Petitioners
Michigan Department of State Police, et al.
Respondents
Rick Sitz, et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That the lower court had erred in ruling roadside sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Thomas L. Casey
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Mark Granzotto
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 June 1990
Decision
That sobriety checkpoints do not violate constitutional rights.
Significance
The ruling gave state authorities a powerful tool for curbing drunk driving,as it allowed police to stop all cars at checkpoints and look for drunken drivers. This stop is a "reasonable" seizure under the Fourth Amendment, since the checkpoints are an effective way to reduce drunk driving, reducing drunk driving is a legitimate state concern, and the sobriety checks are not intrusive on drivers.
In May of 1986, Michigan State Police set up a sobriety checkpoint along a stretch of Saginaw County highway in a publicized campaign to combat drunk driving. It was the state's first and only such action, and had been prompted byMichigan Governor James J. Blanchard, who had suggested adoption of the program a few months earlier in his State of the State address. Nationwide, alcohol-related fatalities topped 23,000 annually during the 1980s, though these figures were steadily declining as anti-drunk-driving campaigns and other deterrent programs, such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving), became more commonplace.
Sobriety checkpoints had been used in other states with mixed results. Opponents argued that the rate of arrest was insignificant compared to the inconvenience presented to motorists, not to mention the tax dollars used. Supportersof the program asserted that if a checkpoint found just one percent of a hundred drivers detained to be driving under the influence, that might yield atleast one innocent life saved from a fatal collision. Checkpoint advocates also argued that the program's true effectiveness lay in deterring intoxicatedpeople from getting behind the wheel of a car. Such programs had been challenged in other state courts, with varied outcomes: some judges had declared them unconstitutional on the basis that unreasonable search and seizure violatedFourth Amendment rights; other courts upheld them.
One Checkpoint Attempt
In Michigan's case, an advisory committee consisting of both law enforcementand civilian transportation experts met to set specific guidelines for the location, techniques used, and advance publicity about a sobriety checkpoint program. These were cautiously devised parameters that tried to follow constitutional precedents, after the committee members had examined the elements of others states' sobriety checkpoints that had been declared illegal by the courts. A computer was utilized to pinpoint state roads with high alcohol-relatedaccident statistics, and on a rainy night in May of 1986 the State Police conducted a 75-minute checkpoint on Dixie Highway in Saginaw County.
For the 126 vehicles that came through the checkpoint, the average delay was25 seconds. Drivers were briefly appraised for signs of intoxication by meansof innocuous conversation. If a driver was suspected of intoxication, he orshe was directed to another nearby spot off the highway, where their licenseand registration were requested and examined by another officer; this officercould also conduct further sobriety tests. Of the 126 drivers, two were detained, and one of those two was found to be driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver attempted to drive through the checkpoint, but was pursued and found to be intoxicated.
Challenged Immediately
The day before the checkpoint program was initiated, the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court on behalf of a group of licensed Michigan drivers opposed to sobriety checkpoints. The "Sitz" name inthe case belonged to Rick Sitz, a state representative in Michigan's House. The petitioners sought an injunction against such checkpoints, and Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Michael L. Stacey granted it. Stacey questioned whethercheckpoints were effective in deterring drunk drivers, and asserted that their power to strike fear in law-abiding citizens far outweighed any effectiveness factor. Still other opponents of the checkpoints argued that they were too costly; they required several officers and patrol cars in order to slow down, then stop drivers, and then more officers to conduct off-road sobriety tests; a similar detention rate of 1 percent could also be accomplished by two officers merely sitting in a parked patrol car observing traffic.
Brown v. Texas
The Michigan State Police then filed an appeal with the Michigan State Courtof Appeals. Like the lower court, this judicial body used the Brown v. Texas balancing test. Brown, named after a U.S. Supreme Court decision, provided guidelines for establishing the constitutionality of intrusions onto citizens' rights against unreasonable search and seizure. (It had alreadybeen determined that stopping an automobile constituted "seizure," and courts had ruled that a person inside a car does not have the same privacy rightsas someone inside a house.) Brown asked if the gravity of public concerns justified the seizure. In this case, alcohol-related traffic deaths weredescribed as a cause for public concern, and the sobriety checkpoints were designed to keep all citizens safe on the road. Brown also queried to what degree the seizure advanced the public interest--whether sobriety checkpoints actually worked. Finally, the third question of the balancing test dealtwith just how far an intrusion, or inconvenience, a sobriety checkpoint presented to the normal, law-abiding motorist.
