Petitioner
Frederick E. Adams
Respondent
Robert Williams
Petitioner's Claim
That a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by reaching in toa car window and removing a gun from the waistband of a driver when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Donald A. Browne
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Edward F. Hennessey III
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 June 1972
Decision
As long as an officer is permitted to make a forcible traffic stop to investigate evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the officer from conducting a limited search for weapons so that he may safely pursuehis investigation when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect isarmed and dangerous.
Significance
The Court's decision gave officers significantly increased powers in pursuinginvestigations and frisking suspects for weapons. It extended the circumstances in which police officers may stop and frisk a person for weapons. More importantly, the Court's decision was the first step in a series of cases expanding the situations in which a police officer may conduct a search of a person without first obtaining a search warrant.
In the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may "stop and frisk" a person whom the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe is carrying a weapon. This reasonable suspicion standard is aless rigorous standard than the "probable cause" requirement ordinarily required to support a search under the Fourth Amendment. In Adams, the Court considered the scope of its holding in Terry.
Early in the morning, while patrolling a high crime area in Bridgeport, Connecticut, police officer John Connolly was approached by an informant he knew and was told that Williams, who was sitting in a parked car nearby, was carrying narcotics. The informant also told officer Connolly that Williams had a gun tucked into his waistband. Connolly approached the car, knocked on the window, and asked Williams to open the car door. When Williams rolled down the window, the officer reached in and removed the gun from Williams' waistband, which was exactly where the informant had indicated. Based on his seizure of the handgun, the officer arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a pistol.As part of the arrest, Williams' car was also searched, and the police discovered heroin and additional weapons.
Williams was tried and convicted of charges of possessing both a handgun andnarcotics in the state court, and his convictions were affirmed by the stateappellate courts. Williams then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Habeascorpus, a Latin phrase meaning literally "you have the body," is a procedure in which a state prisoner asks a federal court to order his release froma state prison because his imprisonment in some way violates the U.S. Constitution. Williams claimed that the officer's reaching into his car and grabbinghis gun was unreasonable, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, he argued, the subsequent search of his vehicle which was based on the officer finding the gun was also illegal, and the evidence seized in the search shouldhave been suppressed. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The state then sought to appeal the case to the Supreme Court by petitioner for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted.
Protective Searches for Weapons Are Permissible
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that the police officer's search of Williams was a reasonable protective search under its decision in Terry v. Ohio. As the Court explained, Terryheld that a police officer may stop a person to investigate if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is committing a crime. The Fourth Amendment, which protects people against unreasonable searches andseizures, generally requires that a police officer have probable cause to believe that a search will recover evidence of a crime or contraband. However, in Terry the Court reasoned that a police officer should be able to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect he has stopped to investigate.Thus, the officer is permitted to conduct a limited search of the suspect forweapons if he has a reasonable suspicion (which is less than probable cause)to believe that the suspect is armed.
Applying the Terry rule to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Williams was armedand dangerous, and thus he was justified in reaching into the car to seize the gun. The Court reasoned that the tip by the informant that Williams was carrying a gun in his waistband, the fact that Williams was suspected of carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon, and the fact that Williams was sitting alone in a parked car in the early morning in a high crime area all gave the officer "ample reason to fear for his safety." Further, this reasonable fear was increased when Williams failed to comply with the officer's request to getout of his car, but rather rolled down the window. Thus, the Court concluded:"Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to a spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude it was reasonable."
Having found the limited search for the weapon in Williams' waistband to be reasonable, the Court concluded that he was properly arrested for unlawful possession of the weapon. At this point, the police were justified in searchingthe remainder of the vehicle, because under the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the police may search a person and his automobile incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, the Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted in Williams' trial, and that he was therefore not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts.
A Dangerous Extension of Terry
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissenting from the Court's opinion,decried the Court's extension of Terry. The dissenting justices firstthought that the informant's uncorroborated tip was insufficient to give theofficer a reasonable suspicion that Williams was in possession of a gun. Justice Marshall distinguished the search allowed in Terry because, in that case, the officer acted based on his own observations after careful scrutiny of the suspects. On the contrary, in this case, Justice Marshall argued, the officer relied only upon "unreliable, unsubstantiated, conclusory hearsayto justify an invasion of liberty."
More importantly, in Justice Marshall's view, the Court was extending Terry too far. As he reasoned, Terry struck a delicate balance betweenthe rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and the need for police officers to be safe when conducting reasonable investigations of criminal wrongdoing. In Justice Marshall's view, the Court's opinion tipped thisbalance too far in favor of police officers:
Impact
In a limited sense, the Court's decision was significant in granting police additional powers to stop and frisk suspects. More importantly, however, the Adams decision was the first step in a series of decisions in which theCourt has continued to expand the situations in which police officers may conduct searches without first obtaining a search warrant. In the years since the Adams decision, the Court has extended Terry to allow policeto stop a person based only on reasonable suspicion in order to fingerprintthe person, to determine whether that person is wanted for another crime, orto detain the person for a reasonable time while further investigation is conducted. Thus, Adams signaled a drastic step in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Related Cases
Frederick E. Adams
Respondent
Robert Williams
Petitioner's Claim
That a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by reaching in toa car window and removing a gun from the waistband of a driver when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Donald A. Browne
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Edward F. Hennessey III
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 June 1972
Decision
As long as an officer is permitted to make a forcible traffic stop to investigate evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the officer from conducting a limited search for weapons so that he may safely pursuehis investigation when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect isarmed and dangerous.
