Petitioner
Ted Chimel
Respondent
State of California
Petitioner's Claim
That the warrantless search of Chimel's entire house, incident to arrest, wasnot justifiable under the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Keith C. Monroe
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Ronald M. George
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, John MarshallHarlan II, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, Byron R. White (Abe Fortas retired)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 June 1969
Decision
Reversed the lower courts' rulings and held that searches incident to arrestare limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect in orderto prevent the grabbing of a weapon or the destruction of evidence.
Significance
For sixty years the Supreme Court struggled with the issue of how extensive awarrantless search conducted at the time of an arrest could be. The rulingsover the years ranged from a search only of the arrestee to a search of the suspect and the entire premises. The Chimel ruling settled the controversy over what could be searched without a search warrant, pursuant to an arrest. The "Chimel rule" limited such a search to the suspect and the area within his reach. This limit allowed the officers to guard against a suspect grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence, but continued to protect the suspect's right to privacy. The decision also served to prevent the police from rummaging through an entire house without a search warrant, during the course of an arrest.
On 13 September 1965 three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Chimel with a warrant for his arrest, based on information that he had been involved in the robbery of a coin shop. Chimel's wife let the officers in to wait for her husband to return home from work. When Chimel arrived home, one officer gave him the arrest warrant and asked for permission tolook around. Although Chimel objected to the search, the officers stated that "on the basis of the lawful arrest," they would search the house, even though they had no search warrant. Chimel's wife objected to the search, but accompanied the officers as they searched the three-bedroom home, including the attic, garage, and workshop. In the master bedroom and sewing room, the officers told Mrs. Chimel to open drawers and move things so they could look for items from the coin shop. After the search, the officers seized numerous items,including coins, medals, and tokens.
At Chimel's state trial, the items found in the search were used as evidenceagainst him. Chimel objected to this on the grounds that the items were seized unconstitutionally and thus should be excluded. His plea was rejected, andhe was convicted. The California Court of Appeals and the California SupremeCourt affirmed the conviction. Both courts held that although the arrest warrant was invalid, the arrest was lawful because the officers had obtained thewarrant in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest. The courts agreed that the search of Chimel's house was justified because it was incident toa valid arrest, even though the officers did not have a search warrant.
The California courts relied on the case United States v. Rabinowitz for their decision. In this case, a one-room business office was searched at the time of the occupant's arrest, although the officers had only an arrest warrant, but not a search warrant. The Court held that a warrantless search "incident to a lawful arrest" may be made of the area that is in the possessionor under the control of the arrested person. Because of United States v. Rabinowitz (1950), the California courts upheld the search of Chimel's entire house.
Before the Chimel decision, courts relied on the Harris-Rabinowitz rule for their decisions regarding searches incident to arrest. In Harris v.United States (1947), officers arrested Harris with an arrest warrant and then searched his entire four-room apartment, without a search warrant. This search was considered acceptable by the Supreme Court as being "incident toarrest."
Setting the Standard
Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the majority in Chimel v. California. He stated that the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz "at least in the broad sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this case, can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis." Stewart explained that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the officer to search the person to remove weapons that might be used to resist arrest or to make an escape. If the officer did not search the person, the officer might be in danger. It is also reasonable for the officer to search for and seize evidence on the arrestee to prevent its concealment or destruction. The area in reach of the arrestee--within his immediate control--may also be searched to prevent the person from grabbing a weapon or evidence.
No justification exists for routinely searching any room, except for the onewhere the arrest occurs. Even there, no reason exists to search desk drawersor other closed or concealed places in the room. Such searches require a search warrant. That principle was used to decide Preston v. United States. In that case, a car towed after arrest was searched without a warrant. TheCourt held the search to be unlawful under the Fourth Amendment although it was contended that the search was incidental to a valid arrest. Because the search was remote in time and place from the arrest, it was not valid.
The defense contended that the search of Chimel's house was reasonable because he had been arrested in the house. Stewart felt that that "argument is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach the evaporation point." Stewart pointed out that it would be hard to explain why it is less reasonable to search a person'shouse when he is arrested on the front lawn or just down the street. The necessary distinction must be made between a search of the arrestee and the areain his reach versus more extensive searches.
Stewart summed up his opinion by noting that the search of Chimel's house went far beyond a search of the arrestee and the area from which he could have gotten a weapon or evidence. "There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. Thescope of the search was, therefore, `unreasonable' under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand."