In 1988, the Michigan State Court of Appeals decided in favor of upholding Stacey's decision banning checkpoints. State Attorney General Frank Kelley appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the ruling and allow reinstatementof the checkpoints. It would be the first such case dealing with sobriety checkpoints heard before the Court. Since the Michigan program had been carefully conceived to circumvent legal challenges, other states anticipated the decision--if the High Court declared Michigan's program unconstitutional, it wasunlikely any other version of the checkpoint would ever be allowed. Twenty-eight other state attorney generals filed briefs in support of the Michigan State Police's appeal, as did an insurance-industry group and the grass-roots organization Mothers Against Drunk Driving.
What About Airport Checkpoints?
The Court's position was to determine whether the sobriety checkpoint programviolated the Fourth Amendment--outlawing unreasonable search and seizure--aswell as the Fourteenth Amendment--which prevents states from enacting laws that violate citizens' other constitutional rights. Challenges against unreasonable search and seizure had been argued before. For instance, a person who enters the United States at a border crossing can expect to be briefly detained and questioned; the same holds true for those passing through security gates into airport boarding areas. Such controls--to deter the entry of illegal aliens, and to prevent firearms or explosives from being carried onto planes--are considered valid since their ultimate goal in advancing the public interest outweighs their inconvenience to the average citizen thusly detained.
The Decision
The Court, ruling on 14 June 1990, overturned the Michigan courts' decisionsby a vote of 6-3. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that such "seizures" were indeed reasonable, even though the one percent detention rate seemed minuscule. Rehnquist noted that the inconvenience presented tomotorists was a slight one, and was superseded by the sobriety checkpoint'sgoal in deterring crime. Furthermore, in the end such statistics, Rehnquist and the other justices noted, were unable to support the argument--the one percent rate could only point up drunk driving arrests, not the number of drivers deterred from operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The High Court's decision was the first ever to support the actions of law-enforcement officials to detain individuals without any prior suspicion of wrongdoing. The three dissenting votes came from Justices Marshall, Brennan, andStevens. In his dissenting brief, Stevens called sobriety checkpoints "publicity stunts." Brennan and Marshall argued that such tactics, based on instilling elements of fear and surprise in citizens, were the cornerstones of authoritarian governments.
Related Cases
Drunk Driving Statistics
Sources
Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics--1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1997.
Michigan Department of State Police, et al.
Respondents
Rick Sitz, et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That the lower court had erred in ruling roadside sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Thomas L. Casey
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Mark Granzotto
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 June 1990
Decision
That sobriety checkpoints do not violate constitutional rights.
Significance
The ruling gave state authorities a powerful tool for curbing drunk driving,as it allowed police to stop all cars at checkpoints and look for drunken drivers. This stop is a "reasonable" seizure under the Fourth Amendment, since the checkpoints are an effective way to reduce drunk driving, reducing drunk driving is a legitimate state concern, and the sobriety checks are not intrusive on drivers.
In May of 1986, Michigan State Police set up a sobriety checkpoint along a stretch of Saginaw County highway in a publicized campaign to combat drunk driving. It was the state's first and only such action, and had been prompted byMichigan Governor James J. Blanchard, who had suggested adoption of the program a few months earlier in his State of the State address. Nationwide, alcohol-related fatalities topped 23,000 annually during the 1980s, though these figures were steadily declining as anti-drunk-driving campaigns and other deterrent programs, such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving), became more commonplace.
Sobriety checkpoints had been used in other states with mixed results. Opponents argued that the rate of arrest was insignificant compared to the inconvenience presented to motorists, not to mention the tax dollars used. Supportersof the program asserted that if a checkpoint found just one percent of a hundred drivers detained to be driving under the influence, that might yield atleast one innocent life saved from a fatal collision. Checkpoint advocates also argued that the program's true effectiveness lay in deterring intoxicatedpeople from getting behind the wheel of a car. Such programs had been challenged in other state courts, with varied outcomes: some judges had declared them unconstitutional on the basis that unreasonable search and seizure violatedFourth Amendment rights; other courts upheld them.
One Checkpoint Attempt
In Michigan's case, an advisory committee consisting of both law enforcementand civilian transportation experts met to set specific guidelines for the location, techniques used, and advance publicity about a sobriety checkpoint program. These were cautiously devised parameters that tried to follow constitutional precedents, after the committee members had examined the elements of others states' sobriety checkpoints that had been declared illegal by the courts. A computer was utilized to pinpoint state roads with high alcohol-relatedaccident statistics, and on a rainy night in May of 1986 the State Police conducted a 75-minute checkpoint on Dixie Highway in Saginaw County.
For the 126 vehicles that came through the checkpoint, the average delay was25 seconds. Drivers were briefly appraised for signs of intoxication by meansof innocuous conversation. If a driver was suspected of intoxication, he orshe was directed to another nearby spot off the highway, where their licenseand registration were requested and examined by another officer; this officercould also conduct further sobriety tests. Of the 126 drivers, two were detained, and one of those two was found to be driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver attempted to drive through the checkpoint, but was pursued and found to be intoxicated.
