Petitioner
State of Maryland
Respondent
Jerry Lee Wilson
Petitioner's Claim
Maryland maintained that passengers of a vehicle should be expected to exit avehicle when requested by a law officer.
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Anthony M. Kennedy, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
16 February 1997
Decision
The Supreme Court held that it was consistent with the Fourth Amendment for an officer making a traffic stop to order passengers to get out of the vehicleuntil the completion of the stop.
Significance
The ruling determined that a police officer has the right to order the passenger of a vehicle out of the car during a traffic stop. Previously, this law had only extended to the driver of the vehicle, due to probable cause when thedriver had committed a traffic violation. The determination to extend this law to cover the passenger as well was primarily based on the added safety risk placed on an officer by passengers of motor vehicles. Justices Stevens andKennedy dissented, stating that aspects of Maryland v. Wilson had notbeen properly preserved and were therefore not relevant to the Supreme Court.They also stated that the extension of this law to cover passengers of vehicles infringed on Fourth Amendment issues due to lack of evidence that the passenger presented any risk to the officer.
A Maryland state trooper witnessed a car, bearing a torn shred of paper withthe name of a car rental agency written on it instead of a license tag, driving over the posted speed limit. After a brief pursuit of one and a half miles, the car finally pulled over. Aside from the driver, two passengers could beseen in the car, each looking repeatedly back at the trooper, then ducking below sight level, only to glance back up moments later. As the trooper approached the car, the driver climbed out and met the trooper halfway, carrying avalid driver's license. The trooper instructed the driver to return to the car and gather the car's rental papers. As the driver sat behind the wheel, looking for the documents, the trooper noticed that the passenger occupying thefront seat appeared quite nervous. He asked this passenger to exit the vehicle. As the passenger exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. The trooper immediately arrested the passenger, Jerry Lee Wilson, under the charge of "possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute."
The case was brought to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. Before the trial began Wilson moved to suppress the evidence, stating that the trooper's order amounted to an unjustifiable seizure under the FourthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution. The circuit court granted the motion tosuppress. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland declared that apolice officer may order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle (as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms),but this procedure did not extend to the passengers. On certiorari this case was referred to the Supreme Court.
A Bright Line Rule?
The argument surrounding this case became an issue of police officer safety verses a constitutional right. In determining whether or not the Maryland v. Wilson case constituted an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights, theSupreme Court studied the case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977). In 1977 Harry Mimms was detained during a routine traffic stop due to an expired license plate. The officer asked Mimms to step out of the car, whereupon the officer noticed a bulge in Mimms's jacket that turned out to be a .38-caliberrevolver. The officer arrested Mimms for carrying a concealed deadly weapon.Like Wilson, Mimms also called for the suppression of evidence due to unreasonable seizure because of the officer's order to exit the vehicle. And, like as in Maryland v. Wilson, the court allowed this suppression. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the rights provided under the Fourth Amendment were subject to a "reasonableness that depend[ed] on a balance between thepublic interest and the individual's right to personal security . . . " (Terry v. Ohio 1968). It was noted that Mimms's actions had not been suspicious, but that it was the arresting officer's habit to order all drivers outof their vehicles as a "precautionary measure" to protect the officer's safety.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution proclaims the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A fundamental question arose as to what situations would allow probablecause for a legal search and seizure.
In each case the officer was required to rapidly assess the situation and actaccordingly. This "unfettered discretion" came under fire by many Supreme Court justices. It was referred to as a bright line rule, a " . . . rule or principle that is simple and straightforward; a rule that avoids or ignores ambiguity." It was feared that if the practice of ordering passengers from vehicles became standard police routine that an unnecessary invasion of the rightsof innocent citizens was inevitable.
A Matter of Safety
Attorney General Janet Reno presented what would be the strongest argument infavor of allowing officers to order passengers from lawfully stopped vehicles. Her primary concern revolved around police safety. In 1994, there were 5,762 officers assaulted in traffic stops. It was noted that there had been a 17-percent drop in fatalities of this nature since the Mimms decision. Reno essentially stated that an officer was at a reduced risk of danger if hecould see the passenger.
At the heart of the case was the issue of passengers always being considereddangerous. It was reasoned that the passenger in an automobile would be quitelikely to know the driver in some way, and that only under statistically rare circumstances would the passenger be a stranger to the driver. Under this rationale a certain connection between the passenger and the driver could be predicted. The passenger would be aware of what was happening inside the vehicle and would therefore be aware of any illegal activity on the part of the driver. That the vehicle contained more than one occupant was enough to createan increase in risk to the officer. With this in mind it was reasoned that the safety of a police officer would be greatly enhanced if the passenger was ordered to stand outside of the vehicle.