Warrantless Emergency Search
Justice White wrote the dissent, in which Black joined. The dissenters felt that the Harris-Rabinowitz rule should remain in place. White felt that when the circumstances are urgent and probable cause exists, an emergency search may be a reasonable one. "It seems to me unreasonable to require the police toleave the scene in order to obtain a search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest." If the police did leave the scene to geta search warrant, the accomplices of the arrestee could remove evidence. Theprotection of privacy must be weighed against the risk of destruction of evidence.
Impact
Chimel v. California was the Court's most important decision regardingwarrantless searches conducted while making a valid arrest. Prior to the Chimel decision, the Harris-Rabinowitz rule, permitting searches of a premises incident to arrest, gave police a broad opportunity for abuse. The police made warrantless searches while arresting a suspect on the grounds that they did not have time to get a search warrant. But in the case of Chimel, the crime was committed a month before the arrest. After the police obtained the arrest warrant, they waited several days before serving the warrant. The police never explained why they could not get a search warrant.
The Chimel decision was important because it said that evidence seizedduring unlawful searches may not be used in court, a concept known as the exclusionary rule. Since Chimel limited the area of warrantless searches, it opened up the possibility that evidence seized outside of the immediatearea of the suspect would be excluded and inadmissible in court, thus aidingthe defendant. When Chief Justice Warren extended the use of the exclusionaryrule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Warren Court was accused of coddling criminals. Warren resigned from the Court on 23 June 1969, thesame day the Chimel case was decided. President Richard Nixon chose as his replacement a strong critic of the exclusionary rule, Warren E. Burger.
In 1971, in Williams v. United States, the Court decided that the "Chimel rule," limiting a search area to within a person's immediate control incidental to an arrest, could not be applied retroactively and should not affectsearches conducted prior to the date of the Chimel decision.
Through the 1980s, the Supreme Court permitted law enforcement officers to search anything in the suspect's immediate control, meaning anywhere from whichthe arrestee might obtain a weapon. This included his person, the room in which he was located, and drawers. In 1990, the Court ruled that officers may make a "protective sweep" of the premises where the arrest took place. But they may only do this if they have a "reasonable belief" that a dangerous personmight be there. The police may also inventory a suspect's effects without asearch warrant, including a shoulder bag. Any evidence found in this manner may be used in a criminal trial.
Related Cases
Ted Chimel
Respondent
State of California
Petitioner's Claim
That the warrantless search of Chimel's entire house, incident to arrest, wasnot justifiable under the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Keith C. Monroe
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Ronald M. George
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, John MarshallHarlan II, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, Byron R. White (Abe Fortas retired)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 June 1969
Decision
Reversed the lower courts' rulings and held that searches incident to arrestare limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect in orderto prevent the grabbing of a weapon or the destruction of evidence.
Significance
For sixty years the Supreme Court struggled with the issue of how extensive awarrantless search conducted at the time of an arrest could be. The rulingsover the years ranged from a search only of the arrestee to a search of the suspect and the entire premises. The Chimel ruling settled the controversy over what could be searched without a search warrant, pursuant to an arrest. The "Chimel rule" limited such a search to the suspect and the area within his reach. This limit allowed the officers to guard against a suspect grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence, but continued to protect the suspect's right to privacy. The decision also served to prevent the police from rummaging through an entire house without a search warrant, during the course of an arrest.
On 13 September 1965 three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Chimel with a warrant for his arrest, based on information that he had been involved in the robbery of a coin shop. Chimel's wife let the officers in to wait for her husband to return home from work. When Chimel arrived home, one officer gave him the arrest warrant and asked for permission tolook around. Although Chimel objected to the search, the officers stated that "on the basis of the lawful arrest," they would search the house, even though they had no search warrant. Chimel's wife objected to the search, but accompanied the officers as they searched the three-bedroom home, including the attic, garage, and workshop. In the master bedroom and sewing room, the officers told Mrs. Chimel to open drawers and move things so they could look for items from the coin shop. After the search, the officers seized numerous items,including coins, medals, and tokens.
At Chimel's state trial, the items found in the search were used as evidenceagainst him. Chimel objected to this on the grounds that the items were seized unconstitutionally and thus should be excluded. His plea was rejected, andhe was convicted. The California Court of Appeals and the California SupremeCourt affirmed the conviction. Both courts held that although the arrest warrant was invalid, the arrest was lawful because the officers had obtained thewarrant in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest. The courts agreed that the search of Chimel's house was justified because it was incident toa valid arrest, even though the officers did not have a search warrant.
