for state officewere exposed to the public, their conduct attracted the attention of societyand they were thus likely to find such exposure sufficient reason to refrainfrom drug use. Moreover, the Court felt that "state officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, and required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort." Furthermore the Court reasoned that Georgia's certification requirement did not succeed in its effort to identify drug abusers because tests were given with advance notice. Unlike Skinner, Treasury Employees, and Vernonia School District, where tests were scheduled without precise timing, users of illegal drugs could thus abstain for a period prior to testing long enough not to be detected. The Supreme Courtthus felt that the Georgia statute was not only unconstitutional, but procedurally flawed.
During oral arguments brought before the Court, justices questioned the respondent's attorney as to whether there were real indications that Georgia has special problems with drug abuse among state officeholders. Counsel for the respondent said, "No, there is no such evidence . . . and to be frank, there isno such problem as we sit here today." Accordingly, the justices held that there was no argument showing real need for establishing a suspicionless program of drug testing among nominees for state office. Thus, cases and rationaleon which the respondent based its defense were rendered impertinent to the facts of the case. In her final statement, Justice Ginsburg summarized the Court's characterization of Georgia's attempt to require drug testing for nominees running for state office. The justices almost unanimously agreed. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. The majority of justices held that the existence ofthe Georgia statute was "symbolic." They asserted that there existed no discernible "special" need that served the state's argument. Additionally, the Court concluded with this commentary: "We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as `reasonable.' But where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged."
The only justice who dissented, Chief Justice Rehnquist, thought that the majority opinion, "had been distorted with novelty of the case." Agreeing that the state of Georgia had reason to fear political leaders may succumb to drugabuse, Rehnquist pointed out that drug abuse is one of the most dangerous problems that exists in the United States, and therefore the state was presentedwith a potential dilemma that could not be ignored. It was not unreasonableto assume that usage of drugs might be extended even to candidates for publicoffice. Rehnquist therefore considered the Georgia statute a correct exercise of a state's legal right, under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, tocreate such a "prophylactic mechanism."
Impact
Although responding to a real, rather than perceived threat--that of illicitdrug use--the state of Georgia appeared to the Court as misguided in its attempt to force political nominees to prove their worthiness as candidates by submitting to drug testing. This case demonstrated how personal rights, protected by the Fourth Amendment, could not be infringed upon or overwhelmed even if a state was acting in response to what it perceived to be a justifiable threat. Because drug testing without suspicion qualified as a warrantless search(a fact uncontested among the lower courts as well), the U.S. Supreme Courtmaintained that the state had no compelling interest or "special needs" whichcould justify compelling candidates for political office to submit to drug testing. To do so constituted an invasion of reasonable expectations of privacy guaranteed under the Constitution when there existed little or no real threat that such strata of American society were especially prone to drug abuse.Neither was it appropriate to subject individuals to protocol that exceeded the ordinary needs of law enforcement. The public interest did not, under suchcircumstances, outweigh individual expectations of privacy. In reversing thedecisions of the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court further defined the limitations which states were compelled to observe when establishing drug testing mechanisms but outlined the constraints under which states could extend their Tenth Amendment right to set and administer electoral balloting within their jurisdiction.
Related Cases
- Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
- Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
- Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
- Vernonia School Distict 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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