Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

Petitioner
David H. Lucas
Respondent
South Carolina Coastal Council
Petitioner's Claim
The South Carolina State Beachfront Management Act deprived the petitioner ofprofitable use of his property by prohibiting construction of new dwellingson his parcels. Thus, it must compensate the petitioner.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
A. Camden Lewis
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
C. C. Harness III
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia(writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
29 June 1992
Decision
The Court ruled that the petitioner suffered a "taking;" his property was rendered "valueless" by South Carolina statute and he was thus entitled to "justcompensation."
Significance
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that state regulations "were designed to prevent serious public harm," the U.S. Supreme Court held thatwhen a property owner suffered a "taking," there were no exceptions from common rule (the Takings Clause and the Just Compensation Clause). Furthermore, when the state of South Carolina amended their original statute by including provisions that might permit limited construction, the U.S. Supreme Court heldthat a property owner must still be compensated. Even when legislation laterrenders the initial act less restrictive, property owners still suffer fromthe original effects of a taking, thus, just compensation must be rendered.
In 1972, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act in order to protectthe state's shoreline from coastal erosion. After five years, South Carolinaissued its own Coastal Zone Management Act in order to protect the shorelinefrom erosion, preserve the beach/dune system and prevent further coastal damage. The act stipulated that before construction could take place in any designated, environmentally-sensitive "critical area," an owner had to obtain permission from the South Carolina Coastal Council. In 1977, the "critical area"was not large and construction was prohibited only along a narrow zone of thecoast. David H. Lucas (the petitioner) bought two residential lots on the South Carolina coast in 1986 (Isle of Palms, Charleston County) for about $900,000. He planned to build single-family homes similar to those on nearby parcels. However, the next year, after a survey gave evidence that beaches of South Carolina were "critically eroding," South Carolina issued the Beachfront Management Act (BMA). The statute placed broad restraints on use along the South Carolina shoreline. Because the "critical area" was extended (on which there was a building ban), Lucas's recently purchased plots were affected. No exceptions were provided. (At the time Lucas bought his parcels, that particularzone was not subject to any construction ban, therefore he was not requiredto have a permit to build a residential development.
Lucas submitted his suit to the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. He believed that his property was rendered worthless, hence he required "just compensation" (a constitutionally guaranteed practice that requires proper compensation for property the government obtains in a "taking.") As petitioner, he asserted that the South Carolina Coastal Council action infringed on his constitutional rights according to the Fifth Amendment (the Takings Clause) becauseno restrictions against building were effective at the time when he purchased his lots. He did not dispute the legitimacy of Coastal Council's efforts topreserve the shoreline from further destruction, but he felt entitled to compensation because his property was rendered "valueless" by what constituted,in effect, a government regulatory "taking."
The attorney for the respondent argued that the South Carolina coast was an extremely precious public resource; therefore, there existed a justifiable public interest in prohibiting further construction along natural resources likebeach/dune shoreline areas. Because public interest outweighed personal claims to property, the South Carolina Coastal Council opposed the Lucas's claim.Furthermore, previous cases suggested that reimbursement was not necessary when noxious and destructive uses of property were recognized and prohibited by the government. Finally, counsel for the respondent argued that Lucas's claim was not "ripe." Lucas had not petitioned the Coastal Council for permission to use his land and therefore had not exhausted all legal avenues.
The (lower) trial court thought that because "prohibition deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots and rendered them valueless," the respondent was obliged to pay more than one million dollars "just compensation."The Supreme Court of South Carolina rescinded that judgment, reasoning that the Beachfront Management Act was intended to preserve South Carolina beachesand that additional construction would imperil the eroding coastal environment. Believing the taking was designed "to prevent serious public harm," the Court cited a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Mugler v. Kansas (1887), stipulating that when government applied its power to preclude "noxious use of property" no owing under the Taking Clause existed.
When the case finally came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority opinion rejected the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The existenceof "constitutional limits" barred deprivation of real estate by irregular "takings." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment established clear procedure outliningcircumstances when compensation must be extended. Particularly, compensationwas required when a physical confiscation of property occurred and "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of property."
Finding South Carolina inappropriately took private property without compensation, the Court was particularly disturbed by the inference that a public interest or "common good" rationalized lack of compensation. All appropriationsthat diminished viable use of belongings constituted a taking. Moreover, theCourt found the respondent's reliance on cases where compensation was avoidedby practicing a reasonable "state's police power" failed to evidence an "objective conception of noxiousness" in order to exercise an exception from justcompensation. The majority justices also emphasized that a thin line separated "harm-preventing" and "benefit-conferring" in order to justify departure from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment regulations regarding takings and justcompensation. But the "noxious-use logic" was not designed as a way for government to avoid compensation.