Significance
The Court's decision gave officers significantly increased powers in pursuinginvestigations and frisking suspects for weapons. It extended the circumstances in which police officers may stop and frisk a person for weapons. More importantly, the Court's decision was the first step in a series of cases expanding the situations in which a police officer may conduct a search of a person without first obtaining a search warrant.
In the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may "stop and frisk" a person whom the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe is carrying a weapon. This reasonable suspicion standard is aless rigorous standard than the "probable cause" requirement ordinarily required to support a search under the Fourth Amendment. In Adams, the Court considered the scope of its holding in Terry.
Early in the morning, while patrolling a high crime area in Bridgeport, Connecticut, police officer John Connolly was approached by an informant he knew and was told that Williams, who was sitting in a parked car nearby, was carrying narcotics. The informant also told officer Connolly that Williams had a gun tucked into his waistband. Connolly approached the car, knocked on the window, and asked Williams to open the car door. When Williams rolled down the window, the officer reached in and removed the gun from Williams' waistband, which was exactly where the informant had indicated. Based on his seizure of the handgun, the officer arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a pistol.As part of the arrest, Williams' car was also searched, and the police discovered heroin and additional weapons.
Williams was tried and convicted of charges of possessing both a handgun andnarcotics in the state court, and his convictions were affirmed by the stateappellate courts. Williams then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Habeascorpus, a Latin phrase meaning literally "you have the body," is a procedure in which a state prisoner asks a federal court to order his release froma state prison because his imprisonment in some way violates the U.S. Constitution. Williams claimed that the officer's reaching into his car and grabbinghis gun was unreasonable, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, he argued, the subsequent search of his vehicle which was based on the officer finding the gun was also illegal, and the evidence seized in the search shouldhave been suppressed. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The state then sought to appeal the case to the Supreme Court by petitioner for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted.
Protective Searches for Weapons Are Permissible
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that the police officer's search of Williams was a reasonable protective search under its decision in Terry v. Ohio. As the Court explained, Terryheld that a police officer may stop a person to investigate if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is committing a crime. The Fourth Amendment, which protects people against unreasonable searches andseizures, generally requires that a police officer have probable cause to believe that a search will recover evidence of a crime or contraband. However, in Terry the Court reasoned that a police officer should be able to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect he has stopped to investigate.Thus, the officer is permitted to conduct a limited search of the suspect forweapons if he has a reasonable suspicion (which is less than probable cause)to believe that the suspect is armed.
Applying the Terry rule to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Williams was armedand dangerous, and thus he was justified in reaching into the car to seize the gun. The Court reasoned that the tip by the informant that Williams was carrying a gun in his waistband, the fact that Williams was suspected of carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon, and the fact that Williams was sitting alone in a parked car in the early morning in a high crime area all gave the officer "ample reason to fear for his safety." Further, this reasonable fear was increased when Williams failed to comply with the officer's request to getout of his car, but rather rolled down the window. Thus, the Court concluded:"Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to a spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude it was reasonable."
Having found the limited search for the weapon in Williams' waistband to be reasonable, the Court concluded that he was properly arrested for unlawful possession of the weapon. At this point, the police were justified in searchingthe remainder of the vehicle, because under the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the police may search a person and his automobile incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, the Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted in Williams' trial, and that he was therefore not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts.
A Dangerous Extension of Terry
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissenting from the Court's opinion,decried the Court's extension of Terry. The dissenting justices firstthought that the informant's uncorroborated tip was insufficient to give theofficer a reasonable suspicion that Williams was in possession of a gun. Justice Marshall distinguished the search allowed in Terry because, in that case, the officer acted based on his own observations after careful scrutiny of the suspects. On the contrary, in this case, Justice Marshall argued, the officer relied only upon "unreliable, unsubstantiated, conclusory hearsayto justify an invasion of liberty."
More importantly, in Justice Marshall's view, the Court was extending Terry too far. As he reasoned, Terry struck a delicate balance betweenthe rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and the need for police officers to be safe when conducting reasonable investigations of criminal wrongdoing. In Justice Marshall's view, the Court's opinion tipped thisbalance too far in favor of police officers:
As a result of today's decision, the balance struck in Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the government. And the Fourth Amendment, which was included in the Bill of Rights to prevent the kind of arbitrary and oppressive police action involved herein, is dealt a serious blow. Today's decision invokes the specterof a society in which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim of police officers who have only the slightest suspicion of improper conduct.
Impact
In a limited sense, the Court's decision was significant in granting police additional powers to stop and frisk suspects. More importantly, however, the Adams decision was the first step in a series of decisions in which theCourt has continued to expand the situations in which police officers may conduct searches without first obtaining a search warrant. In the years since the Adams decision, the Court has extended Terry to allow policeto stop a person based only on reasonable suspicion in order to fingerprintthe person, to determine whether that person is wanted for another crime, orto detain the person for a reasonable time while further investigation is conducted. Thus, Adams signaled a drastic step in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Related Cases
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
- Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
Further Readings
- Dressler, Joshua. Understanding Criminal Procedure. New York:Matthew Bender & Co., 1991.
- LaFave, Wayne R. Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 3rd ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1996.
- Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking. Stop and Frisk.Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University College of Law, 1974.
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