Challenged Immediately
The day before the checkpoint program was initiated, the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court on behalf of a group of licensed Michigan drivers opposed to sobriety checkpoints. The "Sitz" name inthe case belonged to Rick Sitz, a state representative in Michigan's House. The petitioners sought an injunction against such checkpoints, and Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Michael L. Stacey granted it. Stacey questioned whethercheckpoints were effective in deterring drunk drivers, and asserted that their power to strike fear in law-abiding citizens far outweighed any effectiveness factor. Still other opponents of the checkpoints argued that they were too costly; they required several officers and patrol cars in order to slow down, then stop drivers, and then more officers to conduct off-road sobriety tests; a similar detention rate of 1 percent could also be accomplished by two officers merely sitting in a parked patrol car observing traffic.
Brown v. Texas
The Michigan State Police then filed an appeal with the Michigan State Courtof Appeals. Like the lower court, this judicial body used the Brown v. Texas balancing test. Brown, named after a U.S. Supreme Court decision, provided guidelines for establishing the constitutionality of intrusions onto citizens' rights against unreasonable search and seizure. (It had alreadybeen determined that stopping an automobile constituted "seizure," and courts had ruled that a person inside a car does not have the same privacy rightsas someone inside a house.) Brown asked if the gravity of public concerns justified the seizure. In this case, alcohol-related traffic deaths weredescribed as a cause for public concern, and the sobriety checkpoints were designed to keep all citizens safe on the road. Brown also queried to what degree the seizure advanced the public interest--whether sobriety checkpoints actually worked. Finally, the third question of the balancing test dealtwith just how far an intrusion, or inconvenience, a sobriety checkpoint presented to the normal, law-abiding motorist.
In 1988, the Michigan State Court of Appeals decided in favor of upholding Stacey's decision banning checkpoints. State Attorney General Frank Kelley appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the ruling and allow reinstatementof the checkpoints. It would be the first such case dealing with sobriety checkpoints heard before the Court. Since the Michigan program had been carefully conceived to circumvent legal challenges, other states anticipated the decision--if the High Court declared Michigan's program unconstitutional, it wasunlikely any other version of the checkpoint would ever be allowed. Twenty-eight other state attorney generals filed briefs in support of the Michigan State Police's appeal, as did an insurance-industry group and the grass-roots organization Mothers Against Drunk Driving.
What About Airport Checkpoints?
The Court's position was to determine whether the sobriety checkpoint programviolated the Fourth Amendment--outlawing unreasonable search and seizure--aswell as the Fourteenth Amendment--which prevents states from enacting laws that violate citizens' other constitutional rights. Challenges against unreasonable search and seizure had been argued before. For instance, a person who enters the United States at a border crossing can expect to be briefly detained and questioned; the same holds true for those passing through security gates into airport boarding areas. Such controls--to deter the entry of illegal aliens, and to prevent firearms or explosives from being carried onto planes--are considered valid since their ultimate goal in advancing the public interest outweighs their inconvenience to the average citizen thusly detained.
The Decision
The Court, ruling on 14 June 1990, overturned the Michigan courts' decisionsby a vote of 6-3. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that such "seizures" were indeed reasonable, even though the one percent detention rate seemed minuscule. Rehnquist noted that the inconvenience presented tomotorists was a slight one, and was superseded by the sobriety checkpoint'sgoal in deterring crime. Furthermore, in the end such statistics, Rehnquist and the other justices noted, were unable to support the argument--the one percent rate could only point up drunk driving arrests, not the number of drivers deterred from operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The High Court's decision was the first ever to support the actions of law-enforcement officials to detain individuals without any prior suspicion of wrongdoing. The three dissenting votes came from Justices Marshall, Brennan, andStevens. In his dissenting brief, Stevens called sobriety checkpoints "publicity stunts." Brennan and Marshall argued that such tactics, based on instilling elements of fear and surprise in citizens, were the cornerstones of authoritarian governments.
Related Cases
- Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
- United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Drunk Driving Statistics
- In 1982, 43,945 people in the United States died in car crashes, less than 11,000 deaths short of the entire American body count for the VietnamWar. In 1988, the death toll climbed to a high of 47,087, and in 1992 it dropped to 39,250; by 1995, it was at 41,798.
- The number of annual traffic fatalities caused by alcohol has decreased by nearly 32 percent, from 25,165 in 1982 to 17,274 in 1995. As a percentage of traffic fatalities, alcohol-related crashes dropped from 57 percent in 1982 to 41 percent in 1995.
- Transportation Department figures also show that whereas the numbers of alcohol-related traffic fatalities have decreased for persons in younger age groups, they have generally increased for older people.
- Almost 3,000 drivers in the 75 and older category caused fatal crashes while intoxicated behind the wheel in 1995.
Sources
Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics--1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1997.
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