Further, the majority stressed "noxious-use justification cannot be the basisfor departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated." Consequently, if "noxious-use logic" was considered a reference point, constitutional constraints under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (that "taking" must be compensated) would be violated. Thus, the justices reasoned that precluding "permanent physical occupation" of property through "confiscatory regulations" (regulations that made all beneficial use of property impossible) as claimed by the petitioner constituted a taking.
The heart of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision held that traditional understandings about private property and its economical, beneficial use should be respected. The state could have an interest, in certain circumstances, to takeproperty or to prescribe regulations that could devalue property or use of belongings; however, American history (dating back to property rights objections voiced in the Declaration of Independence) required just compensation. Ultimately such "common law principles" could not justify infringing on the petitioner's rights--the Court found it inconceivable that the respondent could merely suggest the petitioner's rights were incompatible with public interest and thereby avoid compensation as ordained by the Constitution.
In writing the opinion for dissenting justices, Justice Blackmun pointed outthat the state had the authority to uphold South Carolina General Assembly legislation addressing evident coastal ruination and attempts to protect it. The Beachfront Management Act (BMA) clearly underscored the importance of the beach/dune system in "protecting life and property by serving as a storm barrier which dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in aneconomical and effective manner." Thus, the minority reasoned it appropriateto recognize that the continued developments in places adjacent to the seashore "jeopardize the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endanger adjacent property." Accordingly, the noncompensated taking of Lucas's land was reasonable. Justice Blackmun emphasized that, inherently, an owner's use of property had to be unhazardous to the community; therefore regulations which the government used to safeguard the "common welfare" did not require compensation. The state's intent was only to "minimize damage to coastal areas" and to "prevent serious injury to the community"; thus, he concludedthat the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct in finding that no takinghad occurred. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the council never made a determination as to whether Lucas's lots were in a "critical area" and inappropriate for construction; Lucas had never applied for a "special permit" nor for additional consideration about natural conditions on his parcelsthat might permit erecting habitation without damaging the environment. (Infact, Lucas had stated that his company produced a study showing the land was"perfectly safe to build on.") The minority opinion, therefore, disagreed that Lucas suffered "total" damage due to restrictions on the use of his property. Moreover, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the state had "full power to prohibit an owner's use of property if it is harmful to the public." Thus, economic loss to an owner could not prevail over the interest of government to restrict harmful use of real estate.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion supporting the dissenting opinion. He ultimately concluded that the BMA had no other intention than to protect the beach/dune system. Further, since the substantial purpose of South Carolina's Legislature was within the limits of restricting land use for general public safety, the BMA did not amount to a property taking and compensation was not appropriate.
Impact
Dissenting opinion notwithstanding, the provisions of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses of the Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments wereupheld by the Supreme Court as immutable rules which ensured that property could not be taken without fair market compensation. In this instance, Lucas'sproperty was not physically taken but because it was rendered valueless, Lucas was entitled to compensation. South Carolina thus failed in its ambition to avoid reimbursement by characterizing actions as a restriction of "public nuisances" to prevent "noxious uses of property." The majority opinion held that takings of property, even if regulatory, must be compensated and that payment could not be avoided even if the state recognized, in some circumstances,that there existed a need to prevent "public harm" or support a public needto preserve the natural environment. In weighing private and public interestsin this issue, economic loss (private property rendered idle) could not be justified even if the government found sufficient interest to prohibit activities or specific kinds of use of private land. The Court summarily held that the Takings Clause (of the Fifth Amendment) could not be lawfully applied without the payment of just compensation.
Related Cases

• Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
  
• Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
  
• Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
  
• First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of LosAngeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

Coastal Zones and the Law of the Sea
The United States has long been a jealous guardian of its coastal boundaries.Its inaccessibility to foreign invaders has helped keep it safe from outsidemilitary forces since the War of 1812. Long before that war, in 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson formulated a principle that became a legal convention long before it was ever memorialized by statute: that the American "territorial sea" extended to three nautical miles beyond its shoreline. Thus anyone operating a vessel within three miles of America's shores was subject toU.S. law.
The closest America came to foreign invasion after 1812 was during World WarII, when cruising Axis vessels on both coasts posed a threat to the nation. After the war was over, President Harry S. Truman in 1945 declared that the territorial sea extended beyond the three-mile limit, all the way to the edge of the continental shelf from which the sea floor rapidly slopes off into deepocean. Other countries supported this idea--and several asserted their own territorial sea extensions to the continental shelf. This the United States opposed, and over subsequent decades the United Nations would hold three different Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to adjudicate international disputes about territorial waters and other aspects of maritime law.
Sources
Jentleson, Bruce W. and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.