The ramifications this would have on personal liberty were considered. Giventhe situation, it is obvious that the passengers "are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle." The only difference produced by the officer'sorder to exit the car was simply that the passenger would now be outside, instead of inside, the vehicle. By placing the passenger(s) outside of the vehicle, the officer would effectively deny access to any concealed weapons hidden in the vehicle. This action also allowed the officer to more easily determine if the passenger posed a threat as he would now be able to see the passenger completely. It was determined by most of the Supreme Court justices that the amount of safety granted by this action significantly outweighed the minorconstitutional infringement placed on the passenger.
Differing Opinions
Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented from this decision. Justice Stevens'sprimary concern stemmed from the millions of other cases that would be affected by this decision. The ordering of passengers would apply equally to legally stopped traffic vehicles in which there was absolutely no sign of potentialrisk to the police officer. He pointed out that statistics did not carry thenumber of how many assaults on officers were carried out by passengers. Likewise, no statistics were found showing that the ratio of assaults was lower in jurisdictions that allowed officers to order passengers out of vehicles. Justice Stevens argued that the sheer volume of annual routine traffic stops (in comparison with the relatively low number of stops that placed an officer at risk) would render the ruling of Maryland v. Wilson as a constitutional burden on passengers. "In all events," he stated, "the aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substantial, and which in my view clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by the majority [of justices]." He believedthat innocent passengers had a constitutional right to decide whether or notto remain in the vehicle. In Maryland v. Wilson the evidence as to why the officer ordered the passenger from the vehicle could not be preserved,since it was of a visual, not a physical nature. Therefore, the evidence concerning Wilson's agitated activity was not considered relevant.
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens, and added that the discretion ofthe officer was valid to the success of this ruling. Even with this discretion, Kennedy pointed out that complaints from citizens and possible politicalintervention could end the practice of ordering passengers from vehicles. "Liberty comes not from officials by grace but from the Constitution by right,"he stated in his opinion.
Impact
The ramifications of this case solidified the procedure used by police officers during traffic stops. The issue of officer safety verses the constitutional rights of citizens will most likely remain a hot point of conflict, and notjust in the area of traffic stops. Because of the virtually endless possibilities that arise during an event requiring police attention it becomes impossible to avoid. Certain situations demand certain actions and if these actionsresult in minor constitutional infringements committed in the course of saving a life, it is possible that the Supreme Court will see many more cases similar to Maryland v. Wilson.
Related Cases
State of Maryland
Respondent
Jerry Lee Wilson
Petitioner's Claim
Maryland maintained that passengers of a vehicle should be expected to exit avehicle when requested by a law officer.
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Anthony M. Kennedy, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
16 February 1997
Decision
The Supreme Court held that it was consistent with the Fourth Amendment for an officer making a traffic stop to order passengers to get out of the vehicleuntil the completion of the stop.
Significance
The ruling determined that a police officer has the right to order the passenger of a vehicle out of the car during a traffic stop. Previously, this law had only extended to the driver of the vehicle, due to probable cause when thedriver had committed a traffic violation. The determination to extend this law to cover the passenger as well was primarily based on the added safety risk placed on an officer by passengers of motor vehicles. Justices Stevens andKennedy dissented, stating that aspects of Maryland v. Wilson had notbeen properly preserved and were therefore not relevant to the Supreme Court.They also stated that the extension of this law to cover passengers of vehicles infringed on Fourth Amendment issues due to lack of evidence that the passenger presented any risk to the officer.
A Maryland state trooper witnessed a car, bearing a torn shred of paper withthe name of a car rental agency written on it instead of a license tag, driving over the posted speed limit. After a brief pursuit of one and a half miles, the car finally pulled over. Aside from the driver, two passengers could beseen in the car, each looking repeatedly back at the trooper, then ducking below sight level, only to glance back up moments later. As the trooper approached the car, the driver climbed out and met the trooper halfway, carrying avalid driver's license. The trooper instructed the driver to return to the car and gather the car's rental papers. As the driver sat behind the wheel, looking for the documents, the trooper noticed that the passenger occupying thefront seat appeared quite nervous. He asked this passenger to exit the vehicle. As the passenger exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. The trooper immediately arrested the passenger, Jerry Lee Wilson, under the charge of "possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute."
The case was brought to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. Before the trial began Wilson moved to suppress the evidence, stating that the trooper's order amounted to an unjustifiable seizure under the FourthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution. The circuit court granted the motion tosuppress. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland declared that apolice officer may order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle (as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms),but this procedure did not extend to the passengers. On certiorari this case was referred to the Supreme Court.
A Bright Line Rule?