The California courts relied on the case United States v. Rabinowitz for their decision. In this case, a one-room business office was searched at the time of the occupant's arrest, although the officers had only an arrest warrant, but not a search warrant. The Court held that a warrantless search "incident to a lawful arrest" may be made of the area that is in the possessionor under the control of the arrested person. Because of United States v. Rabinowitz (1950), the California courts upheld the search of Chimel's entire house.
Before the Chimel decision, courts relied on the Harris-Rabinowitz rule for their decisions regarding searches incident to arrest. In Harris v.United States (1947), officers arrested Harris with an arrest warrant and then searched his entire four-room apartment, without a search warrant. This search was considered acceptable by the Supreme Court as being "incident toarrest."
Setting the Standard
Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the majority in Chimel v. California. He stated that the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz "at least in the broad sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this case, can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis." Stewart explained that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the officer to search the person to remove weapons that might be used to resist arrest or to make an escape. If the officer did not search the person, the officer might be in danger. It is also reasonable for the officer to search for and seize evidence on the arrestee to prevent its concealment or destruction. The area in reach of the arrestee--within his immediate control--may also be searched to prevent the person from grabbing a weapon or evidence.
No justification exists for routinely searching any room, except for the onewhere the arrest occurs. Even there, no reason exists to search desk drawersor other closed or concealed places in the room. Such searches require a search warrant. That principle was used to decide Preston v. United States. In that case, a car towed after arrest was searched without a warrant. TheCourt held the search to be unlawful under the Fourth Amendment although it was contended that the search was incidental to a valid arrest. Because the search was remote in time and place from the arrest, it was not valid.
The defense contended that the search of Chimel's house was reasonable because he had been arrested in the house. Stewart felt that that "argument is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach the evaporation point." Stewart pointed out that it would be hard to explain why it is less reasonable to search a person'shouse when he is arrested on the front lawn or just down the street. The necessary distinction must be made between a search of the arrestee and the areain his reach versus more extensive searches.
Stewart summed up his opinion by noting that the search of Chimel's house went far beyond a search of the arrestee and the area from which he could have gotten a weapon or evidence. "There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. Thescope of the search was, therefore, `unreasonable' under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand."
Warrantless Emergency Search
Justice White wrote the dissent, in which Black joined. The dissenters felt that the Harris-Rabinowitz rule should remain in place. White felt that when the circumstances are urgent and probable cause exists, an emergency search may be a reasonable one. "It seems to me unreasonable to require the police toleave the scene in order to obtain a search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest." If the police did leave the scene to geta search warrant, the accomplices of the arrestee could remove evidence. Theprotection of privacy must be weighed against the risk of destruction of evidence.
Impact
Chimel v. California was the Court's most important decision regardingwarrantless searches conducted while making a valid arrest. Prior to the Chimel decision, the Harris-Rabinowitz rule, permitting searches of a premises incident to arrest, gave police a broad opportunity for abuse. The police made warrantless searches while arresting a suspect on the grounds that they did not have time to get a search warrant. But in the case of Chimel, the crime was committed a month before the arrest. After the police obtained the arrest warrant, they waited several days before serving the warrant. The police never explained why they could not get a search warrant.
The Chimel decision was important because it said that evidence seizedduring unlawful searches may not be used in court, a concept known as the exclusionary rule. Since Chimel limited the area of warrantless searches, it opened up the possibility that evidence seized outside of the immediatearea of the suspect would be excluded and inadmissible in court, thus aidingthe defendant. When Chief Justice Warren extended the use of the exclusionaryrule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Warren Court was accused of coddling criminals. Warren resigned from the Court on 23 June 1969, thesame day the Chimel case was decided. President Richard Nixon chose as his replacement a strong critic of the exclusionary rule, Warren E. Burger.
In 1971, in Williams v. United States, the Court decided that the "Chimel rule," limiting a search area to within a person's immediate control incidental to an arrest, could not be applied retroactively and should not affectsearches conducted prior to the date of the Chimel decision.
Through the 1980s, the Supreme Court permitted law enforcement officers to search anything in the suspect's immediate control, meaning anywhere from whichthe arrestee might obtain a weapon. This included his person, the room in which he was located, and drawers. In 1990, the Court ruled that officers may make a "protective sweep" of the premises where the arrest took place. But they may only do this if they have a "reasonable belief" that a dangerous personmight be there. The police may also inventory a suspect's effects without asearch warrant, including a shoulder bag. Any evidence found in this manner may be used in a criminal trial.
Related Cases
- Weeks v. Ohio, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
- Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
- United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
- Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
- State v. Thomas, 318 N.C. 287 (1986).
User Comments Add a comment…