The argument surrounding this case became an issue of police officer safety verses a constitutional right. In determining whether or not the Maryland v. Wilson case constituted an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights, theSupreme Court studied the case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977). In 1977 Harry Mimms was detained during a routine traffic stop due to an expired license plate. The officer asked Mimms to step out of the car, whereupon the officer noticed a bulge in Mimms's jacket that turned out to be a .38-caliberrevolver. The officer arrested Mimms for carrying a concealed deadly weapon.Like Wilson, Mimms also called for the suppression of evidence due to unreasonable seizure because of the officer's order to exit the vehicle. And, like as in Maryland v. Wilson, the court allowed this suppression. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the rights provided under the Fourth Amendment were subject to a "reasonableness that depend[ed] on a balance between thepublic interest and the individual's right to personal security . . . " (Terry v. Ohio 1968). It was noted that Mimms's actions had not been suspicious, but that it was the arresting officer's habit to order all drivers outof their vehicles as a "precautionary measure" to protect the officer's safety.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution proclaims the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A fundamental question arose as to what situations would allow probablecause for a legal search and seizure.
In each case the officer was required to rapidly assess the situation and actaccordingly. This "unfettered discretion" came under fire by many Supreme Court justices. It was referred to as a bright line rule, a " . . . rule or principle that is simple and straightforward; a rule that avoids or ignores ambiguity." It was feared that if the practice of ordering passengers from vehicles became standard police routine that an unnecessary invasion of the rightsof innocent citizens was inevitable.
A Matter of Safety
Attorney General Janet Reno presented what would be the strongest argument infavor of allowing officers to order passengers from lawfully stopped vehicles. Her primary concern revolved around police safety. In 1994, there were 5,762 officers assaulted in traffic stops. It was noted that there had been a 17-percent drop in fatalities of this nature since the Mimms decision. Reno essentially stated that an officer was at a reduced risk of danger if hecould see the passenger.
At the heart of the case was the issue of passengers always being considereddangerous. It was reasoned that the passenger in an automobile would be quitelikely to know the driver in some way, and that only under statistically rare circumstances would the passenger be a stranger to the driver. Under this rationale a certain connection between the passenger and the driver could be predicted. The passenger would be aware of what was happening inside the vehicle and would therefore be aware of any illegal activity on the part of the driver. That the vehicle contained more than one occupant was enough to createan increase in risk to the officer. With this in mind it was reasoned that the safety of a police officer would be greatly enhanced if the passenger was ordered to stand outside of the vehicle.
The ramifications this would have on personal liberty were considered. Giventhe situation, it is obvious that the passengers "are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle." The only difference produced by the officer'sorder to exit the car was simply that the passenger would now be outside, instead of inside, the vehicle. By placing the passenger(s) outside of the vehicle, the officer would effectively deny access to any concealed weapons hidden in the vehicle. This action also allowed the officer to more easily determine if the passenger posed a threat as he would now be able to see the passenger completely. It was determined by most of the Supreme Court justices that the amount of safety granted by this action significantly outweighed the minorconstitutional infringement placed on the passenger.
Differing Opinions
Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented from this decision. Justice Stevens'sprimary concern stemmed from the millions of other cases that would be affected by this decision. The ordering of passengers would apply equally to legally stopped traffic vehicles in which there was absolutely no sign of potentialrisk to the police officer. He pointed out that statistics did not carry thenumber of how many assaults on officers were carried out by passengers. Likewise, no statistics were found showing that the ratio of assaults was lower in jurisdictions that allowed officers to order passengers out of vehicles. Justice Stevens argued that the sheer volume of annual routine traffic stops (in comparison with the relatively low number of stops that placed an officer at risk) would render the ruling of Maryland v. Wilson as a constitutional burden on passengers. "In all events," he stated, "the aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substantial, and which in my view clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by the majority [of justices]." He believedthat innocent passengers had a constitutional right to decide whether or notto remain in the vehicle. In Maryland v. Wilson the evidence as to why the officer ordered the passenger from the vehicle could not be preserved,since it was of a visual, not a physical nature. Therefore, the evidence concerning Wilson's agitated activity was not considered relevant.
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens, and added that the discretion ofthe officer was valid to the success of this ruling. Even with this discretion, Kennedy pointed out that complaints from citizens and possible politicalintervention could end the practice of ordering passengers from vehicles. "Liberty comes not from officials by grace but from the Constitution by right,"he stated in his opinion.
Impact
The ramifications of this case solidified the procedure used by police officers during traffic stops. The issue of officer safety verses the constitutional rights of citizens will most likely remain a hot point of conflict, and notjust in the area of traffic stops. Because of the virtually endless possibilities that arise during an event requiring police attention it becomes impossible to avoid. Certain situations demand certain actions and if these actionsresult in minor constitutional infringements committed in the course of saving a life, it is possible that the Supreme Court will see many more cases similar to Maryland v. Wilson.
Related Cases
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
- United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
- Ohio v. Robinette, 433 U.S. 562 (1996).
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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